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PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS: THE CASE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Jeffrey Manns*
Abstract: This article shows how the enlistment of private monitors can overcome the
limits of public enforcers in overseeing gatekeeper compliance with liability-induced duties.
Gatekeepers are private actors who possess skills or advantages that allow them to detect and
prevent wrongdoing in a more cost-effective way than the state. The problem enforcers face is
that the same skills or advantages that equip gatekeepers with the ability to identify wrongdoing
often provide them with the means and incentives to subvert their duties and to evade public
oversight. Policymakers have largely attempted to remedy this challenge by increasing sanctions
against gatekeepers and have ignored the potential for heightened monitoring of compliance.
This article shows how governments may overcome their inability to oversee gatekeepers by
providing private actors, such as victims, qui tam litigants, informants, or even the targeted
wrongdoers, with incentives to monitor gatekeeper compliance.
This article puts this private monitoring approach to the test by showing how private
monitoring of gatekeepers can redress the chronic failure of efforts to enlist employers as
verifiers of employees’ immigration status. It suggests that the most effective way to induce
employer compliance is to divide the interests of undocumented aliens from employers by
offering undocumented aliens immunity and temporary worker status in exchange for reporting
their illegal employment. This decentralized, de facto sting operation would make large-scale
amnesty serve a productive enforcement purpose. The article also suggests how competitors
may serve a similar function as in anti-trust law by serving as qui tam litigants who are
empowered to prosecute wayward competitors.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals and failures in other areas such as immigration and drug
enforcement have highlighted the limitations of public oversight and the critical role private
gatekeepers may play in filling gaps in public enforcement. 1

The desirability of private

gatekeepers turns on the fact that the goods or services they supply or demand provide them with
cost-effective opportunities to detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing by customers or
suppliers. For example, lawyers and accountants may be well-positioned to detect fraud by their
clients, employers can confirm the immigration status of job applicants, and internet service
providers and search engines can identify and block access to illegal gambling or child
pornography web-sites at significantly lower economic and social costs than public enforcers.
Enlisting these types of private actors as public monitors of narrowly defined areas of
wrongdoing may provide governments with cost-effective ways to outsource enforcement
functions that may otherwise be beyond their ability to perform. 2

1

See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408–09 (2002) (arguing that “the true denominator in the Enron debacle” was “the
collective failure of the gatekeepers”); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403–07 (2003) (arguing that gatekeepers, such as accountants, lawyers, and
investment bankers, failed the public by not adequately screening for corporate wrongdoing).
2
A broad literature has explored the issue of enlisting private gatekeepers to perform public
enforcement functions, but there is no clear consensus as to what unique features define gatekeepers. See,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2004) (describing a gatekeeper as a “reputational intermediary”
who “receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in misconduct” compared to the primary
wrongdoer); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2003) (defining
gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell a product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a
particular market or engage in certain activities”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer:
Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1050–54
(1993) (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at least extremely useful, services
to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities, and who cannot easily be replaced by
wrongdoers); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). This article understands gatekeepers as private actors
whose role as suppliers or consumers of goods or services provides them with the cost-effective ability to
detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing.
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This article considers how to overcome the “monitoring paradox” that public enforcers may
face in attempting to monitor gatekeeper compliance.3 In many contexts the very skills or
advantages that equip gatekeepers with a greater ability to detect potential wrongdoing than
public enforcers may also provide gatekeepers with the means and incentives to subvert their
duties and to evade public oversight. The same types of shortcomings that limit the ability of
public enforcers to police certain categories of wrongdoing on their own may compromise their
ability to oversee gatekeepers. 4 For example, both policymakers and academics frequently rely
on mandatory disclosures to monitor gatekeeper compliance, but in many cases public enforcers
may face great difficulties verifying compliance due to the complicated nature of the disclosures
or the sheer number of disclosing parties. 5 Similarly, public enforcers may face both practical

3

The question of how to monitor gatekeeper compliance is a significant yet underscrutinized
problem confronting gatekeeper regimes. Much of the literature on gatekeeper compliance has focused
on determining the optimal duty standards to provide gatekeepers with adequate incentives to carry out
their enforcement duties. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
916, 934–49 (1998) (advocating that regulators allow reputational intermediaries to design and be bound
to a set of self-tailored due diligence procedures and potential sanctions to allow market-based incentives
to shape liability, rather than to rely on government-imposed gatekeeper liability); Coffee, supra note 2, at
350–63 (advocating that auditors face modified strict liability for corporate disclosures with a cap on
liability based on a multiple of their expected revenue streams from a given client and arguing that
attorneys should face suspension or disbarment if they fail to monitor adequately corporate nonfinancial
disclosures); Hamdani, supra note 2, at 102–06 (discussing how cost concerns should shape the choice
between imposing strict liability, negligence, or knowledge standards on gatekeepers in any given case);
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1044–46 (1994)
(advocating the imposition of strict liability on internet system administrators to enlist them as
gatekeepers against wrongdoing); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540–46 (2001) (advocating the imposition of
strict liability on all gatekeepers, including investment banks, accountants, and lawyers, for material
misstatements and omissions in offering documents). While these questions are important for designing
any gatekeeper regime, the absence of effective oversight of gatekeepers may condemn even the bestdesigned gatekeeper regimes to failure. If the probability of oversight is low or nonexistent, then
gatekeepers may not have incentives to invest sufficiently in screening for prospective wrongdoers, may
turn a blind eye to detected wrongdoers, or may even collude with wrongdoers for mutual profit.
4
Public enforcers may be better equipped to oversee private gatekeepers than the primary
wrongdoers, but in many cases both tasks may be well beyond the theoretical and practical ability of
public enforcers. See infra Part I.A–B.
5
Academics and policymakers often place great and potentially unfounded faith in the ability of
public enforcers to compel and process disclosures in order to recognize gatekeeper noncompliance. See,
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and political limits on the potential sanctions that they can impose on wayward gatekeepers. 6
This article will argue that these shortcomings may make designing innovative ways to sustain
the monitoring of gatekeeper compliance crucial for providing gatekeepers with incentives to
comply with their duties.
This article will show how private enforcers may serve as effective monitors of gatekeeper
compliance and complement or substitute for public oversight of gatekeepers. Enlisting private
monitors is appealing because they may have cost-effective access to insider information about
gatekeeper compliance, which public enforcers may not be able to acquire or may only acquire at
prohibitive economic or social costs. 7 This article will address four complementary ways in

e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2002)) (imposing governance structures and disclosure
requirements on auditors and mandating that the Securities and Exchange Commission create “minimum
standards of professional conduct” for lawyers); 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003) (requiring lawyers to
disclose to a corporation’s chief legal officer or chief executive officer any “credible evidence” of a
material violation, by the corporation, of U.S. federal or state securities law or other laws or fiduciary
duties); Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 789–98 (2004) (discussing the validity of the SEC’s
disclosure rules for lawyers); Sung Hui Kim, Ethics in Corporate Representation: The Banality of Fraud:
Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1052–54 (2005) (criticizing
the disclosure rules for lawyers as not going far enough and proposing ways to make disclosures more
effective by enhancing the independence of corporate counsel).
6
The law and economics literature frequently posits that sanctions levels are one of many variables
that can be heightened to severe levels to secure enforcement outcomes. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172 (1968); Eric A. Posner, Controlling
Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137,
1177 (2001). As a matter of political practice, the range of sanctions that may be used in any given
context may be far more limited than economic theory would suggest.
7
Other works have explored the benefits and shortcomings of using private enforcement to fill gaps
in public enforcement. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54–68 (2002)
(assessing the potential of a broad range of private enforcement tools); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA.
L. REV. 93, 121–44 (2005) (arguing that administrative agencies should play a greater role in determining
the existence and scope of private enforcement actions); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 186–88 (discussing how environmental
nonprofit organizations and individual citizens may play important roles in uncovering information about
and prosecuting environmental law violations). This article’s original contribution is showing how the
enlistment of private monitors may overcome the shortcomings of public oversight of gatekeepers and
provide gatekeepers with greater incentives to comply with their duties. This article will show how the

6
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which private monitors may fill public enforcement roles. First, victims may have the incentives
and the means to pursue enforcement actions against gatekeepers, especially in cases where the
primary factor limiting public enforcement is resource constraints. 8 Second, a qui tam approach
may empower private litigants to police and initiate actions against gatekeepers in exchange for a
percentage of the sanctions.9 Third, a broad private informant approach could enlist competitors,
employees, and other members of the community to oversee gatekeeper compliance. Lastly,
enforcers may paradoxically enlist as monitors the very wrongdoers that gatekeepers are
supposed to oversee by offering them immunity and additional incentives to report gatekeeper
violations, because they may be best placed to know and establish the nature and scope of
gatekeeper noncompliance. This article will show how enlisting private enforcers to oversee
private gatekeepers entails significant costs, uncertainties, and tradeoffs that must be balanced
against enforcement gains. However, it will suggest that in narrowly defined contexts, each of
these private enforcement tools may offer politically plausible and economically feasible ways to
enhance gatekeeper compliance.
use of private monitors can dramatically enhance access to insider information on gatekeeper compliance
and provide a cost-effective way to sustain oversight of gatekeepers. This article will also highlight the
range of costs, risks, and uncertainties public enforcers face in relying on both gatekeepers and private
monitors of gatekeepers, which makes this approach one with tremendous possibility, but also with
significant tradeoffs that must be taken into account in designing gatekeeper regimes.
8
See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 7, at 13–31 (discussing a range of victim suits that are designed to
compensate victims and deter wrongdoers); Stephenson, supra note 7, at 108 (discussing how victim suits
may fill public enforcement roles). The more remote the connection between the gatekeepers and the
potential victims, the less plausible it may be to enlist victims as monitors of gatekeeper compliance
because of challenges in gaining insider access to information on compliance. Alternatively, the “crime”
may be victimless or impose widely diffuse costs on society that make it difficult to identify particular
victims.
9
Citizen suits are a close cousin of qui tam suits that are used extensively in environmental
enforcement. As the discussion in part II will emphasize, citizen suits do differ from qui tam suits in
significant ways, as qui tam litigants may receive a percentage of sanctions and face no standing barriers
while citizen suit litigants must establish injury-in-fact and the proceeds from citizen suits go to the
federal government. See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 99 & n.18; Thompson, supra note 7, at 192–94.
But because many of the other substantive features of citizen suits overlap with qui tam suits, this article
will focus on the potential of enlisting qui tam litigants to oversee gatekeeper compliance. See infra Part
II.B.
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This article will argue that the use of private monitors may add the most enforcement value
in cases of chronic enforcement failure, where the incentives for gatekeepers and prospective
wrongdoers appear closely aligned and compliance with gatekeeping duties is difficult to
monitor.

No case better illustrates this type of gatekeeper challenge than the context of

immigration enforcement, where both a range of public enforcement efforts and an attempt to
enlist employers as gatekeepers have failed to deter rising levels of undocumented aliens.10
Employers of low-wage illegal immigrants face the threat of gatekeeper liability, yet have strong
economic incentives to subvert their duties and face a low probability that noncompliance will be
detected. 11
Therefore, this article will explore the potential for private monitoring of gatekeepers by
laying out a proposal for reforming employers’ duty to verify employees’ legal status. 12 This

10

See infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 347–48 (1994) (highlighting how the employer
verification regime has failed to reduce illegal immigration); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of
Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 688–95 (1997)
(arguing that the employer verification system has failed to deter illegal immigration); Spencer S. Hsu &
Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized, WASH. POST, June 19, 2006 (discussing how the Bush
administration “virtually abandoned employer sanctions before it began pushing to overhaul U.S.
immigration laws last year” and noting how “[t]he government’s steady retreat from workplace
enforcement in the 20 years since it became illegal to hire undocumented workers is the result of fierce
political pressure from business lobbies, immigrant rights groups, and members of Congress”).
12
See infra Part IV. Reform of employer verification duties is a timely topic as illegal immigration
has become a significant issue in the run-up to the 2006 mid-term elections. Proposals to strengthen
employer verification duties are one of many issues that Congress has considered as part of broader
immigration reform.. For example, both H.R. 4437, which passed the House in December, 2005, and
S.2611, which passed the Senate in May, 2006, would require employers to confirm the social security
numbers of job applicants against an electronic database and significantly increase sanctions for employer
noncompliance. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d),
274A(e) (2006). The House and Senate have been at loggerheads over whether immigration reform
should focus on enforcement or more comprehensively address immigration issues, such as introducing a
temporary worker program and addressing legalization of existing undocumented aliens. See Carl Hulse,
House Adds Hearings on Immigration, WASH. POST June 21, 2006. This Article has neither the space or
time to analyze the strengths and shortcomings of the House and Senate proposals. But as part IV will
discuss, integrating electronic verification into the employer verification duties is part of the solution and
would form an important tool for heightening the accuracy of the verification process and making identity
11
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approach will show how competitors, employees, other community members, and even
undocumented aliens may serve as private monitors of employer compliance and help to
overcome the information and resource gaps that cripple public oversight of employer
compliance. The contentiousness of immigration enforcement makes assessing the costs and
benefits of heightened enforcement difficult.13 Nonetheless, this article will suggest how private
monitoring of gatekeepers, coupled with other reforms to heighten the accuracy and costeffectiveness of gatekeeper compliance and to safeguard against incentives for preemptive
discrimination against legal individuals of foreign origin, may overcome the shortcomings of
public enforcement.
Part I will highlight the structural and practical limits of public enforcement that in many
contexts create the need to enlist private gatekeepers to detect and deter prospective offenders. It
will show how gatekeepers may be well positioned to fill enforcement gaps and, in some cases,
may provide the only means to uncover wrongdoing.

This part will also underscore the

challenges policymakers face in designing effective gatekeeper regimes. Part II will focus on
ways to overcome the difficulties public enforcers face in overseeing gatekeeper compliance. It

and document fraud by undocumented aliens more difficult. However, part IV will show how this
approach is an incomplete solution by itself as employers will continue to retain the ability and the
incentives to sidestep or subvert verification requirements if there is no sustained oversight of compliance
measures, such as through the enlistment of private monitors.
13
Immigration issues understandably raise political passions, as the debate on immigration reform in
2006 has underscored. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, In the Streets, Suddenly, an Immigrant Groundswell,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at A1 (discussing how hundreds of thousands of people across the country
marched to protest Congress’s consideration of immigration enforcement legislation); Nina Bernstein, On
Lucille Avenue, The Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006 (discussing “the grass-roots anger
over immigration policy that many members of Congress say they keep hearing in their districts”). This
article has neither the time nor space to do the extensive debates on immigration enforcement any justice.
This topic was chosen because of the extraordinary challenge that immigration enforcement poses to
public enforcers as this case study offers a chance to explore the potential and limits of both private
gatekeepers and private monitors. For an overview of debates on immigration reform, see GEORGE J.
BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2001); BILL ONG
HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY (2004); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998).
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will show that the structural and practical limits of public enforcement that make public
enforcers poorly positioned to detect primary wrongdoers may frequently make them almost or
equally as poor monitors of gatekeeper compliance. For this reason, this part will assess the
benefits and costs of using a range of private enforcers, such as victims, qui tam litigants, private
informants, and even the primary wrongdoers to oversee gatekeeper compliance.
Parts III and IV will apply the insights on private monitoring to the enforcement challenges
surrounding illegal immigration. 14 For over twenty years, public enforcers have enlisted private
employers as gatekeepers to confirm immigration status, but failed to create adequate incentives
for employer compliance.

These two parts will suggest how enlisting private monitors to

oversee employer gatekeepers could lead to dramatic enforcement enhancements at palatable
political and economic costs. 15

Although these enforcement gains entail social costs and

tradeoffs that society may not wish to accept, this proposal will suggest that the failure of the
employer verification system is a product of a lack of vision, rather than a matter of inevitability.
I. THE POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF ENLISTING GATEKEEPERS
A. The Case for Gatekeeper Liability
1. The Limits of Public Enforcement
The rationale for enlisting private gatekeepers turns on the limits of public enforcers and the
comparative advantages gatekeepers may enjoy in overseeing the primary wrongdoers. 16 For

14

See, e.g., Espenoza, supra note 11, at 347–48 (documenting the failure of the employer verification
regime to reduce the employment of undocumented aliens); Andrew Parker, Collecting What America
Owes, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at 12 (quoting Mark Everson, head of the Internal Revenue Service, as
saying, “What we cannot afford is to let our tax laws be viewed in the same way as our immigration or
drug laws are, where too large a segment of the population says: ‘Those laws are not what we respect.’”).
15
See infra Part III.C.
16
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 61–66 (discussing how private actors may offer advantages over
public enforcers as “bouncers” or “chaperones” in screening prospective wrongdoers in one-off contexts
or repeat player interaction respectively).
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example, in a world without resource constraints, the Securities and Exchange Commission
might be able to confirm the accuracy of every corporate disclosure and transaction, but in the
real world of scarcity, lawyers and accountants are likely far better positioned to detect signs of
wrongdoing by their clients.

The challenge for public enforcers is that regardless of the

theoretical scope of legal obligations and the level of sanctions facing wrongdoers, the ability to
deter wrongdoing will prove only as effective as the reach (or rather wrongdoers’ perceptions of
the reach) of public enforcers extends. In spite of how sweeping public enforcement powers may
be in theory, in practice, the efficacy of public enforcement is often compromised by limits in
public enforcers’ ability to monitor private actors, scarce resources to fulfill competing
enforcement mandates, and the low responsiveness or nonresponsiveness of the primary
wrongdoers to the threat of sanctions. 17
In many contexts public enforcers may be unable to gain access to information about
wrongdoing on their own or to process the available information effectively. The more complex
the activity or the offense, the more prospective offenders may enjoy an advantage over
enforcers in concealing their wrongdoing. 18

Public enforcers may be skilled in gathering

information on and apprehending those who literally rob banks. 19 In contrast, public enforcers
often may lack the skills and access to information to oversee more complex types of
wrongdoing, such as the accounting frauds perpetrated by executives at Enron, WorldCom, and

17

See id. at 56–57.
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate
Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3–16 (2004) (arguing how changes in financial
markets, changes in business-to-business relationships, and the growth of new financial products have
made fraud far easier and more likely to occur).
19
When insiders are the people robbing the banks, public enforcers may be slow both to detect the
wrongdoing and to intervene to stop the harm. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1162 & n.74 (1993) (noting the shortcomings of
public regulators in overseeing the infamous Lincoln Savings & Loan).
18
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Sunbeam. Few public enforcers may be experts in arcane accounting rules, 20 and even those
who are may be less capable of detecting fraud than their private sector counterparts working for
corporations, law firms, and accounting firms are in concealing their tracks.21 For example,
although heightened disclosure requirements may make it easier for public enforcers to oversee
corporations, 22 informed insiders, such as a corporation’s accountants and lawyers, may still be
the only actors who are in a position to detect fraud. 23
A related problem is that private networks may be so dense that they are difficult for public
enforcers to penetrate and effectively oversee. The ethnic-based networks that facilitate most

20

For example, in 2001 the Securities & Exchange Commission had approximately 600 accountants
or financial analysts and 200 investigators or examiners who were supposed to oversee approximately
14,000 public companies, 8000 registered broker-dealers employing 700,000 registered representatives,
8000 transfer agents, 5000 investment companies, 7400 registered investment advisers, as well as the
stock exchanges. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS:
INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 3 (2002). While the SEC’s funding and staffing has
increased in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the number of accountants and investigators is still
dwarfed by the enormity of their oversight tasks.
21
For example, Steven Schwarcz argues that “the Enron debacle highlights the increasingly
widespread problem of complexity” that makes it difficult to regulate and oversee “virtually all
securitization and derivatives deals and other forms of structured-financing transactions.” He asserts that
these transactions may be so complicated that even sophisticated private investors may have difficulty in
understanding detailed disclosures in a reasonable time period. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 18–20.
22
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2002)); see also David S. Ruder et al., The Securities and
Exchange Commission’s Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and
Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103, 1112–13 (2005) (describing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
expansion of disclosure requirements as the “most far-reaching reforms in the securities laws regulating
corporations since the enactments of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934”).
23
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 336–37 (arguing that the Sarbanes Oxley Act does not
adequately address the incentives that corporate directors and officers have to “cook the books” and that
accounting gatekeepers have to acquiesce to irregularities); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SarbanesOxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918–20
(2003) (describing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as sweeping in scope concerning what it claims to address, but
limited in its direct efforts and ability to enhance accounting compliance or corporate governance).

12
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illegal immigration exemplify this type of challenge.24 A web of family, regional, and ethnic ties
inform prospective immigrants about opportunities in the United States, facilitate illegal entry
into the United States and relocation into ethnic communities, and often match immigrants with
employers. 25 Linguistic and cultural barriers, as well as economic interests and threats of
violence from human smuggling and trafficking networks, may create a wall of silence in ethnic
communities. 26 Even linguistically capable and culturally sensitive public enforcers may be
unable to overcome these obstacles on their own to police illegal immigration, or they may be
capable of doing so only at prohibitive economic and social costs.
Another challenge public enforcers face is how to target wrongdoers when they have a low
level of responsiveness to enforcement actions or are judgment-proof. 27 Typically, it appears
both just and economically efficient for the primary wrongdoers to face direct sanctions to force
them to internalize much of the costs of their actions. However, public enforcers are placed in a
quandary when sanctions, such as the revocation of licenses, monetary sanctions, or
imprisonment are hollow threats that the government either cannot carry out for political or

24

See, e.g., RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM 188–190
(2003) (discussing how ethnic social networks form a channel for disseminating information on economic
opportunities and facilitating illegal entry and settlement in the United States).
25
See, e.g., ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 230–
34 (1996) (discussing how family, community, and ethnic networks facilitate illegal immigration flows
and help to match undocumented aliens with employers); Douglas S. Massey, The Social and Economic
Origins of Immigration, 510 ANNALS 60, 68–70 (1990) (discussing the role that social and familial
networks play in facilitating legal and illegal immigration).
26
Ethnic-based criminal networks often facilitate human trafficking and smuggling, and they may
easily threaten violence against members of their ethnic communities or their relatives in their home
countries to deter any cooperation with authorities. See Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter & Jose
Hidalgo, Human Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim Protection Beyond Prosecution
Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 382–84 (2005).
27
The low level of responsiveness may be due to the inability of enforcers to impose sanctions or to
the sheer obliviousness of the targets. For example, homeowners and small business owners may have
widespread ignorance about how the wide range of environmental regulations may affect them. See
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 56 & n.7.
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economic reasons or because there is nothing of worth to the wrongdoer to seize. 28
Alternatively, the problem may be practical limits on the level of sanctions, which pale in
comparison to the returns from wrongdoing. 29

For example, the chronic failure of drug

enforcement in spite of high sanctions and high expenditures on enforcement underscores the
fact that the returns from illicit activity may so substantially outweigh the expected value of
sanctions that they have little deterrence value to prospective wrongdoers. In these contexts, it
may be an exercise in futility simply to throw more resources at the problem or to tweak the
tactics of public enforcers in an effort to heighten direct enforcement against primary
wrongdoers.
Even in contexts where higher public enforcement levels could make a significant impact,
public enforcers generally face competing enforcement priorities and limited resources.30 In a
world without resource constraints, public enforcers could attempt to go through every tax return
and confirm every oxycontin prescription’s validity. But while academics may have the luxury
of assuming away the problem of scarcity, public enforcers often must make do with what
resources they have. At a time in which counter-terrorism priorities have begun to trump more
routine law enforcement activities, public enforcers have had to become even more accustomed
to trying to do more with less. 31

28

Public enforcers confront this problem when trying to enforce laws against illegal immigrants,
attempting to collect fines from bankrupts, or to punish children who have committed criminal offenses.
See id. at 57.
29
See Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 345, 345 (1992)
(discussing how marginal deterrence concerns constrain the level of sanctions which can be imposed for
any given offense because of fears that more harmful offenses may thus appear “costless” to the
offender).
30
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 181–82 (1992) (discussing how private enforcement may be vital for filling
enforcement gaps caused by limited public resources).
31
For example, the consolidation of a broad range of federal agencies into the Homeland Security
Department signifies the subordination of other federal enforcement objectives to national security
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2. The Appeal of Gatekeepers
Enlisting private gatekeepers offers public enforcers the potential to overcome these
obstacles to enforcement in cost-effective ways. 32 In many cases, gatekeepers may offer the only
alternative when public enforcers cannot otherwise identify or prosecute primary wrongdoers.
Private gatekeepers fall into two broad categories: suppliers and consumers whose lawful
activities are necessary for wrongdoers to pursue their illicit ends. 33 The distinctive features of
these demand- or supply-driven relationships with prospective wrongdoers may significantly
shape the responsiveness of gatekeepers to threats of liability.
The conventional image of gatekeepers is private actors, often professionals, who offer
lawful products or services that may be used to legitimize or substantially advance illicit ends. 34
These suppliers may literally function as “gates” inasmuch as the goods or services they supply
are essential to perform certain illicit acts or are functionally essential because of the high cost or

concerns in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO 05–06, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: DHS HAS INCORPORATED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
OBJECTIVES AND IS ADDRESSING FUTURE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 5–7 (2004) (discussing how
“immigration enforcement should be viewed as part of a comprehensive homeland security strategy” and
noting how particular objectives such as worksite enforcement are now focused almost exclusively on
advancing national security objectives); Jeffrey Manns, Comment, Reorganization as a Substitute for
Reform: The Abolition of the INS, 112 YALE L.J. 145, 151–52 (2002) (discussing how the Homeland
Security Act reorganization would lower the profile for immigration issues).
32
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 61–66 (discussing potential ways that private gatekeepers may
complement public enforcement).
33
One could add a third category and frame public regulators as gatekeepers. See Peter B. Oh,
Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 755–66 (2004). But public actors may have strikingly different
incentives and responsiveness than private actors. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 414–15 (2000). For
this reason, lumping public regulators with private gatekeepers may only muddy the waters for
considering the optimal scope of private gatekeepers’ duties and means for oversight.
34
See, e.g., Hamdani, supra note 2, at 58 (defining gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell
a product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain activities”);
Jackson, supra note 2, at 1050–54 (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at least
extremely useful, services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities, and who cannot
easily be replaced by wrongdoers).
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drawbacks of alternatives. 35 Lawyers and accountants who serve corporations, doctors who
write prescriptions for drugs, and internet service providers all fall under this category. 36 Some
of these service providers may actively collude with wrongdoers to retain or expand their
business. However, the more significant threat for policymakers is that gatekeepers will not have
the incentives to invest sufficiently in screening for prospective wrongdoers or turn a blind eye in
the absence of a credible threat of liability. 37
Other gatekeepers may create the demand that attracts prospective wrongdoers. 38 The
paradigm case for demand-driven gatekeepers is employers whose attempts to keep wage levels
as low as possible attract underage workers or undocumented aliens. 39 Another example is
American companies that outsource production facilities to firms in developing countries, which
(“unbeknownst” to the American companies) abuse human rights to cut costs or bribe officials to
help their business and indirectly aid their American clients. 40 These gatekeepers may pose the

35

See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49
MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (arguing that a defining feature of gatekeepers is that the targeted
“misconduct cannot occur without the gatekeeper’s participation”); Kraakman, supra note 2, at 54, 61–63
(arguing that “a specialized good, service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing to
succeed—is the ‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps”). While these authors emphasize how a gatekeeper’s
goods or services are necessary for the targeted wrongdoers’ illicit acts, their views overstate the
distinctiveness of the goods or services that gatekeepers supply or demand. Generally, going through a
gatekeeper offers a more cost-effective option for prospective wrongdoers who can almost always secure
or demand goods or services at greater cost through the underground economy.
36
Other examples include bar owners who have a license to serve alcohol, yet face legal liability for
serving minors or for serving drunken individuals. See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 63.
37
See id. at 61–63.
38
See id. at 53 (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). Kraakman’s definition of gatekeepers is consistent
with both a supply-side and demand-side conception of gatekeepers, although in practice, his and most
other writings on gatekeepers focus on supply-side driven gatekeepers.
39
See id. at 54.
40
American firms may outsource production in developing countries as a way of sidestepping limits
imposed by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FPCA). While corruption by agents of the U.S. firm may
still fall within the FCPA’s scope, these types of violations may be hard for public enforcers to monitor.
See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, 29–35 (1998) (laying out the scope of parent-subsidiary liability under the FCPA).
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greatest challenges for public enforcers to oversee. The economic interests of this type of
gatekeepers and their suppliers may be intimately interconnected and oriented towards explicit or
tacit subversion of the law.
The defining characteristic of both types of gatekeepers is their dual capacity: the services
they offer or demand may serve lawful ends or they may substantially assist wrongdoers in
pursuing their illegal activity. 41 Because of their commercial or professional relationships,
gatekeepers may enjoy privileged access to information about prospective wrongdoing or skills
that may allow them to process and recognize potential illegal acts in cost-effective ways. In
contrast, public enforcers may lack access to this information or the ability to process the
information, except at prohibitive economic and social costs or disruption to markets.
Alternatively, the primary wrongdoers may be very difficult or impossible for public enforcers to
target directly because the wrongdoers are judgment-proof or outside of American jurisdiction,
such as in the case of foreign outsourcing companies or illegal pornography or gambling
websites based outside of the United States. 42
The argument for enlisting gatekeepers turns on the efficiency of focusing policing on the
gatekeepers rather than on the primary wrongdoers. Gatekeepers may be able to deter primary
wrongdoers more easily and cost-effectively than public enforcers. Gatekeepers often receive a
disproportionately small percentage of the fruits of the wrongdoing, yet bear disproportionate
exposures to a risk of loss from both detection of the wrongdoing and the resulting gatekeeper

41

If the gatekeepers merely provided or demanded illegal services, then these cases would fall under
accomplice liability or conspiracy to commit criminal acts or civil wrongs. But the fact that the goods or
services gatekeepers demand or supply can generally be used either legally or illegally places gatekeepers
in a unique position as potential screeners of wrongdoing, yet makes their culpability more ambiguous as
they may or may not actively or tacitly assist in wrongdoing.
42
See Matthew Miller, Catch Me If You Can, FORBES, Mar. 27, 2006, at 113 (discussing how
offshore gambling web-sites escape U.S. jurisdiction).
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liability or reputational effects. 43 Gatekeepers’ assets may be more vulnerable to seizure or liens
than those of prospective wrongdoers; they may enjoy revocable rights such as licenses; or
gatekeepers may simply be fewer in number than the primary offenders they are called to
oversee. Although gatekeepers may be more responsive to the threat of sanctions than primary
wrongdoers, in practice this difference may simply be one of degree. As significantly, the fact
that public enforcers may theoretically be able to target gatekeepers with sanctions does not
necessarily mean that enforcers are in a position to oversee gatekeeper compliance.
But even if gatekeepers may be responsive to sanctions, the question of whether the threat
of gatekeeper liability will heighten enforcement levels in any given context turns on whether
gatekeepers can screen effectively for prospective wrongdoers in a cost-effective way. 44
Gatekeepers may strengthen public enforcement by withholding their support from
wrongdoers, 45 by notifying public enforcers when wrongdoers are detected, 46 or by routinely
providing the government with relevant documentation about their suppliers or clients that make
it easier for government actors to screen and develop patterns or profiles of wrongdoers. 47 These

43

See Coffee, supra note 2, at 308–09.
See Hamdani, supra note 2, at 104.
45
This is the conventional vision of the role for gatekeepers literally to close the gates by
withholding their services. See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 2, at 54 (“Gatekeeper liability is distinguished
by the duty that it imposes on private ‘gatekeepers’ to prevent misconduct by withholding support. This
support—usually a specialized good, service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing
to succeed—is the ‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps.”). This narrow conception of gatekeepers misses the
fact that literal gatekeepers often also performed other important functions of recording information and
pulling the alarm when wrongdoing was identified. A gatekeeper who did anything less might well have
risked his neck by being viewed as betraying his duty.
46
This approach would effectively make voluntary whistleblowing compulsory for gatekeepers and
leave the decision about whether and how to act on information about potential wrongdoing in the hands
of public enforcers.
47
Employers and banks routinely face this type of requirement. For example, employers and
investment companies must disclose individual wages and capital gains to the Internal Revenue Service,
which at least in theory equips the IRS to police tax fraud. Immigration officials could also piggyback off
of this preexisting duty to check whether multiple parties are attempting to use the same social security
numbers, thus signaling possible illegal immigrant employment. Banks must disclose cash transfers of
44
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potential complementary roles to public enforcement suggest why enlisting gatekeepers may
appear to be an attractive policy option. 48
3. The Question of Whether Gatekeeping Liability is Necessary
The fact that enlisting gatekeepers to screen for primary wrongdoers may have significant
advantages does not necessarily mean that public enforcers should enlist gatekeepers through the
threat of liability.

Some prospective gatekeepers may have such a tenuous relation with

consumers or service providers that it would seem unreasonable to subject them to gatekeeping
obligations. For example, although sophisticated color printers may be used to print counterfeit
currency, it would be extraordinarily difficult and costly for companies to identify or monitor
prospective wrongdoers in this context. 49 In contrast, it appears reasonable to use the threat of
liability to require gun salesmen to screen for former felons by checking identification against
federal and state databases. In the context of gun sales, the risk factors would be high and the
monitoring burden would be comparatively low on both gatekeepers and their customers. 50
Although no precise formula exists for who may serve as a desirable gatekeeper, the plausibility
of a gatekeeper duty appears to turn on whether a gatekeeper has access to reasonably costeffective means to identify prospective wrongdoers. 51

$10,000 or more, with a similar goal of alerting the police to transactions that may be related to illicit
activity, such as money laundering. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2005).
48
The extent to which gatekeepers may complement or substitute for public enforcement ultimately
depends on the particulars of the enforcement context. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 1048–49
(arguing that public regulatory controls of financial institutions must remain the focus of securities
enforcement efforts and that gatekeepers must assume a more limited, complementary role at best).
49
If copier companies were held strictly liable, one can imagine mandatory purchases or insurance or
postings of bonds that would cover this risk. But these costs would either cut into the printers’ profits or
economic viability if they could not be passed on to customers, or serve as a new tax on all customers that
may price marginal users out of purchasing copiers, thus causing a deadweight loss.
50
See Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (enlisting gun dealers as gatekeepers for screening for
former felons).
51
If the costs of screening are too high, then gatekeepers may either stop demanding or offering
services, relocate to a jurisdiction where they do not face gatekeeper liability, or shift to the underground
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Some private actors may routinely perform gatekeeper functions on their own because the
reputational costs far outweigh the marginal returns they may gain from colluding with
wrongdoers or casting a blind eye to their wrongdoing. 52 In the case of true reputational
intermediaries, 53 adding gatekeeper liability may simply raise the financial exposure of
gatekeepers yet have little effect on heightening enforcement efforts. The best candidates for
reputational intermediaries are third parties with no direct connection to the prospective
wrongdoers who may perform gatekeeper functions on their own and make gatekeeper liability a
redundancy at best. 54 Here, the classic case is the role that Moody’s Investors Service, Standard
& Poor’s Rating Services, and Fitch Investors Service play in assessing corporate debt offerings
for creditworthiness, as their economic interest lies in their accuracy. 55 Although these types of

economy. It is clear that the level of compliance costs coupled with residual liability must be lower than
the gatekeepers’ valuations of demanding or offering services, but how low these costs must be depends
on the context of individual markets.
52
See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 781, 787 (2001) (arguing that reputational intermediaries are “repeat players who will
suffer a reputational loss, if they let a company falsify or unduly exaggerate its prospects, that exceeds
their one-time gain from permitting the exaggeration”); see also Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 898 & n.124 (1984) (describing how reputational
intermediaries may face analogous incentives to publicly imposed gatekeeper liability because these
intermediaries “place established reputations on the line”).
53
In practice, reputational markets appear inefficient as reputational intermediaries in the securities
markets have repeatedly demonstrated by their failures over the past decade. See Coffee, supra note 2, at
311–18 (documenting the failures of reputational intermediaries in securities law compliance); Frank
Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 366–37
(2004); see also Black, supra note 52, at 787–89 (arguing that true reputational intermediaries cannot
fulfill their role in vouching for disclosure quality and thus reducing information asymmetry in securities
markets because of the ability of false reputational intermediaries to free-ride off of true reputational
intermediaries’ credibility and to provide false or misleading information on securities).
54
To the extent to which gatekeeper liability would burden these actors with liabilities that these
actors could not screen for (or only at prohibitive cost), gatekeeper liability may have the perverse effect
of raising the costs of their services or causing them to exit the market.
55
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 (arguing that rating agencies’ “reputational motivation is sufficient” and that
“[a]dditional regulation of rating agencies thus would impose unnecessary costs and thereby diminish
efficiency”). In some cases corporations directly pay rating agencies to assess their creditworthiness, but
there is little evidence that corporations have been able to manipulate ratings of their debt. To the extent
to which there is a danger of interconnections of interests that distort ratings, it may lie in the ancillary
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third parties may still be far from perfect gatekeepers in policing wrongdoing, 56 they may make
liability-driven monitoring by other intermediaries more costly than it is worth in terms of
enforcement outcomes.
In contrast, advocates for professions such as law, medicine, and accounting may argue that
their reputations are their business. 57

However, a reliance on self-professed reputational

intermediaries alone may prove to be a risky approach in many contexts. This risk would be
high if these intermediaries have direct relationships with prospective wrongdoers, especially if
wrongdoers form a significant portion of their client base, or if the intermediaries have more
indirect economic interests that may compromise their independence. 58 If the intermediaries’
incentives are rightly (or rather wrongly) aligned with wrongdoers, then this reputational cover
may be the very good that these actors can leverage to cover up wrongdoing. 59 For this reason,

services that the rating agencies or their parent companies provide. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the
Ratings Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50–52 (2004).
56
One significant concern is how a combination of regulatory barriers to entry and the nature of the
ratings market have led to the existence of only a small number of ratings companies, which means that
there are only a limited set of eyes watching the gates. See Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit
Ratings, in RATINGS: RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 66 (Richard M.
Levich et al. eds., 2002). Another concern is that rating agencies have a good track record of assessing
risks in initial ratings of creditworthiness, but in recent years have done a poorer job in the timing of
upgrades and downgrades of corporate ratings. See Hill, supra note 55, at 67–68.
57
See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 295, 296–98 (1988) (arguing that the reputational costs that accountants may face from
failing to detect wrongdoing gives them adequate incentives to monitor their clients); see also DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (arguing that an accountant’s concern for her
reputation and exposure to potential loss would make collusion with her clients’ accounting fraud
irrational).
58
Even if institutions consciously seek to function as reputational intermediaries, the individual
interests and business relationships of analysts may compromise the institutions’ reputational
intermediary role.
59
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 3, at 920 (arguing that producers will not engage in fraud only if “the
long-term reputational loss is greater than the short-term gain the producer received from overstating the
value of . . . lower quality [information]”); Coffee, supra note 2, at 309–11 (discussing how incentives for
reputational intermediaries may change over time and cause them to stop fulfilling their gatekeeper roles);
Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 752 (2004) (arguing that “in the long-run, reputational
intermediaries will commit fraud if the risk is acceptable either for the firm or its agents”); Robert A.
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95
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policymakers should employ healthy skepticism about gatekeepers’ claims that their self-interest
or market incentives cause them to screen optimally for wrongdoers without the threat of
liability.
B. The Challenges Surrounding the Design of Gatekeeper Regimes
If public enforcers cannot effectively target primary offenders on their own and market
actors lack sufficient incentives to police wrongdoers, then gatekeeper liability becomes an
appealing strategy.

However, enthusiasm for enlisting gatekeepers should be tempered by

concerns about the cost-effectiveness and potential collateral consequences of this approach. 60
Policymakers must consider whether the costs gatekeeper liability would inflict on the
government, the gatekeepers, and markets as a whole are less than the costs that similar levels of
public enforcement would entail.61 The issue is not merely one of efficiency, but also concerns
political palatability in determining whether enforcement gains justify the economic and social
costs on the state and society. 62
Policymakers may be able to anticipate some costs of gatekeeper compliance with a high
degree of precision. But the limited information that both policymakers and gatekeepers possess
makes it difficult to anticipate the full costs and collateral effects of gatekeeper liability.

NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–47 (2002) (discussing reasons why reputational intermediaries will put their
reputations in jeopardy).
60
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 1070–74 (arguing that greater public regulation may be an
appealing alternative to imposing gatekeeper liability on lawyers because of the difficulties in designing
and enforcing gatekeeper regimes and politicians’ “irresistible” temptation to create rules that overdeter).
But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis,
109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726–27 (1996) (discussing how it is often assumed that defendants are in a better
position than policymakers to assess costs and benefits and to adopt the optimal response).
61
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75 (framing the costs that gatekeeper liability may create as
administrative, private, and tertiary costs).
62
Law and economics literature often overlooks, or rather assumes away, the question of political
viability. But the benefits of private enforcement tools, such as gatekeepers, may come with greater
social costs (or at least greater uncertainties concerning the scope of social costs), and therefore concerns
of political feasibility may be interconnected with the question of efficiency.
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Designing gatekeeper regimes entails uncertainties surrounding the effects of liability standards
on gatekeeper behavior and markets, difficulties in assessing the relative costs versus benefits of
gatekeeper liability and setting the level of sanctions, as well as significant challenges in
overseeing gatekeepers. This article will focus on overcoming the obstacles to monitoring
gatekeeper compliance, but it is important to highlight the range of costs that gatekeeper liability
may inflict on gatekeepers and markets, as policymakers must weigh all of these costs in
designing liability and oversight mechanisms.
1. The Challenges of Choosing Liability Standards
Much of the literature on gatekeepers has focused on what standard to impose on
gatekeepers and, in particular, on the potential for strict liability. 63 However, policymakers’
limited information about gatekeepers’ responsiveness to liability risks and limited ability to
monitor gatekeeper compliance means that any standard will entail uncertain costs and effects on
gatekeepers and markets. For this reason, policymakers must approach standard-setting as an
imprecise science based on assessments of the relative risks of under- or overdeterrence from any
given standard. 64
Strict liability, negligence, and knowledge-based duties for gatekeepers each have distinct
advantages and disadvantages.

63

Strict liability shifts the burden of determining optimal

See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 350–63 (advocating that auditors face modified strict liability for
corporate disclosures); Hardy, supra note 3, at 1044–46 (advocating strict liability on internet system
administrator gatekeepers); Partnoy, supra note 3, at 540–41 (2001) (advocating the use of strict liability
for gatekeepers in the securities offering context). But see Hamdani, supra note 2, at 114 (arguing strict
liability would overdeter in most contexts and impose excessive costs relative to the enforcement gains).
64
Liability incentives created by a given standard may lead gatekeepers to undertake costly
compliance efforts or avoidance strategies, such as greater discrimination against suspect classes or
decisions to exit the market in part or in whole. See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75–78. These collateral
effects may distort markets and significantly raise costs or bar access for legitimate market participants.
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compliance levels into the laps of gatekeepers, 65 and saves courts and public enforcers the costly
and difficult tasks of ferreting out subtle distinctions between good-faith compliance and
subversive obfuscation. 66

The case for negligence is that strict liability may overdeter by

punishing good-faith efforts to comply even in cases where there was no way (or at least no
reasonably cost-effective way) that enforcers could have identified the wrongdoers. 67 However,
gatekeepers may still be overly cautious if they face significant uncertainty concerning what
constitutes good-faith compliance. 68 If the concern is deterring the targeted activity at any price,
then strict liability may have great appeal because of potential chilling effects, although a strict
liability approach is likely to pose the largest costs and most uncertain effects on markets in the
process. In contrast, negligence poses potential risks of under- or overdeterrence depending on
the degree of ambiguity concerning what reasonable compliance measures consist of and the
costs of compliance relative to liability avoidance strategies. 69
The downside of these sweeping standards is that they may prove too burdensome and
costly in any given context. These standards may provide gatekeepers with incentives to exit or

65

It is important to note that strict liability would only theoretically force gatekeepers to internalize
the cost of their misconduct. Even an optimal standard and sanction would bear little fruit if the
probability of enforcement were low. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 322–23.
66
See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–17 (1987) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the merits of strict liability versus negligence liability).
67
But see Partnoy, supra note 3, at 510–516 (discussing the costs that imposing negligence liability
on gatekeepers may inflict).
68
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON.
1, 10–14 (1994) (discussing how varying interpretations by courts concerning what constitutes good-faith
compliance may lead to excessive caution by potential defendants).
69
The more ambiguous the question of reasonable compliance is, the greater the residual liability
that gatekeepers will face under a negligence standard. Similarly, the higher the costs of compliance
relative to liability avoidance strategies, the more likely gatekeeper liability will cause distorting effects
on markets. The relative weight of these two factors may largely determine whether negligence liability
poses greater risks of over- or underdeterrence. See Partnoy, supra note 3, at 510–16.
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to selectively reduce their exposure to markets. 70 This may push markets into the underground
economy or result in greater discrimination against suspect classes. 71 For example, much of the
debate concerning liability for employer gatekeepers in the immigration context turns on the
legitimate concern that discrimination against individuals of perceived foreign origin may appear
to be the cost-effective way for employers to minimize liability exposure. 72 If the odds of and
damages from successful employment discrimination suits are low enough, gatekeepers may find
routine discrimination to be a preferable strategy to good-faith efforts at compliance.
Additionally, gatekeeper strategies of exiting markets or discriminating against prospective
clients or service providers with suspect characteristics may force otherwise law-abiding people
into the underground economy and actually heighten levels of wrongdoing taking place outside
of the public eye.
In contrast, a knowledge-based standard would impose the lightest burden on gatekeepers.
It is the least invasive approach with the lowest uncertainty as to its effects on gatekeepers and
markets, which may suggest its desirability when concerns about the costs or collateral effects of
gatekeeper liability loom large. 73 However, knowledge standards may be the hardest to police
and may underdeter because of the ease with which gatekeepers may turn a blind eye or engage
in tacit collusion with wrongdoers to subvert the duty. Gatekeeper liability under a knowledge

70

See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833, 840–49 (1994).
71
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75–77.
72
See Espenoza, supra note 11, at 344–45 (discussing the concern that the employer sanctions
regime would heighten discrimination against all individuals of perceived foreign origin).
73
See Hamdani, supra note 2, at 104 (discussing how knowledge standards leave “gatekeepers with
no incentives to scrutinize client conduct even when detecting misconduct is relatively easy”).
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standard may run the risk of becoming a charade of “don’t ask, don’t tell” more than the
formalist minimum of information. 74
Because each standard has both strengths and potential shortcomings, gatekeeper duties
should be designed as narrowly as is consistent with advancing the enforcement objectives. 75
The more focused and clear the duty and compliance measures, the more confidently
policymakers can rely on a strict liability or a negligence standard without fears of
overdeterrence. 76 In contrast, the broader or more amorphous the duty, the more appealing a
knowledge standard will be to mitigate dangers of overdeterrence and resulting cost-avoidance
strategies or excessive precautions by gatekeepers. 77
2. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Gatekeeper Liability
Whether gatekeeper liability is desirable turns on a balancing of the costs versus benefits.
As discussed above, the imposition of gatekeeper liability necessarily entails a degree of
uncertain costs and effects on gatekeepers and markets because of the under- or
overinclusiveness of duty standards.

But under any duty standard, gatekeepers will face

heightened screening costs, the danger of residual liability, and decisions about whether and how
to minimize liability exposure.

Gatekeepers will understandably seek to pass on their

compliance costs to their clients or customers to the degree that they can. To the extent to which
demand for the category of good or service affected by gatekeeper liability is elastic, gatekeepers
may have to stomach much of these costs and weigh whether continued participation in the
74

Cf. id.
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 79–81.
76
If a negligence and strict liability duty have the same deterrence value in a given context, then a
negligence standard would be preferable because it would impose less costs than a strict liability standard.
However, because all other things are rarely equal (except in the world of academic assumptions), in
practice policymakers must choose between these standards and seek to take the resulting risks of over- or
underdeterrence into account.
77
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1055–56.
75
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market in whole or in part is profitable. If gatekeepers limit participation or exit markets, lawful
actors who consume or provide gatekeepers’ goods or services will be forced to bear the burdens.
Alternatively, to the extent to which demand is inelastic, then gatekeepers would seek to
pass these costs on to their clients. Market participants will be subject to an implicit tax of
higher fees to cover compliance costs and to indemnify gatekeepers from any residual liability.
While gatekeeper clients could try to mitigate these costs by producing evidence of their lawful
intentions, this information may be costly and in some cases may not even be possible to
produce. Policymakers will have to weigh the burdens that these duties may impose on a wide
set of market participants with the enforcement gains both in deciding whether to impose
gatekeeper liability and what level of sanctions to impose.
The sanctions level is also essential for providing gatekeepers with credible incentives for
compliance. However, policymakers’ limited information about gatekeeper responses and their
limited ability to oversee gatekeeper compliance makes sanction-setting a question with no easy
or uniform answer. Ordinarily, policymakers attempt to force wrongdoers to internalize the costs
of their actions by setting the expected value of a sanction to the social cost of wrongdoing.78
But forcing gatekeepers who fail to fulfill their duty to bear all of the resulting social costs
inflicted by primary wrongdoers could impose high costs and lead to significant distortions of
markets, which could make the cure worse than the disease of wrongdoing. 79 It may be equally
hard to define what the social harm is; in areas such as immigration enforcement, the discussion
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See id. at 1062.
Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564–66 (1988) (arguing that
policymakers should not focus on the social cost of wrongdoing in setting sanctions on third parties).
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as to the extent of the harm is at the center of a polarizing debate. 80 For these reasons, the focus
should be on two factors: the ability of gatekeepers to detect the wrongdoing and the benefits
gatekeepers receive from the goods or services that they demand or sell. Policymakers should
ideally seek to make the expected value of sanctions that gatekeepers face from noncompliance
higher than the costs of compliance plus residual liability. At the same time, these costs must not
be so high that the expected value of sanctions exceeds the profitability of the activity for
gatekeepers. 81

Otherwise, gatekeepers may decide to exit the market or to engage in

discrimination against suspect classes that include law-abiding actors.
This is a difficult balancing act and these uncertainties make setting the level of sanctions
imprecise at best. 82 Because policymakers’ knowledge is most limited at the time gatekeeper
regimes are first enacted, setting broad sanction ranges may provide flexibility for courts or
public enforcers to gauge gatekeeper responsiveness and to adjust sanctions accordingly. This
approach may be particularly appealing where there is a single enforcement body that has the
statutory authority to assess the impact of a gatekeeper regime and to adjust the sanctions in a
uniform way. This solution will not necessarily overcome risks of under- or overdeterrence and
raises dangers of selective enforcement, although it does offer a way to overcome some of the
uncertainties surrounding the enlistment of gatekeepers.
Determining the full costs of gatekeeper liability is difficult, but the social benefits may also
be very hard to pin down. Politicians and policymakers often posit enforcement objectives,
80

See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Rights, Reality, and Utopia, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1789, 1805
(2004); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of
Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29, 52–55 (2003).
81
The more heterogeneous gatekeepers are, the harder it is to calculate the impact of sanctions. See
Jackson, supra note 2, at 1052–53. For example, profit margins vary widely by industry and within
sectors of industry, and sanctions that may drive one set of market participants out may have a minimal
effect on others.
82
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 76.
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which may not have a readily quantifiable value. 83 Even when there are concrete numbers to
debate, raw enforcement outcomes may prove to be poor, or at the very least contentious,
measuring sticks of success. 84 For example, decisions to prosecute some types of offenses, such
as prostitution, may turn more on a moral judgment than on quantifiable factors about the social
benefits of enforcement efforts, such as reducing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 85
In other cases, such as securities fraud, policymakers may be able to calculate some of the social
costs and benefits with greater precision, but determinations on optimal enforcement levels may
ultimately rest on policymakers’ assumptions about the relative costs and benefits.
For this reason, weighing the social costs and benefits may be contentious in any given
gatekeeper context. Despite the fact that social costs and benefits and the optimal level of
sanctions may be hard to calculate with precision, policymakers should not abandon the use of
gatekeepers.

This point does, however, suggest that enlisting gatekeepers would be most

appealing in contexts where public enforcers simply cannot police against wrongdoing on their
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See, e.g., Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec’y, Remarks at the Houston Forum (Nov. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=44&content=4920 (asserting that two key
objectives of border control effects are preserving national security and “the rule of law”).
84
For example, in the immigration context politicians frequently point to the rising numbers of
undocumented aliens detained in the Mexican border region as a sign that American enforcement efforts
are bearing fruit. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Radio Address to the Nation (Oct. 22, 2005),
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Oct/24-735450.htm. But in truth, increasing numbers
of apprehended undocumented aliens may tell a very different story: that the incentives of illegal
immigration to the United States continue dramatically to outweigh the deterrence value of enforcement,
and thus spur increasing levels of illegal immigration.
85
At first glance, it might appear strange to think of prostitution as an offense that could be regulated
by a gatekeeper regime. But one need only open up the yellow pages to see how prostitution is no longer
relegated to the underground economy, but instead exists in the open under euphemisms such as escort
services or adult entertainment. Imposing negligence-based or strict liability on yellow pages and online
directories for serving as intermediaries for these services may help to reduce access by casual users and
the young, who may be the most vulnerable to contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Yet the value of
this type of enforcement would ultimately not turn on a balancing test of social benefits, but rather on a
moral perspective on the merits of targeting vice that may judge enforcement well worth the tradeoffs
because of its symbolic value, even if the administrative, gatekeeper, and market costs far outweighed the
concrete social benefits.
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own because the primary wrongdoers cannot be detected (except perhaps at prohibitive costs) or
are unresponsive to the threat of sanctions. In these cases, the choice may be abandonment of
enforcement entirely or accepting that enforcement may entail significant costs and uncertainties
and therefore attempting to tailor gatekeepers’ duties in as narrow a way as is consistent with
advancing the enforcement objectives.
The other significant factor that remains to be considered is an issue that the literature has
largely overlooked: the challenge of overseeing gatekeeper compliance. Even the best-designed
gatekeeper regime is bound to fail if gatekeepers can evade oversight, and all of the other cost
and benefit calculations hinge on the ability of enforcers to sustain credible monitoring of
gatekeeper compliance. For this reason, part II will explore the limits of public oversight of
gatekeepers and the potential for private actors to fill this critical enforcement gap.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS
A. The Merits of Private Oversight of Gatekeepers
1. The Appeal of Private Monitoring
Much of the literature on gatekeeping appears to posit that public enforcers are capable of
overseeing gatekeepers on their own and thus largely overlooks the potential or need for private
enforcers. 86 It is true that much of the appeal of gatekeepers lies in the fact that they offer a way
to outsource enforcement functions in whole or in part. However, enlisting gatekeepers does not
eliminate the oversight challenge for public enforcers because it merely shifts the locus of public
enforcers’ monitoring responsibilities. Although gatekeepers may in theory be more responsive
to sanctions than the primary wrongdoers, they may also be as or more capable of intentionally
86

See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing that “the least important costs [in designing a
gatekeeping regime] are likely to be the highly visible administrative expenses of detecting and
prosecuting wayward gatekeepers”).
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or unintentionally avoiding public oversight. Monitoring gatekeepers may well be beyond the
capabilities of public enforcers for similar reasons that public enforcers may be unable to detect
and prosecute the primary offenders. 87
In the case of specialized expertise, such as from medical, legal, and accounting
professionals, the gatekeepers may be best positioned to detect prospective wrongdoers. 88 But
this same expertise may empower gatekeepers to conceal wrongdoing from public enforcers’
eyes and make gatekeeper compliance extraordinarily difficult to monitor.89

For example,

doctors may be best positioned to discern that patients want prescription drugs for illicit
purposes, but may just as easily accept or manufacture “symptoms” that justify granting a
prescription, and public enforcers are ill-equipped to oversee this doctor-patient interaction. In
other cases, such as the employment of illegal immigrants, the number of businesses that may
employ undocumented aliens may be almost as numerous as the eleven million undocumented
aliens. 90 Although it may be easier to track corporate entities than individuals, the enforcement
burden is staggering and appears well beyond the capacity of any set of public enforcers.
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Public enforcers may fail to oversee gatekeepers for a wide range of reasons. See, e.g., J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1454–55 (2003) (discussing how government agencies may not fulfill their mandates because
public officials may be “lazy, uninterested, under-resourced, [or] overburdened”); Stephenson, supra note
7, at 110–11 (discussing how private enforcers may overcome enforcement slack by public agencies, due
to political pressure, enforcers’ sloth or inaction, or lobbying); Thompson, supra note 7, at 191–92
(discussing how political considerations, institutional structures, and lack of resources may compromise
public enforcement efforts).
88
See supra Part I.A.2.
89
See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 18–20 (discussing how the complexity of a broad range of
transactions makes it difficult for anyone to detect fraud).
90
There are 6.5 million registered employers in the United States, which does not include employers
who operate exclusively in the underground economy. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, A-08-5-25023, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER MISUSE IN THE SERVICE,
RESTAURANT,
AND
AGRICULTURE
INDUSTRIES
9
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-08-05-25023.pdf.
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The case for using private actors to monitor gatekeepers is strongest in the context of
chronic enforcement failures that have overwhelmed public enforcers and undercut their
credibility, such as the large-scale efforts to combat drug trafficking and illegal immigration.
Where time and experience have demonstrated the limits of public efforts to oversee gatekeepers
and wrongdoers, this fact may provide both a compelling reason and political opportunity for
exploring the potential of private alternatives. 91
Other features that may suggest the desirability of private enforcement tools include the
potential for large-scale fraud due to both the nature of the activity and the sociology of criminal
networks. If the danger for fraud by tacit collusion or corruption by gatekeepers is significant
because the offense can be easily concealed, then a sole reliance on public enforcement may be
wishful thinking that gives gatekeeper liability little teeth. A related concern turns on the
sociology of criminal networks as culturally and linguistically based networks may be far harder
for public enforcers to penetrate on their own, if they can effectively oversee them at all. This
point would be especially true both for drug and human trafficking and smuggling networks that
tend to work through homogeneous groups and use the threat of violence within ethnic
communities to command silence. 92
Private oversight appears particularly attractive in the context of gatekeepers who create the
demand for primary wrongdoers’ services. Because this type of gatekeepers’ economic viability
91

This is the classic rationale for experimenting with the privatization of state functions.
Privatization always poses the risk of exacerbating the situation, but the real or perceived exhaustion of
public alternatives is often the political catalyst for exploring what private alternatives have to offer. See,
e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109,
2148 n.175 (2005) (considering benefits of market water allocation); S.L. Rundle, The Once and Future
Federal Grazing Lands, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1803, 1832–33 (2004) (advocating private ownership
of federal grazing lands).
92
See Sadruddin et al., supra note 26, at 382–84. While policymakers might point to prosecutions of
mob groups as signs of the potential for public enforcement under such harsh conditions, even these
successes largely turned on the efficacy of private informants and wrongdoer turncoats rather than public
enforcers acting on their own.

32

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

may turn on their suppliers’ cost-saving illicit activities, gatekeepers may face overwhelming
incentives to turn a blind eye to, or to actively collude with, wrongdoers. In competitive
markets, entire industries may feel all but compelled to use illicit suppliers as a means to bend
the rules to ensure cost competitiveness. 93 For example, if some firms in an industry employ
Chinese or Indonesian suppliers who violate human rights and bribe local officials to keep costs
low, then their competitors face high pressures to engage in similar practices. 94 Given how
intertwined the incentives of gatekeepers and suppliers may be, it would hardly be surprising that
corporations may end up investing far more in covering their tracks to subvert the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, rather than in fulfilling gatekeeper duties. Private enforcers who have an
insider view on these business relationships, such as employees of the corporation, competitors,
or even the illicit suppliers themselves, may be in far better positions to expose this type of fraud
than public enforcers.
Gatekeepers who are goods or service providers may also face significant temptations to
facilitate illicit activity. These incentives would be most prominent, especially in the short run,
in contexts where prospective wrongdoers formed a significant share of a gatekeepers’ business
that cannot easily be replaced. 95

93

Serving prospective wrongdoers rather than legitimate

See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing a Social Security
Administration study that found that forty-eight percent of Social Security number filings by agricultural
employers did not match SSA records).
94
U.S. multinational companies may be liable for subsidiaries’ violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act if the parent company has knowledge, is willfully blind, or consciously disregards acts of
bribery committed by their subsidiaries. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000);
Brown, supra note 40, at 29–35. Outsourcing production to independent companies in countries with
widespread corruption, such as China, is designed to subvert the substance of compliance with the law.
See Peter S. Goodman, Common in China, Kickbacks Create Trouble for U.S. Companies at Home,
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at A1 (discussing how U.S. companies face high pressure to pay bribes in
China because they are standard business practices).
95
See Coffee, supra note 2, at 322–23 (discussing how auditing firms as a whole may have a broad
set of clients, but arguing that individual auditors who serve a large client such as Enron effectively have
their economic interests interconnected with a single client); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron
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customers may also appear more appealing if they offer higher compensation that reflects the
higher margins that may be earned from illicit activity and more than offsets the risks that
gatekeepers may assume. 96 In these contexts, enlisting private monitors may be valuable in
uncovering illicit relationships between gatekeepers and their clients because of how closely
their interests intertwine.
2. The Broad Features of Private Oversight
Private enforcement tools have both strengths and weaknesses compared to public
monitoring of gatekeepers. Each type of private oversight tool has its own distinctive merits and
shortcomings that will be discussed in depth in the next section. This section’s focus is on the
broadly shared features of these tools.
First, enlisting private monitors may allow public enforcers to achieve mandates within
limited manpower and budget constraints. Private insiders are likely far better positioned than
public enforcers to uncover information on gatekeeper violations in a more cost-effective way. 97
Private monitors may have incentives to innovate new ways to uncover gatekeeper violations or
to prosecute gatekeepers because they personally internalize the monitoring costs and monetary
rewards in ways that public monitors do not. 98

Although some may feel that appeals to

Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237–38 (2002) (discussing how gatekeepers who provide a given client
multiple types of services outside of their gatekeeper duty could face indirect incentives to compromise
their compliance measures).
96
See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 69–70 (noting that in theory wrongdoers can offer bribes up to the
expected value from their wrongdoing, but in practice the difficulties of negotiation make it unlikely that
wrongdoers can make credible commitments to that high a level of bribes).
97
See Thompson, supra note 7, at 224–26 (discussing how interested citizens may be far better
positioned than public enforcers to monitor environmental compliance).
98
See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403–04, 1438–39 (1998) (discussing how private litigants have
pursued the most challenging and significant discrimination cases); Stephenson, supra note 7, at 112–13
(suggesting how private litigants may employ novel strategies and approaches to expand enforcement
potential); Thompson, supra note 7, at 206–09 (discussing how environmental groups made supplemental
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mercenary motives are inconsistent with American civic virtues, in many contexts there may be
no other way to provide adequate incentives for gatekeeper compliance.
The primary downside of private oversight techniques is also their strength: the
responsiveness of private actors to financial incentives. Because private actors can be expected
to respond to financial incentives so long as the expected value of rewards exceeds the risks and
costs of their monitoring, reporting, or enforcement, 99 private oversight and particularly private
enforcement actions may serve as a blunt tool that poses dangers of over- or underenforcement in
any given context. 100 Putting aside potential exceptions such as the role of environmental groups
in citizens suits, 101 we can safely assume in most contexts that private actors’ decisions about
disclosing information or initiating an action about gatekeeper compliance will turn almost
exclusively on their private benefits from these actions. 102 Private actors will not take into

enforcement projects aiding the local environment a condition of citizen suit settlements, an approach the
Department of Justice has subsequently embraced). Empowering private monitors may be a two-edged
sword, however, as private monitors may also have incentives to find ways to engage in fraud against
gatekeepers to extract rewards. Alternatively, private litigants may develop novel enforcement strategies
that may expand the scope of enforcement well beyond its intended scope or may set precedents that
hamstring subsequent public or private enforcers. See Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of CitizenSuit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U.
L. REV. 220, 222–23 (1987) (discussing how citizen suits may force judges to engage in judicial
lawmaking to define regulatory requirements that may siphon regulatory power away from administrative
agencies).
99
See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
167, 175–76 (1985).
100
See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 117–20 (discussing how private enforcement may disrupt
cooperative relationships between regulators and regulated entities, dictate enforcement agendas, and
eliminate possibilities for discretionary enforcement).
101
In the case of environmental groups and other ideologically oriented organizations, the ability to
achieve their goals, to raise societal awareness, and to gain publicity for fundraising through citizen suits
may make enforcement decisions in their self-interest even if the expected value of any suit that they
pursue is negative. The noneconomic aspirations of ideologically oriented groups do not neatly fit into
economic models for predicting what level of incentives can induce a given degree of enforcement
activity. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture,
and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 137–39 (2002).
102
See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 578 (1997) (arguing that private litigants sue for
compensation or relief and “not chiefly, if at all, to deter socially undesirable behavior in the future”).
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account the broader social costs and benefits or public values at stake from information
disclosure or decisions on whether and how to litigate. 103 Therefore, using private monitors by
definition entails risks of over- or underinvestment of resources in any given context of
oversight. For example, the economic incentives of private actors may be to pursue decisions to
go to trial or to settle cases in contexts where broader public objectives would be best served by
other approaches. For this reason, policymakers must seek to align the economic interests of
private monitors in disclosing information or prosecuting gatekeepers as closely as possible with
public enforcement objectives to guard against risks of over- or underdeterrence.
Second, private oversight often entails a tradeoff between the value of uncovering private
information and the inefficiencies of enlisting uncoordinated private actors. 104

If public

enforcers can uncover insider information about gatekeeper violations on their own in a costeffective way, it may be more efficient for them to do so because public actors could coordinate
investigations and prosecutions to minimize wasteful overlap of efforts. Given the shortcomings
of public enforcement, policymakers may have to risk the inefficiencies of overlapping
monitoring by private actors to gain access to insider information on violations. Public enforcers
could mitigate this risk of inefficiency in some cases by enlisting informants on a regular basis
and coordinating their activities. However, when the goal is to enlist a very broad pool of
103

See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1314–20 (2003) (discussing the challenges of enlisting private actors to perform public functions while
attempting to ensure that private actors uphold the values that public law seeks to promote). At the same
time, public enforcers may not take social benefits fully into account or act on them at all as enforcers
may be ignorant of the social cost and benefits at stake or be motivated by other factors such as
minimizing time and resources spent on cases, as occurs routinely in plea bargaining. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947,
1962–68 (2005) (arguing that prosecutors often make the efficient resolution of cases, rather than justice,
the focus of criminal prosecutions by routinely using pretrial detention as a means to pressure defendants
into swiftly making guilty pleas).
104
See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV.
589, 616–17 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 394, 431–32 (1982).
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potential monitors it would be far more effective in terms of costs and outcomes to give private
actors the incentives to come forward with information or a suit when gatekeeper violations
occur.
Third, it is difficult to determine the optimal level of rewards for private monitors. Too high
or low a reward may lead to over- or underdeterrence and either fail to provide gatekeepers with
adequate incentives for compliance or encourage wasteful harassment tips or suits or fraud by
insiders. 105 Enforcers must balance the need to create sufficient incentives for private oversight
with concerns about how these incentives may attract excessive private enforcement. If generous
rewards elicit dubious or frivolous claims on a large scale, they may impose wasteful burdens on
gatekeepers in fending off these claims, on courts in addressing victim suits and qui tam claims,
and on public enforcers in responding to informant tips. The challenge is that reward setting
may at best constitute an educated guess based on subjective judgments or assumptions about the
worth of a given tip or of the degree of culpability or liability that a gatekeeper must bear for the
primary wrongdoers’ illicit acts.
A fourth set of tradeoffs concerns the social and cultural impact from using private
monitors.

Cultivating a mercenary zeal to oversee gatekeeper compliance may create

atmospheres of distrust within communities and chill interaction within firms, because anyone
might be a potential informant or saboteur of compliance. 106

Private oversight may push

wrongdoing further underground and lead violators to resort to threats or violence to deter
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See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 656–57 (1998).
This point should not be overstated as anyone currently could be an uncompensated whistleblower
at any time. The issue is whether adding mercenary motives for whistleblowing could have a more
corrosive effect on relationships.
106
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potential private monitors. 107 Public enforcers who cannot effectively enforce the laws on their
own may be even less capable of protecting the private monitors they seek to enlist. 108 The
threat of violence or retaliation may make prospective private qui tam litigants or informants less
likely to assist the government and may therefore make a private monitoring approach fall short
of its goals. Policy design can only seek to mitigate these tradeoffs as social costs and the risks
of private retaliation may be unavoidable. Although private oversight tools share many of these
traits, each tool entails distinctive challenges and tradeoffs that merit further elaboration.
B. Four Approaches to Private Monitoring
Public enforcers may enlist four main types of private enforcers to monitor gatekeeper
compliance. First, parties directly harmed as a result of a gatekeepers’ action or inaction may be
empowered to sue gatekeepers for compensation. Second, private actors may be enlisted as qui
tam litigants, serving as private attorney generals in exchange for a percentage of the damages.
Third, public enforcers may use private informants to gain intelligence on gatekeeper compliance
from insiders, competitors, or members of the community. Lastly, public enforcers may offer
clemency and other forms of compensation to the primary wrongdoers to come forward and
uncover gatekeeper violations.
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See FRANCIS T. MIKO, TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, CONG. RES. SERV. (2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf
(discussing the use of violence by human smugglers to silence undocumented aliens or coerce payments).
108
For example, the failure of public enforcers to protect cooperating witnesses from threats of
violence suggests that public enforcers who are not in a position to detect violations may be no more
capable of guarding the private enforcers that they solicit. See, e.g., William Glaberson, ‘Lie or Die’
Aftermath of a Murder; Justice, Safety and the System: A Witness is Slain in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2003, at A1 (discussing the failure of the criminal justice system to protect a voluntary witness in a
murder/drug-related case).
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1. The Limited Potential for Victim Suits
The most conventional approach for enlisting private oversight would be to create a private
cause of action for parties who are directly harmed as a result of a gatekeeper’s failure to uphold
her duty. Statutes have granted private causes of action to victims who can prove concrete harms
in many other settings 109 and, in many instances, courts have found implicit private causes of
action in legislation. 110 The appeal of this approach is intuitive: parties who may be harmed by
the primary wrongdoers have the powerful incentive of self-interest to monitor gatekeeper
compliance and to prosecute gatekeepers for compensation when gatekeepers’ action or inaction
allowed the primary wrongdoers to inflict harm. These suits would serve to compensate victims
for the wrongs they have suffered and simultaneously serve to deter gatekeepers from future
violations. 111 Specific acts, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and
the antitrust Clayton Act, provide for treble damages to magnify the deterrence effect of victim
suits. 112 Similarly, class action lawsuits offer the potential to consolidate victim claims and
compensation process without having to involve public enforcers at all. 113

109

See, e.g., Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 2000 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
110
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–97
(1971) (recognizing a private cause of action for individuals for encroachments on their federal statutory
or constitutional rights by federal agents); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (finding
an implied private cause of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). But see
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (calling for courts to “adhere[] to a stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action”).
111
See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 556–558 (1981) (discussing the
deterrence role that victim suits may play).
112
See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
113
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 222–23 (1983) (arguing that private class-action
suits can complement public enforcement by raising the financial consequences of wrongdoing to levels
far above any fees that public enforcers are able or willing to impose).
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Private causes of action may make perfect sense when a wronged party seeks to be made
whole by suing the wrongdoer who caused the injury. 114 The political appeal of empowering
victims to sue gatekeepers may be clear, though this approach is more problematic in practice
and may have limited enforcement value. Holding gatekeepers jointly and severally liable with
the primary wrongdoers for all of the costs that wrongdoers inflict following failed gatekeeping
could easily overdeter. 115 From both a culpability and cost standpoint, the liability of the
gatekeeper should turn on her ability to guard against the harm inflicted by the primary
wrongdoer and the gatekeeper’s ability to profit from the activity, rather than on the actual harm
the primary wrongdoer inflicted on the victim. Otherwise, gatekeepers may choose to exit or
reduce their exposure to markets because the potential liabilities of providing their goods or
services may far exceed the benefits. It may also prove difficult to delineate the percentage of
the harm that rests on the gatekeeper’s shoulders for failing to live up to her duty. For example,
a negligent doctor may prescribe prescription drugs to a patient who feigned the symptoms, but
holding the doctor financially liable for all acts that the drugged-up patient may commit might
appear outrageous and likely to overdeter. 116
A more significant problem with this approach is that victims of primary wrongdoers may
have an economic interest in pinning the blame on gatekeepers (especially if the gatekeepers
have deep pockets and wrongdoers cannot be apprehended or are judgment-proof). But the
114

The logic that a wrongdoer who inflicted an injury should restore victims to their state prior to the
injury is an underlying premise of tort law. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability
be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 427 (1994).
115
The exception would be in cases where a conspiracy existed between the primary wrongdoers and
the gatekeeper, thereby making the gatekeeper fully implicated in any wrongdoing that occurred pursuant
to the conspiracy.
116
The degree of liability to which a gatekeeper is exposed may turn on the extent of their complicity
with the wrongdoing. For example, if a gatekeeper entered into a conspiracy with the wrongdoer, then
she would be liable for all acts that are reasonably foreseeable from the underlying conspiracy. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2004). In contrast, holding a merely negligent gatekeeper
liable for all acts that a wrongdoer performed would seem far more unjust.
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victims may be no better and may often be worse positioned than public enforcers to uncover
information about whether gatekeepers failed to live up to their duties. 117 In cases where victims
are part of the community with gatekeepers or the primary wrongdoers, they may have costeffective access to information on gatekeeper compliance. However, this advantage may at least
partly be offset by greater exposure to risks of retaliation or injury by the gatekeepers or the
primary wrongdoers.
But in cases where victims are far removed from gatekeepers, victims may enjoy no cost
advantage over public enforcers in uncovering gatekeeper noncompliance. Victims may be in a
far worse position than public enforcers in these contexts because they lack access to public tools
of investigation and may have no countervailing access to insider information on gatekeeper
compliance. 118 This point is particularly significant if gatekeeper compliance is difficult to
monitor because of the nature of the interaction between gatekeepers and potential wrongdoers.
For this reason, relying on private causes of action alone to heighten enforcement may end up
having only a marginal impact because the insiders best placed to monitor gatekeepers, such as
employees, competitors, or even the primary wrongdoers, would likely not be involved in this
type of action.
Nonetheless, private causes of action for victims may still be a valuable complement or
substitute for public enforcement if the goal is to heighten enforcement levels in cases in which
gatekeeper violations are easy to detect and the government lacks the resources to detect and
prosecute these violations on its own.

117

But aside from picking the low-lying fruit of

See Bucy, supra note 7, at 59–60. But see Stephenson, supra note 7, at 108 (arguing that people
directly affected by a potential defendant’s conduct may be in the best position to detect violations).
118
Unless we grant victims broad leeway to conduct “fishing expeditions” by using discovery against
gatekeepers to uncover evidence of wrongdoing, a victim suit approach may end up being hamstrung by
the problem that we started with: the difficulties of monitoring gatekeeper compliance.
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enforcement, 119 victims may often be no better positioned than public enforcers to gather
information on violations. There are also many public enforcement contexts where there is no
concrete harm against an identifiable subset of people, or the harm against the public is diffuse
and difficult to calculate. 120 In these contexts, turning to other types of private enforcers who
may have a more direct connection to the gatekeepers may offer a more viable alternative for
uncovering gatekeeper noncompliance.
2. The Potential for Qui Tam Litigation
In contrast to victim suits, a qui tam approach would provide incentives for any private
party to serve as an overseer of gatekeeper compliance. Qui tam provisions allow any citizen to
enforce specific areas of federal law in return for a reward or a percentage of fines levied from
successful prosecutions. 121 This approach serves as the ultimate outsourcing of enforcement

119

In many cases victims may do little more than duplicate public enforcers’ efforts or try to build off
of public enforcers’ efforts by filing suits that mirror the action taken or knowledge disclosed by public
enforcers. See, e.g., John F. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 681 (1986) (discussing how “in the field of antitrust enforcement, [] private antitrust class
actions have tended to piggyback on a prior governmental proceeding”).
120
Possession of illegal drugs, pornography, prostitution, and illicit gambling constitute examples of
“victimless” crimes that, nonetheless, arguably concern public interests such as public morals or health
and safety. See Anthony M. Dillof, Criminal Law: Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 872 n.167 (2004).
121
Citizen suits are closely related to qui tam litigation and empower private citizens to enforce
specified laws in return for lawyer’s fees and other expenses. However, citizen suits appear a far less
effective enforcement tool than qui tam litigation because all penalties from citizen suits go to the federal
government, and standing requirements limit the pool of prospective plaintiffs. Citizen suit provisions
have been primarily used to augment public enforcement of environmental laws. See, e.g., Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000); Clean Water Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911
(2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). While ideological groups, such as environmental
organizations, may advance their agendas and heighten their public profile through citizen suits,
nonideological plaintiffs face an expected loss of value from litigation, since at best they can recoup their
attorney’s fees and expenses. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65
TUL. L. REV. 339, 356 (1990). In contrast, qui tam suits’ offer of monetary awards may attract a wide
range of plaintiffs, which may enhance overall enforcement and the law’s popular legitimacy. Citizen
suit plaintiffs must also establish injury-in-fact and redressability to establish standing to sue. See Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
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functions by vesting enforcement discretion in the hands of “private attorney generals.”122
Although qui tam suits once were the norm for law enforcement, 123 now the False Claims Act is
the notable exception in enlisting private litigants to police federal contract fraud. 124
The False Claims Act provides a valuable model for the design of qui tam provisions and
their potential efficacy. 125 The Act integrates elements of both a private informant and a qui tam
system. Qui tam litigants must file a complaint in federal court that is sealed for sixty days,
during which time even the existence of the suit is not disclosed to the defendant. 126 The litigant
must simultaneously disclose to the federal government “substantially all material evidence and
information” about the claims. 127 By the end of the sixty-day period, the United States can
choose to assume control of the case and effectively transform the qui tam litigants into

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). In contrast, qui tam plaintiffs appear to have standing if they have the
prospect of a reward, “even if only a peppercorn.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 127 (Stephens, J., concurring).
Lastly, citizen suits may be brought only if the violation is ongoing, id. at 109, or the issue is not moot at
the time the suit was initiated. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
187–88 (2000). Because the other features of citizen suits are substantially similar to qui tam litigation,
this discussion will focus solely on the merits of qui tam litigation.
122
See Morrison, supra note 104, 590 (noting that “the term [private attorney general] denotes a
plaintiff who sues to vindicate public interests not directly connected to any special stake of her own”).
123
Qui tam actions have long been a feature of English and American law enforcement, but since the
early nineteenth century public enforcement has almost completely replaced this tool. For an overview of
the history of qui tam suits in the United States and United Kingdom respectively, see J. Randy Beck, The
False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 540–55
(2000); Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into a
Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 456–50 (1998).
124
See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. § 3729–33 (2000).
125
The False Claims Act was originally enacted to enlist private attorney generals to combat federal
contract fraud during the civil war. But by the 1940s concerns arose over the potential for abuse and
blackmail, which led to restrictions on the ability to make qui tam claims and a dramatic decline in qui
tam litigation. See Beck, supra note 123, at 560–61; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal
Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 296–304 (1989). The 1986 Act
significantly expanded the scope of qui tam litigation by empowering individual litigants to bring suit
even if the information was already available in the public record. The 1986 Act also made it easier for
litigants to establish government fraud by lowering the required mens rea for the crime from purposive
intent to defraud the government to mere recklessness. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000); 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(2) (4)(A)–(B) (2000).
126
See 31 U.S.C. § 3739(b)1–2(b) (2000), § 3730(b)(1)–(2) (2000).
127
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)–(3) (2000).
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informants. 128 If the government successfully prosecutes the case, then it must award the qui
tam plaintiff’s litigation costs and attorney’s fees, as well as fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
penalties. 129

If the government chooses not to assume control of the case, litigants may

successfully pursue the case on their own, and receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the
damages as well as litigation costs and attorney’s fees. 130
The results of these incentives for qui tam actions speak for themselves. Since 1986, the
federal government has recovered over $13.5 billion from federal contract fraud cases under the
False Claims Act. 131 Qui tam litigants have received over $1.4 billion of the proceeds. 132 It is
unclear how much of this fraud the federal government could have uncovered and prosecuted on
its own (assuming the government both possessed and dedicated enforcement resources towards
this end). But regardless of this fact, the amount recovered suggests that prospective qui tam
litigants can and will augment public enforcement if the level and probability of rewards are
sufficiently high. 133

128

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(4)(A) (2000).
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000).
130
If the qui tam suit is based on publicly disclosed information or the litigant’s actions contributed to
the wrongdoing, then the successful litigant will receive less than these percentages. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)(1)–(3) (2000).
131
In 2003 alone, qui tam actions resulted in the collection of $2.1 billion, and from 1986 to 2004 qui
tam litigation resulted in the federal government’s recovery of $13.5 billion and qui tam litigants’ receipt
of $1.4 billion. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Civil Fraud Recoveries Total $2.1
Billion for FY 2003; False Claims Act Recoveries Exceed $12 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/November/03_civ_613.htm; THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
LEGAL
CTR.,
FRAUD
STATISTICS
OVERVIEW
1
(2005),
http://66.98.181.12/newsources/fcastatsfy2004.pdf.
132
See THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT LEGAL CTR., supra note 131, at 1.
133
A side effect of a qui tam system is that it serves as an employment program for the plaintiffs bar,
as entire law firms exist simply to enforce the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. See, e.g.,
Phillips & Cohen LLP, http://www.phillipsandcohen.com.
129
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Qui tam suits came into being because of the inadequacies of public enforcement,134 and
reviving qui tam litigation in contexts where the government cannot adequately monitor
gatekeepers is consistent with its original raison d’être. In qui tam litigation, private plaintiffs
with cost-effective access to information on gatekeeper compliance may be expected to file
enforcement actions if the expected returns exceed their costs of investigation, prosecution, and
potential retaliation. In contrast, an overburdened agency, such as the IRS, may lack the ability
to act even if the tips from private informants are literally right on the money. Victim suits could
perform a similar role to the extent victims have cost-effective access to information on
gatekeeper compliance, but broadening the pool of potential litigants to all private actors may
significantly enhance monitoring levels. In qui tam suits, as in victim suits, plaintiffs must bear
the costs of their investigation and litigation, which may help to deter frivolous suits. The use of
a “loser-pays” principle with a qui tam provision could heighten these incentives even more to
weed our harassment suits that are designed merely to extract a settlement from gatekeepers. 135
Although empowering qui tam litigants may dramatically increase monitoring of
gatekeepers, these enforcement gains come with significant tradeoffs. One cost is the potential
overlap of public and private enforcement efforts, which may entail wasteful redundancies. The
False Claims Act attempts to mitigate this danger by creating a sixty-day window for public
enforcers to review suits and to decide whether to assume control of the case. 136 This approach

134

See Beck, supra note 123, at 565–66, 601; Paul E. McGreal & Dee Dee Baba, Applying Coase to
Qui Tam Actions Against the States, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87, 120 (2001) (describing qui tam actions
as “creatures of necessity” for the early American government because of its public enforcement
limitations).
135
See Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The
Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 51 n.250 (1995) (arguing that the incorporation of a loserpays principle may significantly reduce frivolous lawsuits).
136
The danger exists that the government will assume control of qui tam litigation in order to scuttle it
because of illicit collusion with the targeted gatekeepers. But the track record of False Claims Act
litigation suggests that qui tam litigants received compensation far more often when the government
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coordinates public and private enforcement efforts only after the case is filed and may miss
wasteful overlap of public and private enforcement energies before this time. But the risks and
costs of overlapping efforts may be a necessary evil for the enforcement gains from enlisting qui
tam litigants. Another social cost that may be all but impossible to eliminate would be social
waste caused by multiple private parties’ attempting to monitor the same gatekeepers. 137 The
fact that under the False Claims Act the case is not disclosed until sixty days after it is filed may
simply exacerbate the danger of wasteful overlap of private monitoring.
Another potential shortcoming of qui tam litigation is that it may largely take enforcement
decisions out of public enforcers’ hands. 138 Much of public enforcement turns on discretionary
judgments by public enforcers. 139 Although discretionary powers may be abused, they empower
public enforcers to contextualize legal requirements and to show flexibility and mercy when it
may be desirable. In contrast, private enforcement is a blunt tool, and the danger exists that qui
tam litigants will engage in wasteful litigation to extract the most for themselves, when public

assumes control of the case than when it does not. See Bucy, supra note 7, at 51 & n.290 (noting that qui
tam litigants received significantly less compensation when litigating completely on their own than when
the government participated in the case). This fact suggests that qui tam litigants have an interest in
alerting public enforcers about the scope of their investigation and findings, which may mitigate the
possibility of a significant overlap of public and private oversight of gatekeepers.
137
Sunstein, supra note 104, at 431–32 (noting this concern of overlapping enforcement efforts in the
§ 1983 context).
138
Victim suits also take enforcement discretion out of the government’s hands. But victim suit
provisions generally limit standing to cases of actual harm to victims, while qui tam litigants would enjoy
sweeping discretion to initiate actions in any case of alleged gatekeeper noncompliance.
139
See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969)
(arguing that discretionary enforcement may be “indispensable for individualization of justice”).
Discretionary enforcement allows leniency when a law appears overly inclusive or when its application
would impose an injustice in a given case. Discretionary enforcement has its own shortcomings.
Officials are often monopsonists of public enforcement and therefore must routinely prioritize
enforcement efforts, even if mandatory enforcement rules are in place. They may exercise discretion in
arbitrary or invidious ways or unconsciously misuse their powers of selective enforcement. See, e.g.,
Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA.
L. REV. 939, 981-89 (1997) (discussing how a range of motivations other than maximizing convictions
may shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
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enforcers could resolve the case far more efficiently in ways that advance the public interest. It
is possible to implement provisions similar to the False Claims Act to empower public enforcers
to review and assume control of qui tam litigation to mitigate this danger.140

However,

overwhelmed and underfinanced public enforcers may often be equally ill-equipped to take
control of cases even when there is a perceived need to intervene to temper enforcement.
A related danger is that qui tam litigants may employ litigation strategies that establish
precedents limiting both future qui tam litigants and public enforcers. 141 Private litigants may
solely concern themselves with their private benefits, rather than the broader social benefits of
deterrence of gatekeepers, and therefore may either under- or overinvest in enforcement in any
given case. 142 Public enforcers may not be in the position ex ante to know whether a particular
case could lead to outcomes with lasting implications or even to take the time to assess the social
benefits of government intervention or support of a given lawsuit. For these reasons, it may be
best to use qui tam litigation in narrowly defined areas of enforcement where the merits of
discretionary enforcement or public control of the litigation are low. This fact counsels using qui
tam suits as complements to broader enforcement efforts, which may rely on other public or
private means for other facets of enforcement.

140

See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2)–(3) (2000).
While the danger of poor litigation leading to damaging precedents exists, this danger may be
offset by qui tam litigants’ innovative litigation strategies that may make it easier to uncover wrongdoing
or to make successful claims. See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 112–13.
142
See Shavell, supra note 102, at 584–85 (arguing that the amount at stake for private litigants is
only very loosely related to the social benefits of litigation and how it may be socially beneficial to invest
more than the dollars at stake in the suit in cases where substantial deterrence may result and how in other
contexts suits should not be brought at all if they may not result in any or much of a likelihood of reduced
harm); see also Zinn, supra note 101, at 137–39 (noting that the interests of ideologically oriented
plaintiffs may encompass a broader conception of the social benefits and costs than profit-driven
plaintiffs).
141

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

47

3. The Potential for Private Informants
The use of private informants offers another way to provide public enforcers with insider
information, yet to leave public enforcers in control of enforcement actions. Private informants
function as profit-driven whistleblowers, who may dramatically enhance the government’s
monitoring ability yet whose potential use may inflict significant costs on gatekeepers and
markets. 143 Monetary incentives may entice informants to provide invaluable leads that public
enforcers otherwise could not acquire or could acquire only at prohibitive economic or social
costs. However, these benefits come with potential risks of false claims to harass employers or
secure revenge, risks of encouraging sabotage of gatekeeper compliance from within firms, and
social costs that may erode relationships between corporate managers and employees and among
co-workers. 144
Nonetheless, an incentive system for private informants offers several advantages over a qui
tam litigant approach.

The use of private informants allows public enforcers to heighten

monitoring of gatekeepers while allowing public enforcers to maintain control of the power to
prosecute. Because public enforcers may often be able to leverage informant tips to uncover
wrongdoing without disclosing informants’ identity, the same insiders may be able to monitor
continuously gatekeeper compliance in ways that qui litigants or victims may not. However,
informants need not put their money where their mouth is, as in victim suits and qui tam

143

The term “private informant” admittedly also does not carry the best of associations. However,
private informants have been routinely used in limited contexts as complements to public enforcement.
See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
645, 647–51 (2004).
144
The enlistment of informants may have chilling effects on interaction between employers and
employees and between corporations and clients, as these actors may have incentives to minimize
interaction and disclosures if they fear that information could be used against them at a later point. See
Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (1995).
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litigation. For this reason, informants may be more likely to supply false information, which
enforcers will need to screen out.
The federal government widely employs incentives for private informants to assist public
enforcement efforts. 145

Prosecutors routinely use immunity or lower sanctions to secure

cooperation from material witnesses and suspects in criminal and civil investigations. 146 Notices
of public and private bounties for information leading to the arrest and conviction of specific
individuals or types of criminals are ubiquitous fixtures at police stations, post offices, and on the
evening news. 147
The Internal Revenue Service and Securities and Exchange Commission have long used
incentives for private informants to combat tax and securities fraud, respectively.148 In both
contexts the agencies have limited personnel and face stark challenges in detecting fraud. 149 For
example, in 2000 the IRS only audited about one in every 232 returns.150 By the agency’s own
admission, staff reductions of one-sixth since 1992 forced the IRS to write off billions in unpaid

145

See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 93, 109 (2003).
146
See id. at 97–102 (discussing the classic prisoner’s dilemma that seeks to divide the interests of
defendants by offering the first to cop a plea disproportionate rewards).
147
See, e.g., Erik S. Lesser, An Ex-Hostage Receives Her Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at A1
(noting that the former hostage whose call led to the arrest of courthouse murderer Brian Nichols received
a $70,000 informants’ reward).
148
See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (2000);
Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101647, 104 Stat. 4849 (1990); Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1(b)(2) (1999); I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 REWARDS FOR
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (1997).
149
For example from 1990 to 2000, the number of SEC enforcers increased by approximately sixteen
percent, while the number of complaints grew one hundred percent. During this same period, the SEC
reviewed in part or whole only eight percent of corporate filings, compared with twenty-one percent in
1991. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED
WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 13, 21–22 (2002).
150
See As Audits Decline, Fewer Taxpayers Balk at Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A11.
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taxes. 151 More recently, the IRS has tried to expand its enforcement capabilities,152 but its
enforcers are still woefully few in number compared to the scale of their task.
The IRS offers rewards of one to fifteen percent of revenues recouped from tax evasion
depending upon the agency’s assessment of the usefulness of tips. 153 On average the agency
receives over ten thousand tips each year from private informants concerning billions of dollars
of alleged tax fraud. 154 The understaffed IRS may still lack the personnel to pursue these leads,
but private informants’ responsiveness to economic incentives suggests how this tool may form a
valuable complement to public enforcement.
Private informants may enhance the information-gathering capabilities of enforcement
agencies, especially when strong networks and connections between gatekeepers and the primary
wrongdoers pose barriers to public monitoring. But one other challenge is that enforcement
decisions may turn on varying combinations of tips from informant and public enforcement
investigations, which makes reward setting difficult. One way to approach this problem is to
employ agency discretion in setting rewards on a case-by-case basis, such as the IRS’ informant
system. 155 This discretionary approach may allow rewards to reflect the risks taken by the
informant in securing and disclosing the information or the impact in uncovering wrongdoing.
151

See David Cay Johnston, A Smaller I.R.S. Gives Up Billions in Back Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2001, at A1.
152
See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE DATA BOOK 2005 ii (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf) (detailing
how the IRS audited 1.2 million individual taxpayers in 2005); Mary Mosquera, IRS, States Expand
Efforts to Fight Money Laundering, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, June 8, 2004,
http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily.updates/26149-1.html.
153
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(b)(2) (1999); I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 (1997).
154
See Marsha Ferziger & Daniel Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of
Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1167–68. This number is much smaller than
what one might expect given the perceived pervasiveness of tax fraud. This figure may be explained by
the fact that the informant program is not widely advertised or that prospective informants are reluctant to
participate for fear of being exposed in the process or because the expected value of benefits are too low
to justify the risks of being an informant.
155
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (1999); I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 (1997).
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The downside is the lack of predictability may dampen informant participation rates. Informants
may not be willing to undergo the risks of information gathering and disclosure without having
greater certainty concerning the monetary value of the information they provide. The alternative
approach is to fix the level of compensation for tips as a set percentage of enforcement outcomes
to the extent this approach is feasible. This approach may make it easier for policymakers to
attempt to set the desired level of enforcement and for prospective informants to decide whether
the expected value of tips justifies the risks of uncovering the relevant information. 156

A

“sweetener” approach that combines fixed rewards with discretionary incentives based on the
circumstances of each case may offer the best balance of incentives to create clear expectations
for informants.
Another challenge is that the anonymity of private informants is a two-edged sword.
Anonymity may produce incentives for a higher level of informant participation and a greater
number of tips. However, the ability of informants to levy their accusations privately may make
them more likely to produce highly speculative or false tips to harass gatekeepers they are
ostensibly monitoring.

Private informant systems generally do not apply sanctions against

informants for frivolous tips. 157 Public enforcers would face the potentially costly burden of
screening out bona fide leads from false allegations, and the targeted gatekeepers would also
bear the costs of fending off investigations based on erroneous allegations.

156

The challenge with any informant system is that public enforcers may choose not to act on
informants’ tips or settle with gatekeepers at steeply discounted sanctions or none at all. Informants’
compensation therefore will turn on public enforcers’ discretion even if compensation is linked to
enforcement outcomes that stem from the tips. See Natapoff, supra note 143, at 681–82 (discussing how
the rewards for informants turn on the discretion of police officers and prosecutors).
157
This risk may be far less in the case of repeat player informants whose continuing interactions with
public enforcers may produce incentives for providing credible information or allow public enforcers to
gauge the authenticity of present tips in light of informants’ past reliability.
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Private informant systems may also be inefficient because of overlapping search costs. If
multiple private parties are engaging in search costs, there may be excessive private investment
in policing gatekeepers and resulting social waste. If public enforcers coordinated with private
informants this danger could be mitigated. The problem of overlapping searches would be more
common and a necessary tradeoff in cases where private informants come to the government at
their own accord and volunteer information for rewards. The use of informants may also be
costly because government officials will need to invest resources in exploring the validity of tips,
in weighing the value of their information in calculating rewards, and in making financial
payments. While it may be harder to break down the full costs of public enforcers’ uncovering a
given amount of information, these costs dampen the benefits from private informants’ tips.
Enforcers will also need to divert resources from monitoring and prosecuting gatekeepers
towards protecting informants or suspected informants who may face retaliation from
gatekeepers or other interested parties. In extreme cases where informants may face threats of
violence, the need to protect informants may require a commitment to relocate informants and
their families under a witness protection program. At minimum, the costs would entail providing
financial and legal assistance for informants to uphold their rights against retaliation.
The use of private informants also entails significant social costs that caution towards its
application in limited contexts.

It may be socially desirable to use the threat of private

informants to chill particular illegal acts, such as tax evasion and other financial actions that skirt
the edges of legality. However, this chilling effect may make it harder for gatekeepers to
perform their work by providing employers with incentives to minimize exchanges of
information with clients, employees, or the general public for fear that disclosures could be used
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against them. 158 This approach may make it more difficult for gatekeepers to acquiesce to or
assist wrongdoing, but it may also chill lawful and socially valuable interaction between
gatekeepers and other parties. 159 Using private informants may also have significant chilling
effects on social interaction in the workplace and broader community, and therefore should only
be used in narrow contexts where less invasive information gathering techniques have proven to
be ineffective.
4. Enlisting Wrongdoers to Oversee Gatekeepers
Offering immunity and other incentives for the primary wrongdoers to report gatekeeper
violations could serve as an ongoing, large-scale sting operation for overseeing gatekeepers. If
the reward of clemency and additional financial rewards were high enough, public enforcers may
be able to get primary wrongdoers to come to them to reveal gatekeeper violations. 160 This
approach is a hybrid between the use of private informants and plea bargaining, because the
underlying rationale for enlisting gatekeepers is that public enforcers may not be in a position to
identify, apprehend, or prosecute primary wrongdoers in many contexts. 161 Nonetheless, this

158

See Painter, supra note 144, at 240–41.
The widespread application of private informant systems may arouse understandable opposition
from both liberals and libertarians who would see the specter of a “stasi state.” See Inga Markovits,
Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and Forget About the Past—The Case of
East Germany, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 533 (2001) (discussing the “stasi,” the secret police for the
former East German regime, which was notorious for relying extensively on private informers to police
for dissent).
160
These rewards must be substantial because cooperating wrongdoers may face intense social
sanctions from their community, difficulty in finding employment, and other emotional hardships. See
Bucy, supra note 7, at 61–62 (discussing the economic and social costs that whistleblowers may face).
161
See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 1, 46 (2000) (noting how rewards for cooperating witnesses may be necessary to convince them
not to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination).
159
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approach has potential because primary offenders may have a substantial interest in coming
forward to be made clean in the eyes of the law and to receive monetary rewards. 162
Who could be in a better position to know whether wrongdoing was taking place, what the
gatekeeper knew of the wrongdoing, or how the gatekeeper conducted the oversight than the
primary wrongdoers?

The primary wrongdoers would likely not be able to look over an

accountant’s shoulders as she checked quarterly reports or to see whether a lawyer went through
the proper due diligence checks for an initial public offering. But primary wrongdoers may be
able to know firsthand what information the gatekeepers requested and be in the best position to
produce evidence that wrongdoing was tacitly or explicitly tolerated. In cases where the interests
of the primary wrongdoer and the gatekeeper are closely intertwined and difficult to monitor, the
prospect of clemency and monetary gain may offer public enforcers the only way to uncover
evidence of understandings that existed between gatekeepers and the primary wrongdoers.
At first glance, offering clemency and financial rewards to primary wrongdoers might seem
to be turning enforcement objectives on their heads.

The point of gatekeeper liability is

ultimately to deter the primary wrongdoers, so why should wrongdoers be allowed to go free or
profit from their wrongdoing while the gatekeepers may be left facing penalties? Even in a plea
bargaining context, cooperating wrongdoers at best receive a clean slate and typically receive a
reduced sentence. The logic here is that legitimizing some illicit activity may be an acceptable
price to pay for the benefit of producing greater incentives for gatekeeper compliance. If the real
or perceived probability of wrongdoers’ blowing the whistle on gatekeepers and the resulting

162

Being granted clemency may be the most compelling interest for many primary offenders, because
the multiplier effect of being clean in the eyes of the law may be far more valuable than any sum of
money.

54

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

sanctions were high enough, then gatekeepers would respond by investing more in efforts to live
up to their gatekeeper obligations and thus reduce levels of illicit activity in the long run.
The danger exists that this approach could become a farce of primary offenders receiving a
“get out of jail free card” with additional sweeteners on a large scale for reporting gatekeepers.
For this reason, tempering these incentives with a first to report provision offers several
advantages. In conventional criminal plea bargaining, the first primary offender to cop the plea
would receive clemency or disproportionate rewards, while those who plea later may get little
save a moderately reduced sentence. 163 Although this approach admittedly poses the danger of
soliciting false pleas and lying by defendants turned government witnesses, it offers strong
incentives for disclosures of illicit activity. In the context of gatekeepers, the first offender to
provide information substantially leading to the uncovering of wrongdoing by a gatekeeper
should reap the bulk of the potential rewards based on the scale of wrongdoing that her
information uncovers. 164
At the same time, we would not want to discourage other primary offenders from coming
forward to present evidence of gatekeepers’ wrongdoing. All offenders may hold their tongues if
they feel they could gain nothing if they are the second or third person to inform on gatekeepers
and may actually risk much by disclosing their own culpability in the process. For this reason,
other primary wrongdoers who produce evidence of a gatekeeper’s violations before the
163

See Christopher, supra note 145, at 98–102.
Much of criminal and civil enforcement literally consists of dangling carrots of clemency or
reduced sentences to pit one defendant against another in order to reduce the time and costs expended on
cases. See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 714–17 (1988) (framing plea bargaining as an all-too-literal “prisoner’s dilemma”). What is
distinctive here is the argument that offers of clemency and rewards should be awarded exclusively to
primary wrongdoers with the goal of raising the costs of noncompliance for gatekeepers. Enforcers could
do the opposite and offer rewards to firms who disclose primary wrongdoers. Although this approach
might make primary wrongdoers more wary of whom they conduct business with, it might actually
dampen the incentives for firm compliance as firms would only disclose violators if the benefits of
disclosure outweighed the benefits of turning a blind eye.
164
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gatekeeper’s prosecution should receive qualified immunity or reduced sentences or fines for
their own wrongdoing.

At a minimum, cooperating wrongdoers should face sentences

dramatically below levels set by the relevant sentencing guidelines or below the expected value
of sentences that they would receive in conventional plea bargaining. 165
An additional advantage of enlisting primary wrongdoers as informants is that offering
clemency and rewards to primary offenders may offer the only way to uncover illicit activity in
the underground economy. Public enforcers who are unable to monitor gatekeepers in the above
ground economy on their own may be completely inept at detecting gatekeepers functioning in
the underground economy. By using incentives to enlist primary offenders, public enforcers may
be able to target gatekeepers that they may never otherwise have known even existed. This
approach may not only target existing gatekeepers in the underground economy, but also allow
public enforcers to reduce the incentives for primary offenders and gatekeepers to go
underground to sidestep gatekeeper liability.
One important caveat is that the appeal of this plea bargaining approach may turn on the
nature of the targeted illicit activity. If the wrongdoing is malum prohibitum rather than malum
in se, 166 this plea bargaining approach would be far more desirable and politically plausible. It
might be palatable to have illegal immigrants inform on employers or even oxycontin addicts
inform on doctors’ making illicit prescriptions in exchange for clemency. In contrast, it might
seem outrageous to reward contractors whose labor practices trample on human rights for
165

This approach is consistent with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which allow for downward
departures from the Guidelines in cases of acceptance of responsibility, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004), or in cases where the government certifies that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance to the government in developing cases against other defendants. Id. Since primary
offenders would be eligible to receive these two benefits in the course of ordinary plea bargaining,
significantly sweetening the incentives may be necessary to entice primary offenders to come forward.
166
Malum prohibitum refers to “[a]n act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute,
although the act itself is not necessarily immoral.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004).
Malum in se refers to “[a] crime or act that is inherently immoral . . . .” Id.
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reporting their American clients’ negligence in failing to police them. The real line may be
between primary offenders whose acts deeply offend the public and those who may only offend
mildly if at all. For example, the public might not have quietly stood by if Kenneth Lay and his
associates at Enron had escaped liability or even received rewards for successfully blaming
negligent attorney or accounting gatekeepers.167
The downside of this approach is that it would entail significant moral hazards (as would be
true in any plea bargaining context). Wrongdoers by definition would have suspect credibility.
Monetary incentives would give them ample reason to lie about gatekeeper compliance or to
seek to entrap gatekeepers. Public enforcers may have to expend substantial resources assessing
the credibility of wrongdoers’ information as many may come forward for the promise of
immunity. Additionally, gatekeepers will face high costs in defending against false claims,
especially if there is not a clear set of compliance measures, such as a safe harbor of actions
which gatekeepers can fulfill to comply with their duty.
Another danger is that gatekeepers may be tempted to collude with the primary wrongdoers
for mutual profit. The cost of the sanction for gatekeepers must be high enough, such that
primary wrongdoers may not simply pay off gatekeepers to take the fall in order for the primary
wrongdoers to get clean or receive financial rewards. Otherwise, we might have a travesty of
justice as crooks could literally launder their money and then report bank gatekeepers for
laundering their money. In the process, money launderers might be able to make their money
literally clean with a side payment going to the gatekeeper for their troubles and to cover any
liabilities incurred in the process. The danger of collusion between gatekeepers and the primary

167

See Alexei Barrieneuvo, Two Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2006 (discussing the convictions of former Enron chief executives Kenneth L. Lay and
Jeffrey K. Skilling).
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offenders would be significant in cases where the sanctions gatekeepers face are low. But the
costs of collusion for gatekeepers may be higher than they first appear and mitigate this danger
because of the collateral effects of gatekeepers’ being caught. Gatekeepers may face escalating
sanctions if they are repeat offenders and more importantly they may face a higher probability of
scrutiny from public enforcers in this and unrelated areas, such as tax compliance.
Even if the expected value of sanctions were high enough that unscrupulous gatekeepers
would not have the incentive to collude with wrongdoers, wrongdoers might exploit private
informant provisions to target gatekeepers’ deep pockets. By rewarding primary offenders who
inform on gatekeepers, we may create incentives for more intricate efforts at deception by
offenders that may make it harder and more costly for gatekeepers to fulfill their responsibilities.
Concerted efforts by fraudulent wrongdoers to bilk gatekeepers may not necessarily be bad
inasmuch as they paradoxically advance public ends by heightening incentives for gatekeepers to
live up to their duties to screen for prospective wrongdoers. 168 This danger, however, does
counsel against the use of strict liability standards to guard against this risk of fraud, at least
unless there is a safe harbor of compliance measures. Otherwise gatekeepers would be forced to
bear liabilities for fraud that they may lack any capability to detect (or only at prohibitive
screening costs) and imposing liability in that type of context would entail social waste. 169
C. Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Using Private Monitors
This discussion has highlighted how the use of private actors to monitor gatekeeper
compliance may dramatically enhance the government’s ability to uncover and prosecute
gatekeeper violations. But it has also suggested how private oversight tools entail costs that defy
168

See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (discussing how fraudulent sting operations by undocumented aliens or qui
tam litigants may paradoxically serve public ends by heightening pressures for employer compliance with
their verification duties).
169
See Hamdani, supra note 2, at 104.
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easy calculation, which should make policymakers pause before embracing these enforcement
tools on a large-scale.
Victim suits entail the least costs but offer the prospect of the least benefits. Empowering
victims may not be as invasive on gatekeepers as empowering qui tam litigants or informants and
therefore avoid the social costs they may inflict. But this virtue is also the shortcoming of this
approach as victims likely enjoy no informational advantage over public enforcers and, in fact,
lack the tools that public enforcers possess to monitor gatekeeper compliance. 170 The primary
appeal of victim suits is that they may fill enforcement roles in cases where public enforcers lack
the resources to prosecute and the information on gatekeeper violations is readily available. 171
The vice and virtue of the other private oversight tools, such as qui tam suits, informants, or
cooperating wrongdoers, is their potential invasiveness and the economic and social costs that
they may inflict in order to achieve their enforcement ends. The most troubling costs that private
monitors would entail are the social costs that are difficult to quantify. Some of these costs
already exist because gatekeepers face the risk that at any time employees or primary
wrongdoers could go to the authorities and accuse gatekeepers of failing to comply with their
duties. 172 The principal difference is one of degree because adding financial incentives could
significantly enhance the number of monitors and the probability that insiders would monitor
170

In theory, victims could offer bounties to insiders for exposing gatekeepers’ wrongdoing. Because
the value of a suit against the gatekeepers may be quite valuable to victims, they may be able to offer
substantial incentives for information that far exceed those offered by public authorities. The downside of
this approach is that insiders may be vulnerable to retaliation by the gatekeepers or to the danger of civil
or criminal liability for their participation in gatekeeper violations or the targeted wrongdoing. In
contrast, public enforcers would be able to offer more credible assurances or clemency to cooperating
insiders that their information would not be used against them.
171
These enforcement gains are partly offset by the possibility of frivolous suits and fishing
expeditions through discovery imposing wasteful burdens on courts and raising costs on gatekeepers,
which they may seek to pass on to the market actors that they provide or demand services.
172
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act recognized the value of insider whistleblowers by strengthening their
legal protections. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1514A(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2002) (laying out the whistleblower
protections for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
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gatekeeper compliance. This may have a chilling effect on business relations because every
customer or community could be a potential litigant, and could harm workplace environments
because bosses and workers may be concerned about potential turncoats in their midst.
Gatekeepers who do no wrong may in theory have nothing to fear. However, the reality of
gatekeeper liability is more complicated because even compliant gatekeepers may face greater
costs if insiders and primary wrongdoers may profit from reporting on their alleged violations.
In an ideal world private monitors would only report actual gatekeeper violations, but the profit
motive may provide incentives to make baseless allegations. Worse still, insiders may have the
incentives and the means to sabotage gatekeeper compliance through their actions or inaction, so
that others may report the violations and they in turn may receive a kickback for their troubles.
Gatekeepers would face costs in defending themselves against false allegations. They may also
have incentives to overinvest in compliance by building in redundancies of internal oversight to
ensure that their employees are complying with gatekeeper obligations and not subverting
compliance efforts. These costs may cause gatekeepers to limit exposure or exit the markets.
Either way gatekeepers’ clients may be forced to foot the bill by either having reduced access to
services or by facing higher costs that gatekeepers will seek to pass on them to the extent that
they can.
Private monitoring of gatekeepers may dramatically enhance the ability to detect and
prosecute gatekeepers who fail to live up to their duties. However, the costs private monitoring
may inflict are significant and build on the other cost concerns with gatekeeper liability which
were laid out in part I. 173 For these reasons, policymakers should exercise caution in enlisting
this oversight approach, and their greatest appeal may be in cases where public enforcers are

173

See supra Part I.B.2.

60

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

otherwise unable to oversee gatekeeper compliance.

As part III will explore in depth,

immigration enforcement poses this type of difficult enforcement challenge where private
monitoring of gatekeepers may be well worth the costs and risks.
III. THE CASE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
A. Placing Immigration Enforcement in Context
1. An Overview of the Immigration Enforcement Challenge
Immigration enforcement offers a stiff test both of the potential of gatekeepers and the
desirability of using private monitors to oversee gatekeeper compliance. 174 The challenges of
policing illegal immigration have overwhelmed decades of public enforcement efforts. 175 The
federal government annually spends billions of dollars on policing borders and other ports of
entry, 176 and a myriad of laws claim to threaten illegal immigrants with civil and criminal
penalties. 177

174

However, the low probability of enforcement, the lack of available sanctions

As noted earlier, immigration enforcement is only one facet of the larger question of immigration
reform whose full scope this article has neither the space nor the ability to address. Instead, this article
seeks to expand the parameters of one dimension of this debate by suggesting how the use of private
monitors to oversee employer compliance offers a politically viable and economically feasible way to
heighten immigration enforcement.
175
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6–
7 (1997) (discussing how extraordinary expansions of resources spent on border control have failed to
stem increasing levels of illegal immigration); Eric Lipton, Homeland Security Chief Tells of Plan to
Stabilize Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at A11 (quoting Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff as
saying “[w]e have decided to stand back and take a look at how we address the problem [of illegal
immigration] and solve it once and for all. The American public is rightly distressed about a situation in
which they feel we do not have the proper control over our borders.”).
176
While politicians periodically engage in political grandstanding over immigration issues, they have
largely engaged in the politics of symbolism and sidestepped the difficult issues surrounding immigration
reform. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Law and the Border: Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 262
(2003) (arguing that politicians have incentives to appear “tough on immigration,” regardless of whether
policies work, in order to reap short-term political gains); Manns, supra note 31, at 145–50 (discussing
how proposals for the formal abolition of the INS not only failed to address the substantive problems
facing immigration policy, but also lowered the profile of immigration issues, as the two successor subagencies would have less clout and visibility than the INS).
177
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2000) (making first time offender undocumented aliens guilty of a
misdemeanor with up to 6 month prison sentence and $500 fine or both); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000)
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against undocumented aliens except for deportation,178 and the ease of reentry through porous
borders make illegal entry a matter of “when” rather than “whether.” 179

The Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement lacks the funds, personnel, 180 and above all the ability to
monitor the vast networks of citizens, legal aliens, and undocumented aliens that facilitate illegal
immigration. 181

(specifying a number of conditions for which undocumented aliens may be deported, such as violating
visa terms or entering without inspection).
178
The government’s routine use of deportation (or voluntary repatriation, which aliens often ignore
in practice) has very limited deterrent value because of the ease of reentry. The federal government rarely
resorts to criminal sanctions because the legal, detention and imprisonment costs of resorting to criminal
proceedings would be prohibitive if the federal government consistently treated illegal immigration as
criminal acts. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-822T, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE EFFORTS 17–18 (2005)
[hereinafter
PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS],
available
at
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/stana062105.pdf (noting how the Homeland Security
Department lacks the resources and facilities even to detain most undocumented aliens who are
apprehended until a deportation hearing can be held).
179
Most enforcement efforts are concentrated on ports of entry, particularly on the Mexican border
region, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and
Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 768 (2000), which may raise the cost of entry for prospective aliens and
redirect border crossings to more remote areas. Enforcement efforts largely overlook the millions of
undocumented aliens who reach the American interior or overstay legal visas and thereafter face only a
minute probability of detection. Conservative estimates hold that twenty-five to forty percent of
undocumented aliens (approximately 2.5 to 4 million people) have overstayed their legal visas. See
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS,
BACKGROUND BRIEFING PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 9
(2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf; see also JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R.
EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 12–13 (1999) (estimating that
about half of undocumented aliens overstayed legal visas).
180
Although the federal government has taken tentative steps towards enlisting state and local
governments as enforcers, this effort appears token at best, as the total number of state officers trained by
the federal government remains only in the hundreds. See April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a
Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 1149, 1155–59 (2004).
181
The lack of funds, personnel, and inability to manage or oversee immigration flows has been a
problem plaguing immigration enforcement for decades. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-216, THE INS
OVERWHELMED AND UNPREPARED FOR THE FUTURE 1–5 (1993) (discussing the INS’ inability to address
growing levels of illegal immigration); Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public
Education: An Analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 409, 410 n.7 (1983) (discussing a 1980
General Accounting Office Report that found the Immigration and Naturalization Service ill-equipped
and underfinanced); McKenzie, supra note 180, at 1164 (discussing how the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement is “severely understaffed and simply lacks the manpower for proper immigration
enforcement”).
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Over twenty years ago the federal government tacitly recognized its inability to address this
problem on its own by attempting to enlist employers as gatekeepers to confirm the immigration
status of their employees. 182 This approach acknowledged the economic roots for most illegal
immigration, 183 but failed to comprehend the scope of the challenge that employer demand for
undocumented alien labor would pose for creating an effective gatekeeper regime.

The

fundamental problem is that both employers of low-wage workers and undocumented aliens
share a strong economic interest in engaging in formal compliance yet substantive subversion of
the verification process. Mutual self-interest has served as a powerful incentive for implicit or
explicit collusion and obfuscation. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement has
proven so incapable of overcoming these obstacles to monitoring employers for good-faith
compliance that it has largely abandoned enforcement efforts. 184

182

See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). This approach once symbolized an innovative attempt at
reform. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Johnson, Coping With Illegal Immigrant Workers: Employer Sanctions,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 961 (arguing that the pending employer verification system would be “both
effective and fair” in deterring illegal immigration). But see R. Paul Faxon, Comment, Employer
Sanctions for Hiring Undocumented Aliens: A Simplistic Solution to a Complex Problem, 6 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 203, 204–07 (1984) (arguing that employer verification proposals do not address the
underlying problems that create pressures for illegal immigration).
183
See 8 U.S.C. § 1364(b)(3) (2000).
184
The lack of effective oversight coupled with flaws in the design and implementation of the
verification system undermined the gatekeeper regime and made the probability of liability near zero. A
broad literature has documented the failures of the employer sanctions system and the virtual
abandonment of enforcement efforts in this area by the INS and its successor, the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY 50–76 (1994) (documenting the failures of the employer verification
system); Espenoza, supra note 11, 347–48 (arguing that the employer verification regime has failed to
reduce illegal immigration, yet “succeeded” in heightening discrimination against citizens and legal aliens
of foreign origin); Medina, supra note 11, at 688–95 (showing how the employer verification system has
failed to reduce the employment of undocumented aliens and to deter illegal immigration). But see
Stephen H. Legomsky, Employer Sanctions: Past and Future, in THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES
OVER IMMIGRATION 171, 171–78 (Peter Duignan & L.H. Gann eds., 1998) (arguing that the employer
verification system may have had some impact in deterring illegal immigration and asserting that levels of
illegal immigration may have risen even more quickly but for the existence of this system).
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This part will show how the enlistment of private monitors to oversee employers may fill
oversight gaps by providing access to insider information on gatekeeper compliance and
increasing levels of enforcement to heighten incentives for employers to engage in good faith
compliance. 185 It will show how private actors may be well situated to produce information on
whether employment violations are taking place at dramatically lower economic and social costs
than public enforcers. 186 It will suggest how the government may enlist undocumented aliens as
de facto sting operation agents and empower competitors, employees, and other members of the
communities to serve as informants or act as qui tam litigants to monitor gatekeeper compliance
on an ongoing basis.
This part will also suggest other related reforms to make gatekeeper compliance more swift
and cost-effective and to mitigate incentives for discrimination against legal aliens and citizens
of foreign origin which heightened monitoring of employers may create. It will show how recent
legislative proposals to expand electronic access to work authorization databases and recently
enacted enhanced protections for driver’s licenses may provide employers with a cost-effective

185

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of the potential to privatize aspects of
immigration enforcement. One notable author to touch on the subject is Peter Schuck, who has explored
the potential for privatizing the monitoring of released aliens who are awaiting deportation hearings. See
Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 667, 682–85
(1997). Elsewhere, Peter Schuck considers another variant of privatization in laying out a proposal for
the “out-sourcing” of refugee and asylum functions from developed countries to developing countries
through an auction system. See PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS
ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 293–325 (1998). But the broad potential for the privatization of
immigration enforcement remains a largely untapped area of scholarship.
186
In some cases public enforcers could acquire this same information, but at the price of prohibitive
economic costs and social disruption. This point was illustrated by the widespread questioning and
detentions of Arab immigrants in the wake of the September 11th attacks. Administration officials may
claim the strategy of questioning and detaining large numbers of Arab men was a success in acquiring
information on potential terrorist activities and on the immigration status of large numbers of ArabAmericans. However, the heavy-handed enforcement approach may have had a poisonous effect on
Arab-American relations with police and American society for countless years to come, ultimately
creating greater problems than this strategy “solved.” See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 47–56 (2003).
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and accurate means of confirming employees’ identities. 187 Although private oversight could
significantly enhance enforcement under almost any duty standard, this part will show how
imposing a negligence standard or strict liability standard coupled with safe harbor of
compliance measures may offer the best incentives for compliance. Lastly, this proposal will
suggest how strengthening substantive protections for discrimination against legal individuals of
foreign nations may offset risks of overdeterrence. Although this proposal entails significant
costs and tradeoffs, it offers a cost-effective and politically viable way to overcome the obstacles
facing immigration enforcement.
2. The Nature of the Enforcement Challenge
Deterring illegal immigration into the United States is an admittedly herculean task that
would challenge even the most well-crafted policies. 188 The United States is not alone in this
effort as other developed countries have also struggled over the past generation in attempting to
limit increasing flows of undocumented aliens. 189 However, no other country’s challenges
compare to those posed by the over 500 million people who pass through U.S. borders every
year. 190 Each year, the undocumented alien population increases by approximately 700,000

187

See Real I.D. Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 202–07, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); H.R. 4437, 109th
Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e) (2006).
188
Approximately eleven million undocumented aliens permanently live in the United States, and this
figure increases by about 700,000 people each year. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 1–2 (Mar. 21,
2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf. Undocumented aliens add an estimated
seven to eight million workers to the labor force, and this number increases when one factors in seasonal
employment. Id. at 3–4.
189
See generally CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Wayne A. Cornelius et al.
eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION] (assessing efforts to curtail illegal immigration in a
cross-section of developed countries).
190
See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 182, at 9.
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people, 191 and an estimated eleven million undocumented aliens permanently live in the United
States. 192
The push and pull factors that surround illegal immigration make this a complex problem.
Push factors include social, economic, and political conditions in immigrant-sending
countries, 193 such as high birth rates and limited economic opportunities. Pull factors include the
economic opportunities and political freedoms of the United States. 194

As importantly,

interfamilial and ethnic networks provide both incentives and opportunities to immigrate, and
they form mediating structures for new immigrants to enter into the labor market and society. 195
Any agency would be hard-pressed to oversee the overwhelming numbers of undocumented
aliens and to counter the strength of these factors. However, the shortcomings of American
enforcement strategies have made a difficult task appear impossible.
The challenge of illegal immigration is that the push and pull factors combine to make most
illegal immigrants both determined to enter the United States and virtually judgment-proof.
Prospective immigrants are willing to spend large sums and to take tremendous risks in entering

191

PASSEL, supra note 186, at 2. This number approximately equals the 800,000 new permanent
residents that enter the United States each year. See Schuck, supra note 173, at 4.
192
PASSELL, supra note 186, at 2.
193
Schuck, supra note 173, at 6.
194
Globalization and enhancements in transportation and communication have combined to make
more people cognizant of vast economic disparities and capable of pursuing new opportunities through
illegal immigration. The United States may be a particularly appealing destination because of America’s
reputation as an accommodating culture and historical openness to immigration.
195
See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, From Anonymity to Transparence: Screening the Workforce in the
Information Age, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 408, 409 n.24 (2000) (noting how employers in lowwages industries rely on immigrant networks to spread word of job openings); Richard C. Jones, MacroPatterns of Undocumented Migration Between Mexico and the United States, in PATTERNS OF
UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION: MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 33, 43–49 (Richard C. Jones ed., 1984)
(documenting the flow of undocumented aliens from villages to U.S. towns and cities from which earlier
village residents have relocated in the short or long term); see also Massey, supra note 25, at 68–70
(discussing the role that social and familial networks play in facilitating legal and illegal immigration).
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the United States. In contrast, the costs for public enforcers to detect, detain, and repatriate
undocumented aliens are prohibitive. 196
One of the greatest challenges in overseeing illegal immigration is that it often operates
through homogenous networks. 197

Initial influxes of legal and undocumented aliens have

created ethnic networks that have facilitated subsequent illegal immigration.198 Pioneer aliens
come to the United States legally or illegally and pave the way for their family, friends, and

196

See RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE
UNDOCUMENTED:
A
COST
ASSESSMENT
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.americanprogress.org/ATF.CF/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A5215D6FF2E06E03%7D/Deporting_the_undocumented.pdf (estimating that it would take $41 billion a year
over five years just to apprehend, detain, and deport the undocumented aliens currently in the United
States).
197
Illegal immigration patterns are consistent with patterns of legal immigration from the first
settlements in British North America to the present. Pioneers from a given ethnic group paved the way
and encouraged and assisted others from their community to follow in their footsteps. For much of U.S.
history, the lines between legal and illegal immigration were amorphous at best, and benign neglect
encouraged these types of immigration flows. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American
Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–84 (1993) (discussing how prior to 1875
most immigration restrictions were state-based and focused on concerns with crime, poverty, disability,
and contagious disease). Nativist impulses shaped restrictions on Chinese immigration, see, e.g.,
Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (1870); Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22
Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943), and more comprehensive immigration legislation in 1924 primarily
targeted Eastern European immigration. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924)
(repealed 1965). But it is noteworthy that benign neglect characterized immigration from the Western
Hemisphere until after World War II. See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 38 (1999).
198
See Philip L. Martin, The United States: Benign Neglect toward Immigration, in CONTROLLING
IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 83, 89 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 1994) (noting that “most
of today’s migration streams have their origins in the colonial or labor recruitment policies of industrial
countries”). For example, one of the great ironies of immigration policy is that large-scale influxes of
undocumented aliens began with the termination of the nation’s only experiment with a temporary
employment program for low-skilled workers. The Bracero program brought four to five million
temporary Mexican workers to work in U.S. agriculture between 1942 and 1964. See PHILIP MARTIN,
CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., THERE IS NOTHING MORE PERMANENT THAN TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS
1 (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2001/back501.pdf; see also RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE
BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY 5 (1971). Following the program’s
abrupt termination, undocumented aliens continued to follow existing employment patterns and served as
linkages for subsequent intrafamilial and intra-ethnic immigration. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE
STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 152–59 (1992). Illegal immigration
streams from other regions, such as Central America and Asia, have followed similar patterns.
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extended networks to enter the United States. 199 The tight intra-ethnic nature of many of these
networks and the fact that layers of citizens, legal aliens, and undocumented aliens are involved
in facilitating illegal immigration have made it extremely difficult for enforcement officials to
oversee and to close off channels for illegal immigration. 200
In spite of these challenges, the nature of illegal immigration patterns also creates
opportunities for heightened enforcement. Because of geographical proximity, immigration
patterns from Mexico and Central America form more of a two-way flow than illegal
immigration from other parts of the world. 201 It is estimated that sixty percent of undocumented
aliens come from Mexico and another twenty percent from Central America. 202 Thus, a large
majority of undocumented aliens are likely to be highly responsive to changed incentives within
the United States or their home country. 203

199

While the initial migrant may have come legally, the long waits that can number in years and the
high costs of immigration processes may make illegal immigration an attractive option, even for family
reunification.
200
Martin, supra note 196, at 89–93.
201
This fact reflects the seasonal nature of work in agriculture, construction, and other fields with
high concentrations of undocumented alien employees, as well as economic conditions in Mexico and
other nearby countries.
202
See B. LINDSEY LOWELL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR., HOW MANY UNDOCUMENTED:
THE
NUMBERS
BEHIND
THE
U.S.-MEXICO
MIGRATION
TALKS
7
(2002),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6.pdf.
203
In contrast, undocumented aliens from East Asia or the Middle East have endured much higher
costs to gain passage to the United States and therefore may be much less responsive to incentives to
return to their country of origin. However, one irony of America’s focus of enforcement resources on the
Mexican border is that many itinerant workers who would return home after their seasonal work is
complete have now become full-time residents in the United States because of fears of not being able to
make it back to the U.S. if they go home. Id. at 8–10.
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B. The Limits of Public Enforcement Tools in Addressing Illegal Immigration
Public enforcers have repeatedly demonstrated that they lack both the tools and the means to
address illegal immigration on their own. 204 Decades of failed policing of American borders and
the American interior suggest intrinsic limits in the federal government’s enforcement
approaches and the need to consider new ways to enlist gatekeepers and other private actors to
fill the glaring gaps in public enforcement. Although the attempt to enlist employers as verifiers
of immigration status has been part of this story of failure, the shortcomings of this approach
largely reflect the limits of public oversight that plague other areas of public enforcement.
Politicians have relied on highly visible and costly policing of the Mexican border region
and other ports of entry as political cover to suggest they are addressing the problem. 205
However, decades of dramatic increases in border patrol resources and personnel have failed to
stem the tide of increasing levels of illegal immigration and have exposed the limits of a
perimeter policing strategy. 206

204

The determination, ingenuity, and sheer numbers of illegal

Space constraints dictate that I can only touch upon the limits of public enforcement strategies,
which each can and have entailed articles and books in themselves. But suggesting the theoretical and
practical limits of these approaches is important for underscoring the need for enlisting private actors to
address the challenges posed by immigration enforcement.
205
Targeting ports of entry and border regions produces large numbers of detections and deportations.
Politicians can then highlight concrete evidence of high numbers of apprehensions or prevented entry to
show interested constituents that they are dealing with the problem of illegal immigration. See Johnson,
supra note 176, at 262. Highly visible enforcement actions along portions of the Mexican border have
redirected undocumented aliens away from the most populated areas and have thus helped to dampen
political pressure for more comprehensive enforcement efforts. See Sam Howe Vechovek, Tiny Stretch of
Border, Big Test For a Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at A1 (highlighting targeted enforcement efforts
in the San Diego and El Paso border regions).
206
From 1993 to 2004, the federal government increased annual spending on border enforcement by a
factor of five, from $740 million to $3.8 billion, and almost tripled the ranks of the Border Patrol, from
nearly 4000 to just under 11,000 agents. See Walter A. Ewing, From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively
Regulating Immigration to the United States, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 445, 455 (2005). During this
same period the illegal immigration population has more than doubled to eleven million. PASSEL, supra
note 186, at 3–4. But for efforts to tighten border enforcement, levels of illegal immigration may well be
higher. Although the focus on perimeter policing appears to have limited efficacy at best, it continues to
have political appeal. See, e.g., Bush’s Speech on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006 (discussing
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entrants would likely overwhelm the most well designed border strategy, let alone the more
fallible American approach. 207 In a world without fiscal or personnel constraints, the United
States could saturate American borders and other ports of entry with personnel and ensure that
few could escape an initial inspection. 208 But this approach would be both unrealistic and
extremely wasteful, and as importantly it would be incomplete because upwards of forty percent
of illegal immigrants initially enter under a valid visa, and subsequently violate the visa terms or
overstay. 209
Interior enforcement strategies have proven far less effective in deterring illegal
immigration and underscored the limits of a sole reliance on public enforcement tools. Recent
enhancements in the automation and documentation of the entry and exit of foreign visitors have
made it easier for authorities to document likely visa overstayers amongst the approximately 500

President Bush’s plan to “train[] thousands of new Border Patrol agents and bring[] the most advanced
technology to the border”).
207
Because the costs of detention are prohibitive, Border Patrol agents face no choice but to
fingerprint apprehended aliens and to deliver them to the Mexican border, only to see (or rather to miss
seeing) the overwhelming majority of these individuals successfully run the gauntlet of the border region
in future attempts. John L. Martin, Ctr. For Immigr. Stud., Can We Control the Border? A Look at
Recent
Effects
in
San
Diego,
El
Paso,
and
Nogales
(1995),
http://www.cig.org/articles/1995/border/border2.html (“The Border Patrol has long known that many of
the Mexicans whom it apprehends and requires to deport continue to repeat illegal entry attempts in the
hope that they will succeed the next time.”).
208
As immigration expert Wayne Cornelius has opined, “[s]hort of a full-scale militarization of the
border, no policy will prevent a continued influx into this country of Mexican migrants.” Wayne A.
Cornelius, Simpson-Mazzoli vs. The Realities of Mexican Immigration, in AMERICA’S NEW IMMIGRATION
LAW: ORIGINS, RATIONALES, AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 139, 141 (Wayne A. Cornelius & Ricardo
Anzaldua Montoya, eds., 1983).
209
See PASSEL, supra note 177, at 9. One policy argument for a perimeter strategy is that individuals
desperate enough to attempt illegal entry may be more likely to constitute a potential financial burden on
the state or pose a greater threat to public order than those affluent enough to secure and violate a visa.
However, the sophistication of human smuggling networks in securing visas may reduce the socioeconomic gap between visa overstayers and illegal entrants (who trade higher risks for lower financial
costs for illegal entry). Even if this point were true, the mandate of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement is to enforce laws against illegal immigration, not merely to screen out those it
deems “less socially desirable” aliens. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Mission,
http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
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million people who enter through U.S. borders each year. 210 However, overstayers can easily
disappear into the American interior as, with the notable exception of employment verification,
enforcers lack any means to track overstayers’ whereabouts, unless they stumble into a
background check by committing a crime. 211 The federal government has required all aliens to
register with immigration authorities in an effort to fill this gap, but those who register are
presumably bona fide visa-holders or otherwise law-abiding aliens who would constitute the
least appealing candidates for deportation. 212
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement lacks the manpower, resources, and
means to track down on its own the vast majority of undocumented aliens who do not register.213
Although billions of dollars are allocated to policing the borders and other ports of entry, only a

210

See Bryan Paul Christian, Visa Policy, Inspection and Exit Controls: Transatlantic Perspectives on
Migration Management, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 232–33 (1999).
211
Heightened visa screening or the use of monetary conditions for applicants from high-risk
countries may offer alternative ways to reduce risks of overstaying. Visa screening is by definition
imprecise, but investing more State Department resources on visa screening is far less costly than tracking
down overstayers. Compare Christian, id. at 217, 220 (discussing how low-level State Department
officials base visa decisions largely on a few minute interview with applicants), with GOYLE & JAEGER,
supra note 194, at 1 (estimating that it would take $41 billion a year over five years just to apprehend,
detain, and deport the illegal immigrants currently in the United States).
212
See Diane Cardwell, Pakistani and Saudi Men Find Long Lines for Registration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2003, at D2 (noting that about 100,000 noncitizen Arab adult men registered by the deadlines, which
constitutes only a percentage of the estimated several hundred thousand Arab noncitizen men in the
country); Corey Killgannon, All-American? U.S. Says No; Teenager May Be Deported, but Pakistan Isn’t
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at D1 (describing the fear and outrage that this registration policy has
created among Arab-Americans in New York City); Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands of Arabs and Muslims
Could Be Deported, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A1 (detailing how about fifteen percent
of the Middle Eastern men who registered with the immigration authorities now face deportation because
of their illegal status, which led to a backlash to the registration policy).
213
Even the registration of aliens is so time consuming that it has placed a significant strain on the
manpower resources of the Bureau. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Seek to Fingerprint Visas’ Holders, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A2 (discussing how efforts to register Arab-American men overwhelmed the
manpower resources of the INS). To have a realistic prospect of being effective, a registration plan must
turn on the active support of local authorities in registering aliens. Although the federal government has
sought to forge partnerships with state police forces in the wake of September 11th, McKenzie, supra
note 180, at 1155–59, federalism continues to pose significant barriers to registration efforts and
immigration enforcement more broadly. See Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal
Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promise of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 456–58 (1999).
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token force of about 2000 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials enforce
immigration laws in the American interior. 214 The understandable priority of these limited
number of agents’ efforts is identifying and removing criminal aliens upon their release from
state and federal prisons. 215 Few would quarrel with making the deportation of criminal aliens a
priority as they may pose the most direct threat to society. 216 However, the dearth of interior
enforcement personnel means that the majority of interior enforcement resources are consumed
by this task. 217 The remainder of scarce resources is scattered amongst efforts to target human
smuggling and trafficking networks, noncriminal removals, benefit fraud, and enforcement of
laws against employment of undocumented aliens. 218 Even to the limited extent that interior
enforcement takes place outside of the criminal alien context, these efforts are largely related to

214

As of 2002, only about 1,800 immigration enforcement officers are dedicated to enforcing
immigration laws in the American interior outside of ports of entry. See Eric Schmitt, Administration
Split on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at A1. This problem has only grown
worse in recent years, as in 2004 the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement had a deficit of
$150 to $200 million dollars, which has led to a hiring freeze and reduced enforcement efforts. See Clark
Kent Ervin, A To-Do List for Chertoff, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2005, at A21.
215
See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., BACKGROUNDER: INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY (1999), available at http://uscis.gov/text/shared/lawenfor/interiorenf/strategy.htm. While the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement does not have an official interior strategy, its resource
allocation indicates that it continues to make screening for criminal aliens its overwhelming enforcement
priority. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-660T, HOMELAND SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO
IMPLEMENTING THE IMMIGRATION INTERIOR STRATEGY 3–5 (2003) [hereinafter HOMELAND SECURITY],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03660t.pdf (statement of Richard M. Stana).
216
For example, in 2000, attempts to determine the legal status of over 100,000 convicted criminals
accounted for 91% of the cases taken up by enforcement officials. See 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, § VII, at 3–4 (2002) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION
SERV.],
available
at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/yearbook2000.pdf).
217
See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 213, at 3–5.
218
On average, each year the equivalent of four hundred officers’ time is allocated to policing
smuggling and trafficking networks, and the equivalent of two hundred officers’ time or less is given to
noncriminal removals, benefit fraud, and worksite enforcement, respectively. Id. at 5.

72

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

national security concerns, 219 and routine efforts at enforcing immigration laws have become the
exception outside of the Mexican border region. 220
Given the paltry number of interior enforcement officers, any increase in staffing would
likely lead to marginally better results. Increased staffing alone, however, may do little more to
solve internal enforcement problems than increases in staffing have addressed illegal border
crossings. The primary barrier to interior enforcement is the ease with which undocumented
aliens may virtually disappear within ethnic networks and communities. These networks often
serve as an impetus for the decision to migrate and act as the primary mediating structures for
immigrants to find housing, jobs, and other services. 221 Legal immigrants often serve as official
covers to harbor and employ undocumented aliens, and extended families often include citizens,
legal aliens, and undocumented aliens, a fact which further complicates oversight. 222 Employing
officers with greater linguistic abilities and cultural understandings may modestly enhance the
ability to oversee these networks, but acquiring the insider information needed to identify
undocumented aliens on a large scale is likely well beyond the means of public enforcers to
achieve on their own. 223

219

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-06, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: DHS HAS
INCORPORATED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES AND IS ADDRESSING FUTURE PLANNING
REQUIREMENTS 2–3 (2004).
220
See id.
221
See, e.g., ALBA & NEE, supra note 24, at 188.
222
See, e.g., id. at 43.
223
Given fiscal constraints on personnel levels, one could imagine recourse to a selective enforcement
strategy that concentrates efforts on policing ethnic networks and enclaves. However, this strategy could
easily backfire. Racial profiling, whether actual or inferred, may fuel allegations of racism and
discrimination against people of foreign origin. Crackdowns could poison relations between ethnic
communities and federal and local officials and lead to the dispersal and greater decentralization of
networks. In this atmosphere the understaffing of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
could become an even more significant liability. The prohibitive social costs of such an approach would
likely far outweigh any short-run enforcement benefits. Compare Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against
Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000) (arguing that racial profiling
against Latinos for illegal immigration enforcement perpetuates stereotypes of all Latinos as foreigners),
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Even when the government is able to identify undocumented aliens, public enforcers lack
effective sanctions to impose directly on undocumented aliens. Deportation may be the most
plausible sanction, 224 given that many undocumented aliens are judgment-proof and the sheer
scale of illegal immigration would overwhelm detention centers and prisons. 225

However,

deportations are costly, especially outside of the border regions, and constitute an ineffective
sanction because of the ease of illegal reentry. 226 Additionally, both the economic and social
costs entailed in the detention of undocumented aliens, deportation proceedings, and actual
deportations are so prohibitive that this approach is not a viable option on a large-scale. 227
Sanctions short of deportation, such as the denial of state services to undocumented aliens,
have proven to be equally ineffective tools of deterrence.228 Economic opportunity, rather than

with Peter H. Schuck, A Case for Profiling, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 59 (making the case for profiling in
the context of counter-terrorism efforts).
224
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) (specifying a number of conditions for which undocumented aliens
may be deported, such as violating visa terms or entering without inspection). If deportees had been in
the United States for more than 180 days or over one year before their apprehension, then they cannot
legally reenter the United States for three years or ten years, respectively. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)
(2000). The irony of this provision is that the sanction of a multi-year ban on legal reentry may all but
force these individuals to resort to illegal immigration once again if they wish to reenter.
225
Imprisonment offers the illusory promise of making aliens “pay” for their illegal entry with their
time. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2000) (punishing undocumented aliens with up to a six-month prison
sentence, a fine, or both for the first offense, and up to a two-year imprisonment, a fine, or both for a
subsequent offense). These sanctions are rarely used for good reason, because systematic efforts to
imprison undocumented aliens not only may arouse popular opposition, but also could pose immense
social costs and overwhelm already overcrowded prisons. See PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note
176, at 17–18 (noting how the Homeland Security Department has decided that due to limited detention
spaces, the detention of aliens subject to national security investigations were to be given priority, while
employment-related aliens were to be given the lowest priority, which in practice meant they were to be
routinely released).
226
Deportations may simply raise the financial cost for determined migrants, as repeat efforts to cross
will almost inevitably result in success.
227
See GOYLE & JAESER, supra note 194, at 3; Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive
Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1048–50 & nn.516–22 (1998) (discussing
the legal costs associated with deportation proceedings).
228
For example, the federal government has denied undocumented aliens access to almost all public
benefits except for emergency relief. See, e.g., IIRIRA 501, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621 (2000) (denying
access to all federal grants and licenses); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (cutting off undocumented aliens’ access to most federal
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social services, is the magnet for most illegal immigration, and denying services to aliens in their
time of need may end up only magnifying the social burden in the long run. 229 For example,
cutting off access to services such as preventive medicine may ultimately force states to face
higher burdens to provide constitutionally mandated emergency care.230 Additionally, the denial
of basic services may make undocumented workers more vulnerable to involvement in organized
crime. 231 This approach, like the other efforts at targeting undocumented aliens directly, failed
because public enforcers lack the tools and the means to detect and deter undocumented aliens
on their own.
C. The Limits of the Existing System for Enlisting Employers as Gatekeepers
The enlistment of employers as gatekeepers in 1986 constituted a recognition of the limits
of public enforcement and the need to enlist private actors to fill the enforcement gaps in the
American interior. 232 The theoretical appeal of requiring employers to verify the legal status of
prospective employees is intuitive as this approach offers a way to target the economic roots of
public benefits); see also Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Leg. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) (cutting off
undocumented aliens’ access to most public services in California).
229
See Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Introduction: The Ambivalent Quest for Immigration Control, in
CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION, supra note 187, at 37 (arguing that “there is little empirical evidence for
the proposition that availability of social services or entitlements is a powerful magnet for would-be
illegal entrants”).
230
Prospective undocumented aliens may also face such poor conditions at home that these attempts
at deterrence may have little or no effect. See Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens’ Access
to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1475, 1478–80 (1995).
231
Other sanctions may have illusory appeal, such as rescinding the automatic citizenship provision
for children of undocumented aliens. Citizenship by birth may make the United States a more appealing
destination than other developed countries. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the
Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 60 (1997). However, the merits of perpetuating illegal status from
one generation to the next are dubious at best. As Peter Schuck has argued, even if citizenship by birth
could be abrogated in the case of illegal immigrants, the notion of having a permanent noncitizen class of
undocumented aliens being perpetuated from generation to generation appears repugnant to America’s
egalitarian ideals and broader policy objectives of immigrant assimilation. See SCHUCK, supra note 183,
at 352.
232
See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1952)); see also Illegal Immigrant Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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illegal immigration. 233 Employers are uniquely positioned to function as gatekeepers because
the vast majority of undocumented aliens come to the United States seeking economic
opportunities from employers. 234 An effective verification system with high levels of employer
compliance could have high deterrent value in decreasing both the value and the availability of
economic opportunities for undocumented aliens and thus making the United States a less
attractive destination. 235
The problem is that while employers are well positioned to serve as gatekeepers, their
economic interests often clash significantly with good-faith compliance. Employers of low-wage
workers and undocumented aliens share incentives to find ways around the substance of the
verification requirement, which has led to large-scale subversion of the law. 236 The same types

233

See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
In theory, common carriers, landlords, banks, check-cashing stores, and retail stores could all be
enlisted to screen for the legality of their customers, but this broader approach would impose much higher
costs on society and pose greater challenges for monitoring. Each of these gatekeepers could be required
to confirm the immigration status of individuals who are using their services or for whom they are
providing services or face the prospect of liability. These gatekeepers already routinely check
identification information for both legal reasons and their own self-interest and have developed swift,
cost-effective ways to confirm identity and creditworthiness. If driver’s licenses were made into a more
secure, functional equivalent of a national I.D., see infra Part IV.B, these private actors could confirm
immigration status at a low cost by swiping an identification card or typing in a social security number. If
the error rate of federal databases were low and the expected value of sanctions outweighed compliance
costs, this broad gatekeeper approach could create significant deterrence for undocumented aliens by
making it quite difficult for them to participate in any facet of the U.S. economy. The downside of this
approach is that the broad enlistment of gatekeepers could pose high social costs on all Americans and
place unconscionable burdens on undocumented aliens. It would also suffer from a lack of effective
monitoring of compliance as both the nature of transactions and their scale would make it difficult for the
government to monitor more than a token amount of transactions. In contrast, an employer gatekeeper
approach would impose a minimal burden on the American public by limiting identification confirmation
to a single context and not bar undocumented aliens from access to essential goods and housing.
235
This point would be especially true for the eighty percent of undocumented aliens who are from
Mexico and other parts of Central America, and therefore have more economically viable options of
returning to their home countries. See B. LINDSEY LOWELL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
HOW MANY UNDOCUMENTED: THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXICO MIGRATION TALKS 7 (Mar. 21,
2002), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/reports.jsp?s=allreports.
236
See Andrew Parker, Collecting What America Owes, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A9
(quoting Mark Everson, head of the Internal Revenue Service, as saying “What we cannot afford is to let
234
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of shortcomings that have compromised direct enforcement efforts against undocumented aliens
have led to chronic failures to monitor employer compliance. The Bureau of Immigration and
Customers Enforcement lacks both the manpower and the means to acquire insider information
on noncompliance on its own, and this fact coupled with flaws in the design of the verification
system has led to the virtual abandonment of large-scale efforts at monitoring employers. 237
The verification regime requires employers to confirm the identity and employment
eligibility of all workers and to terminate their employment if they lack the proper identification
materials or if their illegal status later comes to light. 238 Employers face a sliding scale of
sanctions for the knowing employment of undocumented aliens, ranging from a warning and a
$275 fine for initial violations to a $11,000 fine for repeat offenders.239 Both employers and
prospective employees must certify the receipt and submission of legal work authorization
materials. 240

our tax laws be viewed in the same way as our immigration or drug laws are, where too large a segment
of the population says: ‘Those laws are not what we respect.’”).
237
As former INS Commissioner Doris M. Meissner conceded: “This whole area of employer
enforcement has been moribund. There has been a steady decline in effort and resources directed at the
workplace.” See Robert Pear, Clinton to Ban Contracts To Companies That Hire Undocumented Aliens,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at A12.
238
Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1952)); see also Illegal Immigrant
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
239
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 274(a)10(b)1(ii) (2000). These figures greatly
overstate the value of fines as employers routinely negotiate down the level of sanctions in plea
bargaining with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
See PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 17. Employers also face possible criminal penalties for a pattern or
practice of violations, although this provision has rarely, if ever, been used. See, e.g., Illegal Immigrant
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009
(amending 8 U.S.C. §1324(a) (1996)) (imposing a penalty of up to five years imprisonment for the hiring
of ten known undocumented aliens within twelve-month period).
240
Employees’ violation of this certification may lead to perjury and additional civil fines, although
employees have rarely been directly targeted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(h) (2000).
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The range of materials that prospective employees may furnish to prove work authorization
makes the rules easy to satisfy or sidestep. 241

Broad access to counterfeit identification

materials, 242 and the absence of a requirement to check the identification against a national
database, makes it easy to satisfy the verification requirements.243 Prospective workers can
present illegal documentation and employers need only show that they did not know that the
documentation was false. 244 The knowledge standard makes it difficult to prove employer
violations except in the blatant cases of failures to request or submit identification materials or
other clear evidence of fraud or collusion. 245
Low fines and low levels of enforcement have combined to produce little deterrent effect for
employers to engage in more than formalistic compliance.246

241

Worksite enforcement has

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(C) (2000).
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., I-96-08, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE EFFORTS TO COMBAT HARBORING AND EMPLOYING ILLEGAL ALIENS IN
SWEATSHOPS 2–7 (1996); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-99-105, ILLEGAL
ALIENS: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 2–3
(1999). The federal government has required all visitors to have machine-readable passports by October,
2004 and bio-metric passports by October, 2005. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002). But the problem is that the horse is already out
of the barn as starter identification documents such as birth certificates and social security cards are
already readily available on black markets. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ECONOMIC CRIMES POLICY
TEAM, IDENTITY THEFT FINAL REPORT 10–13 (1999) (discussing how social security numbers and
driver’s licenses are widely exploited as “breeder” documents to secure other legal forms of
identification).
243
H.R. 4437 and S. 2611 seek to close this particular loophole by requiring employers to confirm the
social security numbers of job applicants against an electronic database, a significant reform discussed in
part IV. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e)
(2006). While the abundance of counterfeit starter documents such as birth certificates will allow
undocumented aliens to acquire social security numbers, at minimum this approach will raise the costs for
undocumented aliens to enter into labor markets and pressure employers to engage in more explicit legal
violations by not checking social security numbers against this database in order to hire undocumented
aliens. For a more complete discussion on this point, see Part IV.B.
244
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(c)(ii) (2000).
245
Employers must retain copies of documentation for three years after hiring and one year after
dismissal. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(3)(B). However, so long as a formal verification process has taken place, it
is unlikely that the knowing hiring of an illegal alien can be uncovered or proven.
246
Sanctions range from $275 for first time offenders who knowingly employ undocumented aliens
up to $11,000 for repeat offenders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 274a(b)(1)(ii) (2000).
242
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consumed no more than two percent of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and its successor agency’s enforcement resources over the past decade. 247 In 1999 the INS
dedicated only the equivalent of 240 agents’ time (or 9% of its investigative force) to the
oversight of employers, and this number dropped to a paltry 90 agents (or 4% of its investigative
force) in 2003. 248 The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement has almost exclusively
focused its enforcement resources on national security concerns, such as airports and power
plants, and on the detection of criminal aliens in the wake of September 11, 2001. 249 Even in the
rare instances when employers are caught red-handed, they are at best given a slap on the wrists
with miniscule fines. 250
Firms have a myriad of strategies to minimize the possibility of effective oversight and
sanctions, such as engaging in formalistic compliance, subcontracting functions to third parties
who function on the edges of the underground economy, and failing to keep any record of
undocumented alien employees.251 Firms are immune from sanctions if they satisfy the formal

Additional penalties of $110 to $1100 apply for failure to complete and retain Form I-9 records verifying
compliance. See 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(5) (2000).
247
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-99-105, supra note 240, at 4; see also
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 18 (noting that the number of worksite arrests
decreased from 2849 in 1999 to 445 in 2003). The number of employer investigations ranged only from
5149 to 7788 per year between 1992 and 2000. These investigations resulted in a height of 773 warnings
in 1997, a figure that declined to only 282 warnings in 2000. Notices of intent to fine employers peaked
at just over 1000 in 1994 and declined to only 178 in 2000. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERV., supra note 214, at 4 & table 60.
248
See PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 3.
249
See id. at 12; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: DHS
HAS INCORPORATED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES AND IS ADDRESSING FUTURE PLANNING
REQUIREMENTS 6–7 (2004), http://www.gov/new.items/d0566.pdf.
250
For example, Wal-Mart was caught employing at least 250 undocumented aliens and suspected of
employing many times more. The punishment of an eleven million dollar fine appears so miniscule to a
$220 billion corporation that it will have little-to-no deterrent effect. See Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart
to Pay U.S. $11 Million in Lawsuit on Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at A1.
251
See, e.g., Harry Austin, When Employers Lure Illegals, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Nov.
16, 2003, at F4 (discussing Wal-Mart’s claim of no knowledge due to the practice of using contractors to
recruit employees).
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requirements of the verification system and did not know of their employees’ illegal status. 252
Even if firms knowingly employed undocumented aliens and knew that there was a high
probability of being caught, the marginal advantages in terms of wages and productivity from
employing undocumented aliens may exceed potential fines under the current system. 253 The
shortcomings of the verification regime appear to have emboldened both employers and
undocumented aliens to violate the provisions at ever-increasing levels. 254 Although flaws in the
design of the verification requirements and a lack of monitoring of employer compliance have
doomed the current system to failure, the following part will show how the use of private
monitors can breathe new life into the gatekeeping duties of employers by providing them with
credible threats that their compliance measures will be subject to ongoing oversight.
IV. REDESIGNING THE EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION REGIME
The existing employment verification system has flaws in its design and implementation,
but this part will suggest how enlisting private monitors may provide employer gatekeepers with
heightened incentives to comply with their verification duties. It will show how policymakers
may enlist undocumented aliens as part of a de facto sting operation that would paradoxically use
the incentive of legalization to encourage undocumented aliens to report employer violations.
Alternatively, it will suggest how other private actors, such as competitors, employees, and other
252

The nominal enforcement of this law is likely worse than having no law at all, as it has fostered
norms of formalistic compliance with the law, but subversion of the law’s substance.
253
Undocumented aliens bring skills with a willingness to work at lower wages, for longer hours, and
in poor working conditions. Companies may feel they have to risk sanctions, because competition
necessitates reliance on the most cost-effective labor available. See Celia W. Dugger, A Tattered
Crackdown on Illegal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at A1 (quoting a N.Y. City textile factory
owner saying, “I have to make a profit. . . . I think I have to hire illegal people because I don’t want to pay
$7, $8 for work that illegal people can do for $4.25.”).
254
Other variables obviously have shaped the upsurge in illegal immigration, such as economic
dislocations caused by the implementation of NAFTA. However, the failure of employer sanctions may
have demonstrated the lack of will to enforce immigration laws and tacitly encouraged further
immigration.
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members of the community, may be well placed to serve as informants or qui tam litigants to
enhance gatekeeper oversight.

This part will underscore the viability of this proposal by

highlighting how the federal government may make available the document and database tools
for employers to comply with their immigration duties in a swift, cost-effective way. Lastly, it
will suggest how reforming the duty standard for employment verification and enhancing
antidiscrimination protections for legal aliens and citizens of foreign origin may mitigate risks of
overdeterrence.
A. The Merits of Private Monitoring of Employer Compliance
1. The Perpetual Sting Operation of Enlisting Undocumented Aliens as Informants
One of the fundamental challenges facing immigration enforcement is the fact that
employers and undocumented aliens share an interest in subverting immigration laws. The vast
wage gap between the United States and undocumented aliens’ countries of origin makes
undocumented aliens often willing to provide services at or below minimum market rates and to
acquiesce to labor law violations. 255 Employers are more than willing to turn a blind eye to
immigration violations and identify fraud to secure a cheap, exploitable labor source and to
bolster their profits. 256 So long as the interests of both undocumented aliens and employers
remain aligned, both parties may continue to seek innovative ways around any stumbling blocks
that public enforcers may throw in their way.
For this reason public enforcers need to consider unconventional tactics to divide the
interest of undocumented aliens from their employers. On a very limited scale, the Bureau of
255

See supra Part III.C. The significance of this issue is underscored by the fact that the Supreme
Court is hearing oral arguments in April, 2006 concerning the ability of workers to bring a RICO claim
against their employer for depressing their wages by systematically hiring undocumented aliens. See
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams, 411 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 830
(2006).
256
See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 213, at 3–6; Dugger, supra note 251.
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the former INS have targeted undocumented aliens
directly through sting operations by creating sham companies or job opportunities to trap
undocumented aliens who are seeking employment. 257

These tactics may have modest

deterrence value in capturing headlines and leading to the detention and deportation of small
numbers of immigrants. 258 But enforcement agents lack the resources to carry out these types of
sting operations on a large scale, as the costs of detentions, legal proceedings, and deportations
would be financially ruinous and potentially impose an unconscionable human cost on illegal
immigrants and their families. 259
Instead of wasting scarce resources in attempting to target undocumented aliens directly,
enforcement energies should be directed solely against employers to dampen the demand for
undocumented alien labor. Public enforcers should implement a more counterintuitive strategy
of enlisting undocumented aliens as monitors of employer compliance. Enforcers could embrace
a piecemeal approach of setting up individual sting operations against employers using
undocumented aliens, but this strategy would be hamstrung by the costs and energies that
agency-led sting operations would absorb.

Instead, public enforcers should decentralize

enforcement efforts by offering incentives of temporary or permanent legalization to any
undocumented aliens who are willing and able to report and substantiate employer violations.
By seeking to enlist any undocumented aliens as potential informers against their employers,
enforcers may be able to drive a wedge between the interests of undocumented aliens and
257

See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Officials Defraud Ploy to Catch Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2006, at A8.
258
See Steven Greenhouse, An Immigration Sting Puts Two Federal Agencies at Odds, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2005 (discussing a controversial sting operation in which immigration agents posed as organizers
of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration meeting in order to detain forty-eight
undocumented aliens).
259
See GOYLE & JAEGER, supra note 194, at 1 (estimating that it would take $41 billion a year over
five years just to apprehend, detain, and deport the undocumented aliens currently in the United States).
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employers. If all undocumented alien applicants had the incentive to inform on their employers
for their own hire, employers may become far more wary of subverting the verification process
by casting a blind eye to illegal status. 260 This attempt to disrupt symbiotic employer-employee
relationships would constitute a perpetual sting operation, which, if coupled with strong
sanctions, could produce lasting incentives for employer compliance with their gatekeeper
duties. 261
The logic of using incentives for undocumented aliens to report on gatekeeper violations
turns on the fact that undocumented aliens are in the best position to prove their own illegal
status and would often be able to confirm firsthand what compliance measures employers did or
did not perform in their particular case. The nature of ethnic networks and workplace interaction
would also place undocumented aliens in a good position to know whether their employers were
engaging in a pattern of employing undocumented aliens. It may be troubling to some to reward
culpable parties for disclosing illicit acts that they instigated, and this approach would admittedly
pose moral hazards. However, the enforcement benefits from this decentralization of employer
monitoring could dramatically magnify the deterrent effect for employers.
One important question is what level of incentives would be sufficient to get undocumented
aliens to come forward on a large scale to report on employer violations. Undocumented aliens

260

The possibility that undocumented aliens may report employer violations may at minimum give
employers incentives to compensate and treat undocumented aliens better, which may be good in itself
and accord with the objectives of those who seek greater protections for undocumented alien workers.
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Dunne, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy: Understanding Why
Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 624–26
(2000); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2179–84 (1994). As importantly, this
response by employers would have the valuable collateral effect of making the economics of employing
undocumented aliens less favorable for employers and help to dampen demand for undocumented alien
labor.
261
This approach would also create incentives for employers to discriminate against all individuals of
apparent foreign background, an issue which part IV.D will address.
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may feel they have much to lose from going to the authorities and risking changes in the status
quo of their employment.

As discussed earlier, the federal government has few tools to

prosecute undocumented aliens in the American interior because of the prohibitive costs of
detentions, hearings, and deportations. 262 Undocumented aliens, however, may hold fears of
deportation that vastly outweigh the probability of this sanction and make them leery of any
contact with authorities. 263 They may not want to take any risks that could imperil their current
economic position as their extended families often may rely on them to send remittances
home. 264 And undocumented aliens may have legitimate fears of retaliation from their fellow
workers or other members of their community for cooperating with the authorities. Therefore,
the incentives for cooperation must be significant enough to overcome these concerns.
The most effective incentive that the federal government has to offer is the temporary or
permanent legalization of the undocumented aliens. Currently, undocumented aliens may be
able to secure counterfeit documents and engage in identity fraud at low cost to sidestep
employment restrictions, 265 but undocumented aliens are likely to place a high value on
legalization. A temporary work visa or permanent residency would allow undocumented aliens
to return home for periods of time without risking deportation on their return, provide access to

262

See infra Part III.B.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61,
62–63 (2002) (arguing that “when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse
outcome, not on its likelihood,” which may significantly distort private and public decisions).
264
The remittances that undocumented aliens send home to our regional neighbors form America’s de
facto foreign aid program. In 2004 undocumented workers sent $45.8 billion dollars of remittances to
their families in Latin America and the Caribbean. See Richard Lapper, Remittances to Latin America
and Caribbean, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 8; see also Stephen Fidler, New Migrants Spur Growth in
Remittances, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2001, at 7 (highlighting the fact that remittances from the United States
dramatically exceed development aid to Latin America and equal about one-third of foreign direct
investment to the region).
265
See Press Release, INS, INS Cracks National Counterfeit Document Operation (Nov. 13, 1998),
available at http://uscis.gov/text/publicaffairs/newsreels/fineprint.htm.
263
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social services, tax refunds, and Social Security contributions, create eligibility for permanent
residency, and make their day-to-day lives much more secure by removing fears of detection.266
The question remains of how public enforcers could make the reward proportional to the
scale of wrongdoing that an undocumented aliens exposes. The federal government could offer
undocumented aliens a sliding scale of rewards ranging from a one-year temporary workers’
permit to permanent residency based on the scale of gatekeeper wrongdoing that their
information helps to uncover. Making the minimum reward of a one-year or two-year temporary
workers’ permit renewable, at least for a set period of years, could place undocumented aliens in
a position far better than living on the edges of legality. 267 Even the minimum reward may
produce a significant incentive for undocumented aliens to assume the risks of reporting their
employer, and offering work permits for longer periods up to permanent residency status would
produce incentives for disclosing multiple instances of employer noncompliance.
Although legalization may be valuable to undocumented aliens, this reward alone may not
provide sufficient incentives for undocumented aliens to cooperate with authorities.
Undocumented aliens may face a stiff price for reporting on their employers, such as disruption
of their current employment and exposure to threats, retaliation, or alienation from their
communities. Thus, two other forms of compensation may be appropriate. First, they should be
eligible for monetary rewards of a percentage of the sanction that employers face as a result of

266

See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Bush Proposes New Temporary
Worker Program, Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.
267
To assuage the concerns of those who believe this approach may take away the ability of enforcers
to address legitimate threats that undocumented aliens may pose, it is important to underscore the fact that
temporary or permanent residency would be subject to the same conditions that temporary and permanent
residents of the United States already face. In particular, just as under current law, the commission of
crimes of moral turpitude would form a basis for revoking temporary or permanent residency. See, e.g., 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2000).
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their tip. 268 Because of the value of legalization, this incentive may not need to be as high as to
attract other informants or qui tam litigants for whom money would be the sole reward. But
allowing financial compensation may still offer a way to create proportional incentives to the
value of the information uncovered.
A second and far more costly form of compensation would be offering cooperating
undocumented aliens new identities and the chance for them and their families to be relocated.
A witness relocation program may be key for overcoming the significant deterrent to cooperation
with authorities that ruthless human trafficking and smuggling networks may pose. 269 These
groups would not be pleased with activities that threatened to disrupt their “business model” of
transporting and connecting undocumented aliens with employers. Therefore, the combination
of additional monetary rewards and witness relocation may be necessary to overcome these
disincentives. 270
Another question is what reward to give undocumented aliens who produce evidence of a
given gatekeeper’s violations, but who are not the first to do so. The value of their contribution
may be significantly less, if only because the first tips may alert enforcers to investigate a
gatekeeper further and prompt piggyback claims from other undocumented aliens who may be

268

See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 99, at 174–76 (discussing the benefits of enforcement by private
agents who have a direct interest).
269
The risk of retaliation may be especially high in contexts where illegal employment networks are
interconnected with human trafficking or smuggling syndicates. See Sadruddin et al., supra note 26, 382–
84 (discussing how human trafficking and smuggling syndicates may easily threaten violence against
members of their ethnic communities or their relatives in their home countries to deter any cooperation
with authorities).
270
One irony of a witness relocation program for cooperating aliens is that many, if not most, have
assumed false identities to enter and work in the United States, and therefore their professional and
educational reputation may often not be closely tied to their employment prospects. They may
nonetheless have significant community ties that may form a deterrent to cooperation for both positive
and negative reasons. In spite of this fact, the impact of receiving a new identity and a fresh start may be
less than for many other prospective types of informants and may often be consistent with their economic
motives for entering the United States.
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affected. But the quandary is that policymakers would need to ensure that undocumented aliens
would not be deterred from reporting violations because of fears that being the second or third to
report could expose them to the risk of deportation.
If every person who reported gatekeeper violations received a one-year or two-year,
potentially renewable temporary worker status, then one can easily imagine that undocumented
workers would likely agree amongst themselves to go en masse to enforcers to report violations
so that they all could benefit. This approach would not necessarily be bad as social and ethnic
bonds amongst undocumented aliens may be so tight that they will only go to report violations if
it does not hurt their friends and neighbors. However, this approach could also become a gaping
backdoor for subverting the system and overwhelm enforcers with the sheer number of tips from
aliens seeking temporary worker status. For this reason, it may be more appropriate to offer
immunity for those who are second or third in offering good-faith tips on the same set of
gatekeeper violations and to vest discretion in enforcement officials to determine whether to
grant temporary worker status in these contexts. The underlying goal of this enforcement
proposal is to target employers and only indirectly to shape incentives for undocumented aliens
not to enter the U.S. or to return home by diminishing opportunities for illegal employment. For
this reason granting immunity to undocumented aliens who come forward to the authorities is
consistent with the policy objectives. This approach may still pose risks, but it may offer the
best balance between encouraging tips from undocumented aliens, while not making it such a
broad loophole for legalization that it undercuts the enforcement objectives.
Another concern would be that legalization and monetary rewards may pose too great an
incentive for undocumented aliens to inform on employers and almost beckon fraud. Explicit
fraud could undermine the approach and the danger of nuisance accusations and lawsuits could
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impose high costs on employers. If the sanctions for employers are low, then one can imagine
employers willingly being caught employing undocumented aliens for under-the-counter
payments from the undocumented aliens. This fraud could become the de facto outlet for
legalization of undocumented workers with the government receiving “legalization payments”
vis-à-vis the sanction paid to employers. It is hard to place a price on what legalization would be
worth to undocumented aliens or prospective immigrants, but depending on the availability of
outlets for legal temporary employment or permanent immigration it may well be worth many
times more to the undocumented alien than the fine costs the employer. This temptation would
be especially strong for small-scale employers who would have the least reputational costs at
stake. One factor that may mitigate this risk is the fact that being caught for immigration
offenses may lead to higher penalties for subsequent offenses and a heightened probability of
monitoring and enforcement for other crimes. These collateral effects may make this type of
collusion uneconomical for gatekeepers.
A related concern is the burden frivolous suits may impose on gatekeepers. The danger of
fraud and deception is quite substantial because of the strong incentives undocumented aliens
may have to trap employers in a self-serving sting operation. The incentives for deception may
also cast doubt on the testimony of undocumented aliens whose veracity may be challenged
because their self-interest would be closely intertwined with the conviction of gatekeepers. One
consideration that may temper this danger is the fact that undocumented aliens are by definition
also in a vulnerable position and would have understandable fears about disclosing their illegal
status to authorities unless they had credible claims, as they would fear losing their jobs or being
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exposed to deportation. 271

In contrast, informants or qui tam litigants may have greater

incentives to offer more speculative claims or frivolous tips because of the lack of repercussions
(except in harming their credibility to public enforcers), and qui tam litigants may merely pursue
cases for their potential settlement value or to see if they can uncover evidence of actual
violations through discovery.
This approach may ironically arouse the ire of opponents of illegal immigration because it
legitimates the status of undocumented aliens. They might argue that offering the reward of
legalization is hypocritical as it may undercut other enforcement efforts and may enhance the
appeal of the United States as a destination for undocumented aliens. But it is important to stress
that this approach is distinguishable from general amnesty programs, which paper over the
problem in the short run but create expectations for future undocumented aliens that they too will
be legalized if they dwell long enough in the United States. 272 Instead, the virtue of this
approach is that it rewards undocumented aliens for their contribution to heightening overall
enforcement against employers.

It consciously trades off present enforcement against

cooperating undocumented aliens in exchange for greater incentives for employers to comply
with their verification duties in the long run. 273

271

See Sunstein, supra note 263, at 62–63 (arguing that when strong emotion is involved, people tend
to focus on the negative outcome and not on the likelihood of occurrence).
272
See JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border from Reagan through
Clinton, 1981–2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601, 610 (2002) (discussing the amnesty policy implemented
by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).
273
Another virtue is that it would be quite low in expenditure terms (which is a significant criteria for
securing congressional support). See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 99, at 176 (arguing that when an
enforcement agent has an incentive to maximize his self-interest, the policymaker’s interest is also
maximized, resulting in a more efficient system). In fact, this approach may even “pay” for itself as the
revenues from employer fines could offset many of the costs from legalizing the cooperating
undocumented aliens.
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Use of the incentive of legalization could also complement the creation of a large-scale
temporary workers’ program for low-skilled workers. 274 Heightened immigration enforcement
would produce pressures from sectors of the economy that have depended on undocumented
alien labor for access to low-skilled workers and the creation of a temporary workers’
program. 275

The enactment of meaningful immigration enforcement measures could be

combined with the creation of a temporary workers’ program as a quid pro quo to overcome the
significant political stumbling blocks to reform. 276 If a temporary worker program were on a
large enough scale, it would have the added benefit of providing greater incentives for
prospective undocumented aliens to work through legal channels to enter the United States by
providing a credible alternative to illegal immigration. The government could attempt to manage
flows of migrant workers by offsetting grants of temporary worker status to cooperating
wrongdoers by reducing the number of available temporary worker slots in any given year.
The social costs and risks from enlisting undocumented aliens as part of an ongoing sting
operation are significant and must be weighed against the benefits of heightened monitoring and
access to insider information. However, the moral hazards posed by offering a reward of
legalization to undocumented aliens may be a small price to pay for an approach that may split
274

The creation of a temporary workers’ program would serve both as a logical complement to
greater enforcement against illegal immigration and as a valuable political compromise. Current Senate
legislation recognizes the value of integrating these two facets of immigration reform. See S. 2611 ,
109th Cong. (2006) (proposing the coupling of the introduction of a temporary worker program and
procedures for the legalization of undocumented aliens who have long resided in the United States with
heightened enforcement measures).
275
While the Bush administration’s proposal for a temporary workers’ program has languished on the
legislative back burner since the attacks of September 11, 2001, creating temporary employment
opportunities may address the labor needs in low-wage industries that undocumented aliens currently fill
and provide incentives for prospective immigrants to work through legal channels. See President George
Bush, supra note 264 (laying out a proposal for a temporary workers’ program).
276
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 followed a modified version of this approach in
integrating the creation of an employer verification system with an amnesty for a large percentage of
existing undocumented aliens. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1952)).
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the interests of employers and undocumented aliens.

Though this approach may be

controversial, it may create lasting incentives for employers to comply with their verification
duties.
2. Enlisting Private Informants and Qui Tam Litigants as Monitors of Employers
Although undocumented aliens may be in the best position to report on employer
compliance and offer conclusive evidence of gatekeeper violations, cooperation by
undocumented aliens with the authorities may be limited by concerns about potential economic
dislocation or threats of violence or other forms of retaliation. This fact raises the need to
explore how other private monitors could help fill enforcement gaps.
In many other contexts we would examine the potential for victim suits to serve as a means
to hold gatekeepers accountable for failures to fulfill their duties.

But one of the many

challenges of immigration enforcement is that there is no identifiable class of victims, as illegal
immigration imposes widely dispersed costs on society.277 Both the scale of these costs and even
the existence of “victims” from illegal immigration are contentious political questions. 278 Even
to the extent policymakers could identify or specify particular classes of individuals adversely
impacted by illegal immigration, such as low-wage workers who directly compete with

277

See Sen. Alan K. Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and the
National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 147, 152 (1984) (noting that the exact impact of illegal
immigration is difficult to gauge).
278
The uneven distribution of the social benefits and social costs of illegal immigration makes the net
costs more difficult to document and imposes disproportionate burdens on those with the least political
clout. See BORJAS, supra note 195, at 105–08. For example, low-income localities bear the burden of
paying for the public education of children of illegal immigrants out of local property taxes, while farmers
or other corporate beneficiaries of low-wage workers shoulder few of the costs. As Robert Borjas has
highlighted, other costs are harder to document, such as downward pressure on low-income wages in
illegal immigrant destinations, because migration from these areas to other parts of the country partly
offsets these effects. See George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping:
Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9755, 2003) [hereinafter Labor Demand].
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undocumented aliens, 279 it is far from clear how to define the harm from gatekeeper violations in
any given case, let alone to imagine what damages would be appropriate to redress the harm.
In contrast, the enlistment of qui tam litigants and private informants sidesteps the thorny
issue of victim status and offers public enforcers practical ways to enhance access to insider
information and to heighten levels of enforcement. If these private actors received a percentage
of the sanction and the likelihood of receiving this reward were sufficiently high, private actors
could be expected to provide tips to enforcers or to investigate or prosecute employers for
violations. 280 This approach would envision four types of prospective informants or qui tam
litigants: competitors, employees, job seekers, and other members of the community at large. 281
An employer verification regime arguably serves as an unfair competition law. Firms that
exploit undocumented alien labor may enjoy a significant cost advantage over their law-abiding
counterparts, who pay legal minimum wages, overtime, and social security and wage taxes.
Even if firms do pay taxes for undocumented alien employees, they may also exercise their
leverage over undocumented aliens to violate other laws in pushing undocumented aliens to
work longer and harder under illegal working conditions. 282 In a competitive market situation,
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See Borjas, Labor Demand, supra note 276, at 1335 (concluding that immigration lowers the
wages of competing workers with similar skills and education).
280
See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 99, at 175–76.
281
A fifth type of prospective informant would be bounty hunters with no ties to the community
whose mercenary motives could provide sufficient incentives for them to invest in monitoring employer
compliance. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 80–81 & n.31 (discussing
the historical role of bounty hunters and their contemporary role as bonds bailsmen). The list of potential
private monitors is not comprehensive, but suggests the types of individuals who would have the interest
and opportunity to monitor and report on violations by employers.
282
See Foo, supra note 260, at 2181 (discussing the harsh and illegal working conditions that
undocumented aliens often face); Abel Valenzuela, Jr. et al., On the Corner: Day Labor in the United
States,
January,
2006,
at
12-16,
available
at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_Corner1.pdf
(discussing
employer workplace violations and abuses of day laborers).
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nonenforcement of employer sanctions against a significant number of firms may necessitate that
other firms subvert the law and hire undocumented aliens simply to remain competitive. 283
Under the current system, virtue is its own (and sole) reward for law-abiding firms as they
may face competitive disadvantages if they comply with their duties by actively screening for
undocumented aliens, and they have little to gain from monitoring their competitors’ compliance.
Empowering companies to serve as private informants and qui tam litigants would provide firms
with a significant financial incentive to police one another. 284 An informant system would give
firms incentives to monitor competitor compliance and provide them with greater reason to
pressure public enforcers to act on their tips. 285 A qui tam approach would provide firms with a
weapon directly to enjoin the illegal and unfair business practice of employing undocumented
aliens. The threat of financial sanctions, coupled with the fact that a percentage of the proceeds
would go to the competitor litigant, may provide greater deterrence for firms. This approach
could level the playing field in a way similar to private causes of action for enforcing antitrust
laws. 286 One significant difference is that because the impact of employment violations is far
more diffuse than antitrust violations, competitors would simply receive a percentage of the
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For example, textile firms in the United States have frequently claimed that they have no choice
but to employ undocumented aliens because of intense wage pressures. See Dugger, supra note 251, at
A1.
284
The danger of collusion on the employment of undocumented aliens exists, but the economic
incentives for reporting or prosecuting may make collusion difficult to sustain in the long run. See
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9,
18–21 (2004) (discussing in the antitrust context how oligopolists may be able to sustain tacit collusion in
the long run, but noting how the difficulty of sustaining collusion increases sharply when the number of
participants increases).
285
This approach poses an obvious danger of tips that are designed to harass competitors, but having
public enforcers screen tips should mitigate this risk, as competitors who cry wolf would lose their
credibility over time. In the case of qui tam suits, incorporation of a “loser pays” provision covering legal
fees and other expenses should also reduce the risk of harassment suits.
286
See, e.g., Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2005) (creating a private
cause of action for antitrust violations with treble damages).
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sanctions and would not need to establish the level of damages or lost profits caused by unfair
competition.
Other types of prospective informants or litigants would include workers within the
gatekeeper firm, job seekers, and other members of the community who may all have both the
incentives and access to uncover employer wrongdoing in exchange for rewards. Employees
may be well situated to know of the legal status of other employees just by engaging in
conversations with their coworkers. They may also enjoy the best vantage point for monitoring
what verification steps a company is or is not taking. Low-wage job seekers are the individuals
most directly affected by the employment of undocumented aliens, 287 and they may have
independent incentives to invest in finding out whether avenues for employment are closed to
them because of illegal practices.
Individuals from the community at large may also be better situated than public enforcers to
detect whether employers are using illegal alien labor. Immigration status is often an open secret
in ethnic communities, and local customers may be as well placed as anyone to recognize and
confirm that employers are engaging in immigration violations. The threat of informants or qui
tam suits may create higher tensions within communities. However, any approach that enlists
private enforcers necessarily entails social costs, and the prospect of significant monetary gain
may be the only way that individuals within communities would report this type of violation.
Providing incentives for informants to come forward to report on employer noncompliance
may allow public enforcers to overcome information gaps, while preserving prosecutorial
discretion in screening and pursuing cases. This approach raises many of the same benefits,
costs, and risks as providing incentives for undocumented aliens to report on employers.

287

See Borjas, Labor Demand, supra note 276, at 1370.
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Monetary compensation for informants may not raise as much of a potential furor as offering a
reward of legalization for undocumented aliens. But payment for being a “snitch” may similarly
open informants’ credibility to impeachment. 288 Because informants do not need to bear the
costs of public investigations, moral hazards exist that informants will levy frivolous accusations
in hopes that public enforcers will come across evidence of employer noncompliance and result
in a reward. To the extent that informants’ tips expose their identities, informants from within a
firm or from the local community may also face threats of retaliation. Blown covers may require
whistleblower protections in the case of gatekeeper employees and, in extreme cases of violent
threats, may require spending for relocation, which may significantly add to the costs of paying
informants.
The most troubling effect of using either private informants or qui tam litigants is the
chilling effect the threat of reporting violations could have in the workplace and within ethnic
communities. Incentives for private enforcers to monitor employers could fuel distrust between
employees and employers, as well as among coworkers. Employers and employees would have
incentives to engage in self-censorship for fear that their words could become bases for
informant tips or qui tam suits from a disgruntled employee. Employers would also have
incentives to engage in redundant oversight of their own compliance efforts to ensure that no
employee is able to sabotage compliance and then report these “violations” for the sake of
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See Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants: Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951) (discussing how informants “have been generally
regarded with aversion and nauseous disdain”).
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personal gain. 289 These costs may be admittedly high, but the chilling effect on employing
undocumented aliens would further the underlying purpose of the verification requirements.
The logic of rewarding individuals who come forward with information on employer
violations that public enforcers may not otherwise be able to uncover is clear. In contrast, using
qui tam suits to oversee employer compliance may be a more counterintuitive approach in this
context. Undocumented aliens would likely disappear at the first sign of litigation, and much of
the evidence of their employment could be concealed or destroyed before the start of a discovery
process. 290 Although the disappearance of witnesses could make prosecutions more difficult, the
targets of this oversight are not the undocumented alien employees, but rather the employers to
deter employment violations. Qui tam litigants would likely be insiders or secure the testimony
of insiders in advance to ensure that sufficient evidence will exist for prosecutions.
The False Claims Act provides a well-developed model for a qui tam provision.291 The key
element of the False Claims Act framework is that it retains the potential for prosecutorial
discretion. Qui tam litigants must disclose “substantially all material evidence and information”
about the claims to the government at the time of filing a sealed complaint.292 At the end of a
sixty-day period, the government can choose to assume control of the case and award the
litigants costs and attorney’s fees, as well as fifteen to twenty-five percent of the penalties
imposed. If the government chooses not to assume control of the case, qui tam litigants will
289

The problem of sabotage would exist even if human resource personnel could not serve as
informants or qui tam litigants. They may simply work through third parties inside or outside of the firm
who could file valid tips of suits and then receive a kickback once the rewards were received.
290
A case in point is the failure of Operation Vanguard, a 1999 operation in which the then INS
subpoenaed personnel records from Midwestern meatpacking plants and compared them against INS and
Social Security databases. Of those workers called in for questioning, seventy percent disappeared rather
than being interviewed. See Spencer S. Hsu & Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized, WASH.
POST, June 19, 2006.
291
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730 (2000); see also infra Part II.B.2.
292
See id. § 3730(b)(2)–(3).
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receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the penalties, as well as litigation costs and attorney’s
fees, if they prevail. 293 Use of some variant of this approach will allow public enforcers to
intervene when significant policy or precedent issues are at stake. 294 The particular percentages
used in setting rewards under the False Claims Act may not be sufficient given the fact that the
potential penalties for employment verification violations pale in comparison to government
contracts fraud. However, the principle of setting upper and lower bounds on rewards levels is
useful in making reward levels more predictable but also incorporating a measure of discretion to
reflect the quality of qui tam litigants’ efforts and information.
The responsiveness of both qui tam litigants and informants will turn on the level of
compensation and the probability of compensation. There is no set formula for determining what
sanction level for employers or what reward level for qui tam litigants or informants would
provide appropriate incentives as it will depend on the probability of receiving a reward and the
risk of retaliation. What is clear is that current penalties for employers, ranging from a warning
to $275 fines for initial violations up to $11,000 for repeat offenders, are so low that they offer
little deterrent value and little incentive for informants or qui tam litigants regardless of what
percentage of the sanction serves as the reward. 295
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See id. § 3730(d)(2).
See Shavell, supra note 102, at 601–04 (discussing how the fact that private litigants do not usually
take the deterrence value of trials into account may lead them to pursue socially excessive levels of trials
or settlements in a given context). There may be instances where the public interest may call for a
settlement rather than full prosecution of employment violations or the reverse. Additionally, there may
be cases of such high stakes in terms of revenue or legal implications that the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement has a substantial interest in managing the case. If the federal government
intervened too often, it could depress the rewards, and therefore dampen the incentives, for participation
by qui tam litigants. However, the limited enforcement resources of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement would likely allow qui tam litigants to act as litigants in the overwhelming
majority of cases.
295
8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1) (2005).
294

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

97

This article will propose a sliding scale of sanctions based on the size of the employer. 296
The advantage of this approach is that it imposes sanctions that are roughly proportional to the
deeper pockets of larger corporations, so that smaller corporations do not bear higher relative
exposure to liability. The ceiling on penalties for gatekeeper violations would be $15,000 per
violation for employers of one to fifteen workers, $25,000 per violation for employers of fifteen
to one hundred employees, and $50,000 per violation for employers of 101 to 200 workers, and
potential fine levels could more gradually increase for firms with higher numbers of employees
up to a cap of $75,000 per violation. 297 The floors for violations could be set at half the cap
levels with a baseline of $7500 per offense for employers of one to fifteen employees. Repeat
offenders could face a sliding scale of increasing sanctions to attempt to deter violations. 298
Determining what percentage of these fines would be sufficient to attract informants or qui
tam litigants may be a matter of approximation at best. Given the sliding scale for businesses, 299
it may make sense to offer rewards of fifty percent of the fines small-scale employers must pay
and to gradually decrease this figure to twenty or twenty-five percent of fines for employers of
over two hundred. This level of compensation will likely be more than adequate to attract a high
296

This proposal applies a modified version of the framework for compensatory awards in intentional
discrimination cases brought under Title VII, which was laid out in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000)). A gatekeepers’ failure to verify employer status is less reprehensible than intentional
discrimination, and the proposed compensation framework reflects this fact by capping penalties at
approximately half the amount of compensation used in the 1991 act.
297
See id. § 1981 a(b)(3) (creating a scale for damage awards based on the number of employees).
298
Recent Senate legislation has proposed a lower scale of sanctions for employment verification
violations ranging from $500 to $4,000 per undocumented alien for initial employer offenders and $4,000
to $10,000 for repeat offenders. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(e)4(A). The Senate bill would also threaten
potential criminal sanctions of up to three years of imprisonment (and/or a fine of $20,000 per
unauthorized alien) for employers “engag[ing] in a patter or practice of knowing violations,” a far more
draconian step. Id. at § 274A(f). Use of a criminal sanction for a civil offense may serve as a substitute
sanction to deter otherwise judgment-proof employers who have flagrantly violated immigration law on
many occasions, but without an effective way to oversee gatekeeper compliance this approach may serve
as a symbolic, yet toothless threat.
299
See id.
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level of private informant and qui tam participation. Thus, it would be better to err initially on
the side of too small an incentive for qui tam suits to avoid the danger of overdeterrence. Then,
if necessary, incentives could be raised to solicit higher levels of participation. 300
Empowering qui tam litigants poses risks of abuse. Thus, safeguards are necessary to
prevent overdeterrence and abuse of litigants’ powers, and to reduce the social costs imposed by
this approach. Inclusion of a “loser-pays” principle in the qui tam provision would help avoid
the danger of frivolous lawsuits and the use of qui tam litigation for harassment purposes. 301
Without this provision, plaintiffs would have greater incentives to engage in highly speculative
lawsuits or to go on fishing expeditions against targets with deep pockets in efforts to uncover
unlawful practices. 302 However, having the loser pay the opposing side’s legal fees would force
prospective plaintiffs to take more of the full costs of suits into account. This provision would
also mitigate concerns that corporations or their proxy entities would use qui tam suits to hurt
competitors or that disgruntled employees would use this tool to harass employers.
The danger exists that private informants or qui tam litigants will sacrifice the state’s
interests for greater personal gain. Qui tam litigants may have incentives to blackmail employers
or to agree to less than optimal settlements in exchange for kickbacks. In this way, they could
either cut the government out of the compensation entirely or extract a higher percentage of
300

Over time, it may prove necessary to increase the percentage that private informants or qui tam
litigants collect if participation in there is low participation. The False Claims Act offers a good example
of the need to adjust fine levels over time. Its overhaul in 1986 resulted in the establishment of higher
levels of rewards and a higher probability of compensation. This approach attracted many more qui tam
litigants and became the poster child for successfully enlisting private actors. See Beck, supra note 123,
at 561–63.
301
See Brookins, supra note 135, at 51 n.250 (arguing that incorporation of a loser-pays principle may
significantly reduce frivolous lawsuits).
302
A loser-pays provision may decrease harassment suits and magnify incentives for those with valid
claims. But the more uncertain it is that courts will be able to recognize valid claims as such, the more
likely that a loser-pays principle may screen out valid claims and attract false claims based off of
litigants’ calculations of the expected value of gain or loss from suits. See Shavell, supra note 102, at
587–88.
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Implementing fixed minimums for verification penalties or

requirements that a court approve any settlement should mitigate some of the conflicts-of-interest
issues concerning settlements.
Mitigating the risks of blackmail is more difficult. Existing laws applying criminal and civil
sanctions to blackmail seek to deter this conduct.303 However, a blackmailer will have leverage
to contract a settlement outside of the state’s auspices if others are unlikely to discover the
violations. This risk of blackmail may not be all bad inasmuch as it would still raise the costs for
employing undocumented aliens and therefore have some deterrence value, even though it would
take revenue away from the federal government. 304 However, the risk of blackmail may not be
very high in practice because of the nature of employment violations. In most cases, employers
would have good reasons to believe that if one person knew about the fraud, then others would
likely unearth it, making blackmail payoffs a poor investment and making a settlement with the
government and future verification compliance a better option.
A related concern is that private informant or qui tam provisions may be exploited as
money-making schemes by con artists. For example, immigrant smuggling rings could place
undocumented aliens in jobs with fake documentation. The undocumented alien employees
could then conveniently disappear at the same time that a third party filed a qui tam action
against the employer. Related principal-agent problems could arise within a corporation. A
human resources employee could be complicit in violations of the employer verification regime

303

See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 670–73
(1984) (suggesting how blackmail may perversely further public enforcement objectives in some
contexts).
304
See Jennifer G. Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1943–49 (1993)
(arguing that legalizing blackmail of criminals would actually deter crime).
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and then become a private informant or qui tam litigant, or tip off a third party to do so and profit
from violations she helped commit.
Clever con artists would make it extremely difficult to link a third-party informant with a
scheme to frame employers. Because of the difficulties in detecting this type of fraud, one could
impose high civil or criminal sanctions in attempts to deter this conduct. 305 Blatant cases of
entrapment could form a defense for employers, especially when there is evidence that an insider
set them up, yet in most cases it would likely be impossible to prove the entrapment. Guarding
against this risk of fraud admittedly will impose greater costs on businesses. However, this
danger may ultimately play a positive role in providing employers with additional pressure
actively to guard against the employment of undocumented aliens.
Another concern is the need to protect the whistleblowers. A private informant approach
may allow the identities of informants to be kept completely secret depending upon whether the
information they provide necessarily reveals their identity. However, qui tam litigants who are
still employees of employers engaging in illegal practices would be putting their necks on the
line. As in the case of other whistleblower statutes, employers should be barred from taking any
retaliatory measures against employees engaged in qui tam suits or suspected as informants. 306
Retaliation may assume many subtle forms, but providing employees broad protection with the
full range of legal remedies that other whistleblower statutes provide should guard against this
danger. 307
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See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000) (allowing courts to reduce the bounty to parties who
“planned and initiated” the violation of the statute).
306
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1514A(a)(1)–(2) (2004) (laying out the whistleblower protections
for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
307
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2004) (providing employees who faced retaliation with “all relief
necessary to make the employee whole,” including reinstatement, back pay, and special damages, such as
litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees).
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Lastly, public enforcers should be banned from using insider knowledge to file qui tam
actions. Establishing a presumption that enforcement personnel and their close families are
ineligible for qui tam actions would reduce the potential for conflicts of interest. Otherwise,
enforcement personnel would have every incentive to look the other way on the job and then to
file qui tam actions when off the job. Society would be worse off if had to pay enforcers both
their salaries and qui tam proceeds to secure the same enforcement results. 308 Similarly, an
insider trading principle should limit parties from collecting anything more than their reasonably
and actually incurred expenses if they knew or reasonably should have known that the
information they acted upon came from an enforcement agency or officer’s tip. Otherwise,
public enforcers may have incentives not to act and to tip off third parties in exchange for
kickbacks.
B. Filling the Need for a Swift, Accurate Means of Compliance
Creating a swift, accurate means of gatekeeper compliance is crucial for containing the costs
that gatekeeper liability may impose on employers and prospective employees and mitigating
incentives employers may have to discriminate against applicants of apparent foreign origin to
mitigate potential liabilities. One significant challenge is that pervasive identity fraud and the
widespread use of counterfeit documents threatens to compromise the accuracy of the
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One alternative would be to incorporate rewards for detecting gatekeeper violations into the
contracts of public enforcers. In theory, making part of a public enforcer’s compensation contingent on
enforcement outcomes could mitigate the risk of public enforcers “double dipping” to receive informant
rewards. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD., 1, 1–3 (1974) (proposing that policemen be compensated based on the fines
produced from their enforcement efforts). The problem is that there is a strong public aversion to linking
the efforts of public enforcers to enforcement outcomes. Here there would also be a significant moral
hazard that public enforcers would abuse their extensive enforcement powers and discretion to frame or
extort gatekeepers for the sake of private gain.

102

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

verification process and make it easy for employers to turn a blind eye to fake documentation.309
For this reason, enhanced identification protections and access to information on immigration
status must complement efforts to heighten incentives for employer compliance with their
verification duties.
Recent legislative efforts have recognized the significance of this problem and focused on
ways to combat document and identity fraud by attempting to create a more accurate system for
verifying identity and immigration status.

Both the Real I.D. Act of 2005 and proposed

legislation on employer verification duties have sought to make the electronic verification of
Social Security numbers a centerpiece of efforts to address document and identity fraud. 310 The
Real I.D. Act seeks to make electronic confirmation of Social Security numbers and immigration
status an integral part of state department of motor vehicle processes for granting and renewing
driver’s licenses. 311 Proposed legislation in Congress seeks to extend this approach to the
employer verification context by mandating that employers confirm Social Security numbers of
employees against a similar electronic database. 312In conjunction with private oversight of
employers, the combinations of these approaches would go far towards providing employers
with both significant incentives to comply with their verification duty and a cost-effective and
more accurate means for employers to fulfill their duty.

309

See Press Release, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., INS Cracks National Counterfeit
Documents Operation (1998), available at http://www.rapidimmigration.com/www/news/news_124.html
(documenting a single INS bust which led to the seizure of two million counterfeit resident alien cards,
social security cards, and driver’s licenses and noting that these IDs had a street value of a mere $40 to
$200).
310
See Real I.D. Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 202–207, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); H.R. 4437,
109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e) (2006).
311
See Real I.D. Act of 2005 §§ 202.
312
See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e)
(2006).
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1. Assessing the Impact of the Real I.D. Act of 2005
The need for a more secure identification system has been obvious since the inception of the
employer verification regime. 313 Under the current system, undocumented aliens can easily
secure and use fraudulent documentation to “confirm” their legality. 314 The Real I.D. Act of
2005 attempts to fill this gap by seeking to transform state driver’s licenses into a de facto
national I.D by May, 2008. 315 The Act prohibits federal agencies from accepting state driver’s
licenses and personal identification cards unless these identification materials meet a set of
conditions to counter identity and document fraud. State identity documents must incorporate
uniform data and antifraud provisions based on a national standard and use a common machinereadable technology. States must also allow electronic access by all states to their databases, and
state department of motor vehicles must verify the presented documents and the immigration
status of applicants. 316

Specifically, the Act requires applicants to submit a photo I.D.,

documentation confirming birth date and present residence, a social security number, and
documentation confirming legal status. 317 The Act also requires state departments of motor
vehicles to electronically check applicants’ social security numbers and immigration status

313

Others have argued that a national identification card or a functional equivalent is essential for the
verification process to have any deterrence effect. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra
note 182, at 54–60; Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 1003 (arguing “short of the
erection of a two-thousand-mile wall along the United States-Mexican border and implementation of an
effective national identification card system . . . exclusionary immigration policy will regulate the
velocity of the labor flow but will never threaten the flow itself”). Most European countries, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand use national identification cards. See, e.g., Mark Landler, FineTuning For Privacy, Hong Kong Plans Digital ID, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at C1 (noting that Hong
Kong has had a national identification card system for over fifty years).
314
See id.
315
See Real I.D. Act of 2005 §§ 202–207, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005).
316
See id. § 202.
317
See id. §§ 202(c)(1)–(2).

104

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

against the Social Security Administration and Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
databases. 318
State driver’s licenses already serve many of the purposes of a de facto national I.D. within
the United States, and if successful, the Real I.D. Act’s approach would help curb this form of
document fraud. But it remains to be seen to what extent states are able and willing to comply
with this massive unfunded mandate or whether the target date of 2008 is even remotely
realistic. 319 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that compliance will cost states $100
million over the next five years, 320 but the National Conference of State Legislatures has
estimated that it will cost between $500 and $750 million. 321 Additionally, the Act may only
have a moderate impact in combating fraud because the federal government may be poorly
positioned to oversee compliance by state departments of motor vehicles and states may lack
sufficient incentives to comply with this federal mandate.

318

See id. §§ 202(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(C).
See id. § 204 (granting the Department of Homeland Security authority to make grants to states to
comply with the Act, but not appropriating any money for this purpose). The existence of minimum
national standards and a national database for commercial driver’s licenses suggests the potential viability
of this initiative, although the Act poses challenges because of its more sweeping coverage. In 1986
Congress set minimum national standards for state commercial driver’s licenses that required the
inclusion of the name, address, social security number or equivalent, and physical description of the
licensee. See Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, H.R. 5484, 99th Cong.
§ 12006 (Jan. 21, 1986). Congress authorized a private association, the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators, to create a database containing this information, as well as updated information
on the dates and status of licenses that is accessible to states, commercial drivers, and prospective
employers.
See AM. ASS’N. OF MOTOR VEHICLES ADMIN., COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE
INFORMATION SYSTEM (CDLIS): DEFINITIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE
2–3 (11997), http://www.aamva.org/Documents/drvCDLcompliancerequire.pdf.
320
See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 418, REAL I.D. ACT OF 2005 1–2 (2005),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6072&sequence=0&from=6 (estimating that
compliance with the Real ID Act would cost state and local governments $100 million from 2005–2010
and would cost the federal government $100 million during this period).
321
See Ann E. Marimow, Anti-Terror Legislation Expected to Lengthen DMV Lines, WASH. POST,
May 14, 2005, at B5.
319
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The Real I.D. Act primarily addresses document fraud and will do little to address identity
fraud. That horse is already out on the barn as fraudulent starter documents, such as birth
certificates, are widely available and can be used to acquire social security numbers and licenses
“legitimately.” This approach will not deal with this loophole, but it will raise the cost for
prospective undocumented aliens to establish fraudulent identities. Criminal syndicates will
have to go to more trouble and expense to compile the legitimate documents needed to acquire a
driver’s license. Incorporating fingerprinting or biometric data for social security cards and birth
certificates would narrow the opportunities for identity fraud by more clearly linking driver’s
licenses to their holders, 322 but would also raise the cost of compliance and the political ire of
those opposed to a national I.D. 323 But regardless of this fact, the Real I.D. Act may create a
more accurate common form of identification that could be used as the centerpiece of a more
accurate verification system.
2. The Potential for Electronic Verification
Under the current system the lack of access to a database for employers to confirm the
authenticity of identification documents significantly reduces the effectiveness of the verification
process. 324 The appeal of mandating that employers use an electronic database to verify and
record employment eligibility is intuitive. 325 If a highly accurate computer database existed,
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See Robert Pear, Foreigners Obtain Social Security ID with Fake Papers, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2002, at A12. Incorporating a fingerprint or biometric data would not be foolproof either, but it would
make it harder to use duplicate identification documents and raise the cost of producing fraudulent
identities.
323
It is noteworthy that even the proposed legislation to mandate access to a social security database
for employment verification expressly disclaims any intent to create a national I.D. See H.R. 4437, 109th
Cong. § 701(a)(H)(ii) (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(c)(6) (2006).
324
See supra Part Section III.C.
325
The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform noted the need for such a database over ten years
ago, but to date the INS and its successor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services have experimented
only with pilot programs of limited scope. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 182,
at 60. More recently, H.R. 4437 and S. 2611 have proposed that the Homeland Security Department and

106

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

then employers could confirm employment status with a click of a button at a quick speed and
low cost.
Both the Real I.D. Act and proposed legislation on the verification process rely on
electronic verification of Social Security numbers as a tool to make immigration status
verification swift, cost-effective, and accurate.326 Past and current agency experiments suggest
the viability of allowing uniform employer access to a computerized database of Social Security
numbers and immigration status information. 327 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 required the then-INS to initiate three pilot programs: a machinereadable document system, a citizen attestation program, and a Basic Pilot Program using an
electronic database program. 328 Although the first two programs were abandoned because of
technical difficulties and concerns about accuracy and heightened discrimination, respectively,329
the Basic Pilot Program serves as a template for broader reform of document verification. 330

Commissioner of Social Security make available an online or telephone-based database for employers to
confirm the accuracy of job applicants’ social security numbers, so that mandatory confirmation of social
security numbers’ accuracy can be incorporated into employers’ verification obligations. H.R. 4437,
109th Cong. § 701 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d) (2006).
326
See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 701 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d) (2006).
327
The INS has experimented with a range of telephone-based and electronic verification initiatives.
The first project was the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program in 1986, a
telephone-based database for government officials to confirm eligibility for public benefits. See Wendy
Zimmermann, The Save Program: An Early Assessment, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 129–55 (Michael Fix ed., 1991). Subsequent pilot
programs in the 1990s used the SAVE database and other INS databases to explore the potential for
telephone-based and electronic employment verification processes. See INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH &
WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE CITIZEN ATTESTATION VERIFICATION PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION 14
(2003)
[hereinafter
CITIZEN
ATTESTATION],
available
at
http://149.101.23.2/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/newpageforcavp.htm.
328
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§§ 401–04 (1996).
329
See CITIZEN ATTESTATION, supra note 327, at 35–43 (criticizing the citizen attestation verification
program because of flaws with the database and the requirement that only noncitizens needed to provide
electronic verification, raising concerns about illicit discrimination); INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH &
WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE MACHINE-READABLE DOCUMENT PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION 85–86
(2003), available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repssutides/piloteval/newpageformrdp.htm

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

107

The Basic Pilot Program is currently a voluntary program that allows employers to check all
prospective employees’ social security numbers against an electronic Social Security
Administration database. 331 If the validity of the number is not confirmed, then the data of
noncitizens is electronically checked against a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) database. 332 If the number is still not confirmed, then USCIS status verifiers manually
check other USCIS databases. Prospective employees may then file an appeal with the SSA or
USCIS to contest the rejection of their employment eligibility, which the agencies must resolve
within ten working days. 333 If employees’ data is not found in the databases after a manual
check or employees do not file an appeal, then they are presumed to be unauthorized workers
and can be terminated by their employers. 334
The primary shortcomings of the Basic Pilot Program are the limited, voluntary
participation by employers, the fact that it only addresses identity or document fraud in a limited
way, and the fact that its efficacy relies on employer self-compliance without any credible threat
of direct monitoring. Given that the program uses electronic databases, it would be virtually
costless to allow uniform employer access to the SSA and USCIS databases, aside from the
potential cost of employing more powerful servers. The main costs would be the need to hire
(finding that the pilot program of using machine-readable Iowa driver’s licenses to verify immigration
status failed because of technical and procedural problems); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Systematic
Alien
Verification
for
Entitlements
Program
Page,
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/SAVE.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (noting that these pilot programs
were terminated in May and June, 2003, respectively).
330
See INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & WESTAT, INS BASIC PILOT EVALUATION: SUMMARY
REPORT
4–8
(2002),
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/INSBASIC_summ.pdf
(providing
an
overview of the features of the Basic Pilot Program).
331
See INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE BASIC PILOT PROGRAM
EVALUATION
40–44
(2002)
[hereinafter
BASIC
PILOT],
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/C_II.pdf.
332
Id. at 42.
333
Id. at 44.
334
Id.
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dramatically more status verifiers to perform manual checks of immigration status, to handle
appeals and to heighten the accuracy of the SSA and USCIS databases in order to reduce the
need for manual checks. 335 The former INS and current USCIS have managed telephone and
electronic databases on immigration status for twenty years, 336 which should give them a
foundation to build on in making these databases more accurate if higher levels of funding were
available.
The Basic Pilot Program places Social Security cards at the center of the employment status
confirmation process, 337 and a common theme of pending legislation for electronic verification is
the use of Social Security Cards or state driver’s licenses in the verification process. 338 This
focus on one or two means of identification confirmation represents a step of progress from the
current system where a broad range of documents may be used to confirm immigration status.339
Mandating verification of social security numbers may mitigate risks that completely fraudulent
social security numbers are being used. But one problem that neither the Real I.D. Act nor the
Basic Pilot Program resolves is the fact that starter documents, such as birth certificates that are
easily counterfeited, may be used to acquire lawful social security cards. 340 While this fact

335

Currently, thirty-eight status verifiers manually verify immigration status for 2300 participating
employers. See PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 9–11.
336
See CITIZEN ATTESTATION, supra note 327, at 7–8.
337
See BASIC PILOT, supra note 327, at 35–36.
338
See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 702 (2005) (requiring electronic verification of social security
numbers); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(c)(1) (2006) (requiring prospective employees to present a
passport, driver’s license, permanent residence card, or employment authorization card for electronic
verification).
339
Job applicants currently can produce twenty-seven different types of documents to prove
employment eligibility, and these documents include a range of identification documents that are either
easily counterfeited, easy to obtain, or faceless and fungible, such as social security cards. See DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION FORM I-9, at 3 (2005), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/files/i-9.pdf.
340
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-830T, IDENTITY FRAUD: PREVALENCE AND LINKS
TO ALIEN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 6–7 (2002) (statement of Richard M. Stana) (noting that there are 8,000
state or local offices that issue birth certificates and other forms of identification that aliens can use as
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means there would still be a significant loophole in the system, at minimum these reforms would
make document and identity fraud more difficult and make it more costly for counterfeiters to
sidestep the system’s requirements.
If proposed legislation succeeds and all employers were required to participate in electronic
verification under a variant of the Basic Pilot Program, errors could have much more farreaching impact and delays in making manual checks or hearing appeals could harm the welfare
of lawful workers. 341 Undocumented aliens who are conditionally rejected may well disappear
once they receive a notice of non-confirmation for fear of being detected as such by the
authorities. To minimize risks of frivolous claims clogging up an appeals system, appellants or
their employers could be required to place a bond or money into an escrow account that would
be forfeited if the appellant could not establish her work status eligibility.342

To provide

incentives for accurate data-keeping and swift processing of appeals, USCIS could be obligated
to compensate legal workers a fixed per-diem sum or the opportunity cost of the temporary
denial of employment if resolution of their work status lasted beyond a set time frame, such as

starter documents to prove their residence and identity); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-133T,
COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION RAISES HOMELAND SECURITY CONCERNS 1 (2003) [hereinafter
COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION] (statement of Ronald D. Malfi) (showing that social security certificates,
birth certificates, and driver’s licenses are easily forged and that this fraud is difficult to detect). Some
legislative reforms have sought to address birth certificate fraud. See, e.g., S. 1438, 109th Cong. § 312
(2006) (Bill Proposed by Texas Senator John Cornyn). But even the most effective system of electronic
recording of birth certificates will have only prospective effect for future births and will not address the
current problem of birth certificate fraud.
341
See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701–702 (2005) (embracing the Basic Pilot Program’s
approach of having a ten-day period for a secondary check of Social Security numbers if they initially are
not recognized); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d)(8)(C) (also providing for a ten-day window for a
secondary check of prospective employee information).
342
The proposed Senate legislation prohibits employers from requiring prospective employees to post
bonds or to indemnify the employer against potential liability arising from the employment verification
requirements. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(h) (2006). However, the requirement that presumptive
undocumented aliens or their employers post a bond to file an appeal would be a partial mirror image of a
federal government obligation to compensate legal aliens or citizens for erroneous identifications.
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the ten-day norm under the Basic Pilot Program. 343

Employers would be prohibited from

rescinding offers of employment during the appeal period, although employees could not begin
work until appeals are successfully resolved. 344
Offering uniform access to the Basic Pilot Program would equip good-faith employers with
better tools to comply with their duties. However, absent effective oversight of employer
compliance, policymakers may be stuck with many of the same failures as under the current
system. Some shortcomings of the Basic Pilot Program could be easily overcome by mandating
that multiple uses of the same social security card or other forms of prima facie document or
identity fraud automatically trigger a red flag in the database. 345 For example, USCIS could
mitigate some of these dangers by imposing minimal recording requirements on employers, such
as by having the electronic database automatically record the identity of job applicants and
documents used when employers make inquiries, and employers could be required to record the
dates of commencement and termination of employment into the database. Although many

343

See S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d)(10)(D), 274A(d)(11)(D) (2006) (proposing to compensate
lost wages to workers whose employment is terminated because of an erroneous denial of employment);
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 701(7)(I) (2005) (authorizing Federal Tort Claims Act claims for dismissals
based on an erroneous non-verification). Merely compensating for lost wages may understate the
economic impact of erroneous denials of immigration status. See, e.g., Manns, supra note 103, at 1996–
99 (laying out a framework for determining and administering an opportunity-cost-based compensation
system). Determining the amount of compensation more accurately may depend on the consequence of a
false positive identification. For example, individuals who are merely inconvenienced in waiting to
clarify their legal status but ultimately receive the employment may have less of a claim than individuals
who do not receive a job because an employer has cold feet. One way to minimize this problem is to
mandate that employers check the immigration status of prospective employees only after they have made
job offers official, with the proviso that employers may not withdraw job offers to a prospective employee
until the affected individual has the chance to contest the database’s record of his or her immigration
status.
344
The Senate bill incorporates a prohibition on termination until a final non-confirmation decision is
issued. See S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d)(8)(D)(viii) (2006). Strengthening anti-discrimination
protections could also help to guard against employers using more informal means of revoking offers to
appellants. See infra Part IV.D.
345
See BASIC PILOT, supra note 331, at 27–29 (discussing the heightened incentives for identity fraud
that the Basic Pilot program may create).
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Americans have multiple jobs to make ends meet, listings of three or more contemporaneous
jobs at once or jobs in different parts of the country could provide clear evidence that identity
fraud is taking place. The database could automatically alert the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and the Social Security Administration of prima facie cases of
identification fraud, such as multiple uses of the same social security number, and trigger review
of gatekeeper compliance or identity theft. 346 Counterfeiters will undoubtedly try to adapt by
engaging in more sophisticated types of identification fraud, such as by using easily
counterfeited starter documents such as birth certificates to acquire legal social security numbers.
But at a minimum this approach could significantly raise the costs for undocumented aliens of
securing fake identification to satisfy the verification system’s requirements.
A more significant challenge is that employers may respond to a more accurate employer
verification system by sidestepping the system. Because of the current verification system’s
reliance on employer self-compliance, employers could simply choose not to use the databases,
ignore the databases’ negative responses, or tacitly or explicitly ask prospective employees to
come up with other identity information to process into the system when there are doubts about
the authenticity of identification materials. Employers might have incentives to serve merely as
gatekeepers of their own self-interest in detecting potential violators, so that the information of
undocumented aliens would not be processed into the verification system. So long as employers

346

Currently, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is denied access even to
outcomes of database searches because of concerns that employers would not participate if they were
exposed to a higher probability of oversight. Implementing automatic disclosures of multiple nonconfirmations accords with the proposed House measure for automatic investigations if multiple attempts
to confirm the same social security number signal potential fraud. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §
701(F)(ii) (2005). By contrast, the Senate legislation would create a watered down disclosure regime
which would allow disclosure to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of verification
data only if a company has had 100 or more employees rejected over a three-year period or ten or more
employees who attempt to use the same social security number. See S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(e)
(2006).

112

PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS

stand to gain from employing undocumented aliens and face a low risk of direct monitoring of
noncompliance, they can be expected to continue to subvert their duties. For this reason making
identification confirmation a swift and highly accurate process is only one step in strengthening
the employer verification system. Combining this reform with private monitoring of gatekeeper
compliance may give employers both better tools for compliance and a credible threat of
oversight, so that they have less incentives either to evade compliance or to engage in
discrimination against individuals of foreign origin to minimize their liability exposure.
C. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of a Heightened Duty Standard
Reducing document and identification fraud would make it easier for employers to verify
employment status. However, an equally significant concern is the ease with which employers
can formalistically satisfy their legal burdens while subverting the verification system in
practice. The existing employer sanctions system imposes a knowledge mens rea requirement on
employers, which makes it difficult for public enforcers to prove violations except in extreme
cases. 347 In fact, this standard perversely gives employers an incentive to “know” as little as
possible about the legal status of prospective employees. 348

Private monitors, such as

undocumented aliens or other insiders, may be best placed to produce credible information

347

See supra Part III.C. The Senate has proposed only a minor shift to a standard of “knowing” or
“reckless disregard” of an undocumented alien’s status. See S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(1)(A) (2006),
while House legislation provides for a good-faith defense for compliance with the electronic verification
system’s requirements.. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701(a)(7)(J), 702(1)(B)(i) (2005); S. 1438, 109th
Cong. § 732 (2005). The House’s good-faith defense may be sufficient in the context of public oversight
alone, as enforcers may implicitly recognize that defense through nonenforcement even in the context of a
strict liability regime. In the context of private oversight of gatekeepers, the considerations of over- or
underdeterrence loom larger because private enforcers are likely to be motivated solely by profit motives
and will be concerned solely about establishing liability.
348
Given the ease with which undocumented aliens can acquire fraudulent identification materials,
this approach makes the verification process a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy from the standpoint of
employers. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exists.”).
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regarding what employers knew about employment status and what compliance steps were taken.
However, it may still be difficult and costly for private or public enforcers to prosecute cases
concerning employer’s knowledge because of the ability of firms to mount strong defenses
concerning their knowledge and what compliance steps they took.
In contrast, the use of negligence or strict liability standards may offer significant
advantages in both addressing concerns of underdeterrence and in making it easier for private
enforcers to produce conclusive evidence of gatekeeper violations. If employment verification
databases are highly accurate, then either standard would produce similar outcomes. But any
database is bound to have significant limitations because of the easy access to fraudulent starter
documents and the ability of aliens to engage in identity theft.349 Thus, the choice on which
standard to use may turn on the degree of uncertainty about what constitutes good-faith
compliance. 350 Such uncertainty could raise the costs for businesses seeking to guard against
potential liability. Ambiguity may also result in greater administrative costs from contested
enforcement actions, based on claims that a reasonable investigation was conducted.
In contrast, imposing a strict liability requirement would provide enforcement officials with
the lightest burden of proof for enforcement. 351 The vice and virtue of this approach would be
the chilling effect this standard may have on both the employment of undocumented aliens and
foreign-born citizens and legal aliens. A strict liability standard would draw a bright line
between the hiring of undocumented aliens and the hiring of all other authorized workers. The
approach would also underscore Congress’s commitment to deter the hiring of undocumented
aliens. However, use of this standard could result in punishing employers who acted in good
349

See COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION, supra note 336, at 6 (showing that social security certificates,
birth certificates, and driver’s licenses are easily forged and that this fraud is difficult to detect).
350
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 68, at 10–14.
351
See SHAVELL, supra note 66, at 5–17.
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faith to uphold the verification procedures, resulting in social waste from residual liability and
undermine popular support for enforcement. This danger is especially significant in the context
of victim suits or qui tam litigation, because private parties are unlikely to exercise prosecutorial
restraint in response to good-faith efforts at compliance in ways that public enforcers are more
likely to do. 352 A strict liability standard may also have a greater chilling effect on the hiring of
all foreign-born citizens and legal aliens due to employers’ efforts to minimize potential
liability. 353
Either integrating safe harbor provisions into a strict liability regime or delineating what set
of steps entail a full defense of good-faith compliance may offer the best approach to limit the
dangers of overdeterrence. 354

Employers could be required to (1) examine documents for

authenticity and preserve a record of the identification materials for a minimum of three years
after the termination of employment; (2) confirm these materials against an electronic database
of social security and/or immigration status information; and (3) record the immigration status
inquiry, the employment decision, and the date of the employment’s termination in the
immigration database. 355 Requiring employers to perform this set of obligations would be a
manageable burden, especially with access to SSA and USCIS databases under an extension of
352

In most strict liability contexts public enforcement officials implicitly have discretion to decide
what constitutes good faith compliance that should not be penalized and exercise that discretion through
nonenforcement. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 14–15 (1996) (discussing how, in practice, liability is almost always combined with a
measure of discretionary enforcement as exemplified by overinclusive drug laws).
353
See infra Part IV.D.
354
For example, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice routinely issues enforcement
guidelines that effectively create a safe harbor from enforcement. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
355
The current system requires employers merely to copy the identification materials for employees
and to retain this information until one year after the duration of employment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)
(2000). Implementing a safe harbor provision along the lines described above would be consistent with
the good-faith affirmative defense proposed in the House legislation. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong.
§§ 701(a)(7)(J), 702(1)(B)(i) (2005).
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the Basic Pilot Program and heightened document and identity protections under the Real I.D.
Act.
D. Balancing Sanctions with Concerns for Preemptive Discrimination
Another problem with the existing employer verification system is the low expected value
of sanctions that employers face. The potential sanctions range from a warning to fines starting
at $275 for a first offense and rising to a maximum of $11,000 for repeat employers of
undocumented aliens. 356 Even if private oversight dramatically increased enforcement, fines
must also increase for the expected value of violations significantly to shape corporate hiring
practices. 357 One danger of heightened fines for employing undocumented aliens is that it may
result in greater incentives for discrimination against citizens and legal aliens who appear to be
of foreign origin.

Thus, greater enforcement should be coupled with heightened

antidiscrimination protections for legal aliens and citizens of foreign origin.
Data from the initial implementation of the employer verification system in 1986 supports
the need for strengthening antidiscrimination provisions. During the first two years following
the enactment of gatekeeper liability, employers appear to have anticipated higher levels of
enforcement against employing undocumented aliens and have responded by significantly
heightening discrimination against individuals of foreign origin regardless of employment

356

Sanctions range from $275 to $2000 per alien for first-time employer offenders; $2000 to $5000
per alien for second-time offenders; and $3000 to $11,000 per alien for employers who have committed
violations on numerous occasions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000); 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.10(b)(1)(ii)(A)–
(C) (2005) (adjusted for inflation). Additional penalties of $110 to $1100 apply for violations of
verification paperwork requirements. See 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(5) (2000).
357
The expected value of sanctions must increase such that it raises the aggregate costs of employing
undocumented aliens to levels higher than employing legal aliens or citizens. This level is challenging to
determine because the wage gap and value employers place on employing undocumented aliens over their
legal counterparts may vary significantly by skill, industry, and geography.
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status. 358 After 1988, employers appear to have recognized that public enforcers were poorly
positioned to oversee employer compliance and that few enforcement actions were taking
place. 359 As a result, there was little incentive for preemptive discrimination against individuals
of apparent foreign origin, and discrimination appears to have declined commensurately. 360
To the extent that more effective oversight of employers succeeds in heightening
enforcement levels, the danger of preemptive discrimination against legal aliens and citizens of
apparent foreign origin will also increase. Existing antidiscrimination laws exclude legal aliens
from protection who are not “actively pursuing” naturalization, 361 and antidiscrimination laws do
not apply to employers of three or less employees. 362 Although the federal government should
provide incentives for the active pursuit of naturalization, making the application of

358

See, e.g., Cynthia Bansak & Stephen Raphael, Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino
Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 275, 276–80
(2001) (discussing the potential increase in employment discrimination against legal aliens who appeared
to be of foreign origin from 1986 to 1988); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-62,
IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 23 (1990);
TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION 25 (1990) (noting that the
employer sanctions regime creates “a greater incentive to comply with the sanctions provisions than with
the anti-discrimination provisions”).
359
See Medina, supra note 11, at 689–90 (arguing that declines in illegal immigration and the
employment of undocumented aliens from 1986 to 1988 were largely attributable to the large-scale
legalization of existing aliens in 1986, rather than the efficacy of the employer verification system).
360
See, e.g., Katharine M. Donato & Douglas S. Massey, Effect of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act on the Wages of Mexican Migrants, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 523, 534–36 (1993) (finding that the
employer sanctions regime had not had a lasting effect of heightened discrimination against legal aliens of
foreign origin). However, empirical studies may not fully capture the impact of employer sanctions in
encouraging discrimination based on foreign origin because such discrimination is hard to prove.
361
See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(B) (2000). The
antidiscrimination provisions extend protection to discrimination based on citizenship status for citizens
or legal aliens who demonstrate the intent to naturalize. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)–(3). Legal aliens
who do not apply for naturalization within six months of eligibility are not protected, nor are
undocumented aliens who do not receive naturalization after two years, unless they are “actively
pursuing” naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(B). Additionally, this provision exempts firms that
privilege citizen applicants over their equally qualified legal alien counterparts and government
contractors who discriminate based on citizenship status because of state orders to do so. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C).
362
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A).
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antidiscrimination laws turn on this fact appears to be arbitrary and misguided. Similarly,
policing employment decisions of small-scale employers may pose the most difficult challenges,
but legal applicants of foreign origin should receive protection in this context as well.
Admittedly, these loopholes are modest, but a more significant weakness of current
antidiscrimination protections is that the default response for employment discrimination against
legal aliens or citizens based on national origin or citizenship status is the issuance of cease and
desist orders. 363 Administrative judges also have discretion to add a modest range of financial
sanctions up to a maximum $10,000. 364

In a world of moribund enforcement against the

employment of undocumented aliens, these protections may have been adequate, but in a world
of heightened enforcement they may be far too weak to overcome the incentives to discriminate
against legal aliens.
Ideally, policymakers should attempt to have the expected value of sanctions for hiring
undocumented aliens approximate the expected value of sanctions for discriminating against
legal citizens and aliens of apparent foreign origin.

This approach would seek to place

employers in a position where discriminating against individuals of apparent origin does not
appear to be a cost-effective strategy for limiting liability exposure under the verification regime.
Although this goal sounds simple, it may prove difficult to make the expected value from both
violations approximate each other because the probabilities of enforcement may be different.
The problem is that it would likely prove far harder to establish intentional discrimination
based on apparent foreign origin than to show violations of the verification requirements. But
how much harder it would be to establish intentional discrimination than gatekeeper
noncompliance is an open question that may be hard to pin down, especially before reforms are
363
364

See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(A).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5).
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implemented. For this reason it may make sense to impose significantly higher sanctions for
intentional discrimination than for verification violations, but to set broad ranges to allow judges
to account for the need to impose stiffer penalties if preemptive discrimination occurs much
more frequently.
Application of the compensation levels for intentional discrimination laid out in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 would lead to sanctions that roughly double this article’s proposed penalty
levels for verification violations. 365 Firms with fifteen to a hundred employees face a cap of
$50,000 per violation, employers of 101 to 200 face a cap of $100,000, employers of 201 to 500
face a cap of $200,000, and a maximum of $300,000 for employers of over 500. 366 The
minimum compensation for intentional discrimination could be set at half of these levels, which
would provide significant discretion for judges in setting penalties. There is nothing special
about these particular compensation levels, but the fact that they are used in other intentional
discrimination contexts makes them form a useful benchmark.
If empirical data suggests that preemptive discrimination increases significantly in the wake
of a reform of the verification system, then allowing an adjustment to higher compensation levels
for employment discrimination may be appropriate. Setting sanctions levels is admittedly an
imprecise science at best, but this approach would represent progress both in creating more
credible deterrence through higher sanctions and a proximate symmetry of incentives.
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has shown how the enlistment of private monitors may allow public enforcers to
overcome limits in their ability to oversee gatekeepers. Private monitors may provide public
enforcers with cost-effective access to information on wrongdoing and enforcement resources to
address gatekeeper contexts where the nature and scale of both the wrongdoing and compliance
measures would otherwise be difficult to detect or confirm. Victim suits, incentives for primary
wrongdoers to report on gatekeeper violations, rewards for informants from the community, and
the enlistment of qui tam litigants present distinct costs, risks, and tradeoffs. But in narrowly
defined contexts, each of these tools may offer politically plausible and economically feasible
ways to enhance gatekeeper compliance with their duties.
The case study on immigration enforcement has shown how the enlistment of private
monitors may provide employer gatekeepers with significantly heightened incentives to comply
with their verification duties. Offering undocumented aliens the reward of legalization to inform
on their employers may seem to be a counterintuitive strategy, but this approach has the potential
of dividing the interests of employers and undocumented aliens and producing incentives for
employer compliance. Enlisting private actors, such as competitors, employees, job seekers and
other members of the community, as informants and qui tam litigants may provide other ways to
gain insider information on noncompliance and to heighten enforcement levels. Although this
approach poses costs and risks, this article has shown how it is possible to equip employers to
fulfill their obligations in a cost-effective, accurate way and how to mitigate concerns of
overdeterrence through the design of duty standards and the adoption of antidiscrimination
protections. The challenges of overseeing employer gatekeepers in the immigration context are
both stark and distinctive, but this approach may serve as a blueprint for thinking about how
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private monitors may oversee similar challenges facing the oversight of gatekeepers in other
contexts.

